Fiscal News, Uncertainty, and the Business Cycle by Pfeifer, Johannes
Fiscal News, Uncertainty, and the Business Cycle
Inaugural-Dissertation
zur Erlangung des Grades eines Doktors
der Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftswissenschaften
durch die
Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät
der Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität
Bonn
vorgelegt von
Johannes Pfeifer
aus Trier
Bonn 2012
Dekan: Prof. Dr. Klaus Sandmann
Erstreferent: Prof. Dr. Gernot Müller
Zweitreferent: Prof. Dr. Christian Bayer
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 31.01.2012
Diese Dissertation ist auf dem Hochschulschriftenserver der ULB Bonn http://hss.ulb.uni-
bonn.de/diss_online elektronisch publiziert.
Acknowledgments
I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my Ph.D. supervisor Gernot
Müller for rekindling my interest in macroeconomics after first deserting it for
empirical finance. Without his guidance, encouragement, and invaluable support the
completion of this thesis would have been unthinkable. His valuable criticism and
comments, which helped to vastly improve my research and its presentation, were
truly appreciated. While some of his directions turned out to be dead ends, I learned
a lot wandering on these paths and I am truly grateful for that.
My special gratitude goes to Christian Bayer for becoming my thesis committee
member, always lending an open ear to my questions, and providing valuable advice.
I am deeply indebted to my coauthors, Alexandra Peter (Chapter 1) and Benjamin
Born (Chapters 1 and 2), who contributed to this work. In this regard, I would
particularly like to thank my long-time office mate Benjamin, who shared the joy and
hardships of both graduate school and poor movie selection with me. You were the
best coauthor, office mate, and friend I could hope for. I am eagerly looking forward
to many joint projects still to come.
I thank Michael Evers for countless discussions that often provided an unexpected
new angle to the economic problems at hand and Patrick Hürtgen for critically
reviewing parts of this work.
Special thanks go to Urs Schweizer for developing the Bonn Graduate School of
Economics (BGSE) into the stimulating and thriving research environment whose
hospitality I have enjoyed the last 4 years and to Silke Kinzig and Pamela Mertens
for working tirelessly in the background to make the BGSE run smoothly. Financial
iii
support from the German Research Foundation (DFG) is gratefully acknowledged.
Thanks also to my fellow grad students Rafael Aigner, Inga van den Bongard,
Deniz Dizdar, Tilman Drerup, Sebastian Ebert, Andreas Esser, Patrick Hürtgen,
Stephan Kurka, Matthias Lang, Juliane Parys, Ronald Rühmkorf, Gregor Schwerhoff,
Christian Seel, Mirko Seithe, Marco Sorge, Jörn Tenhofen, Christoph Wagner, Felix
Wellschmied, and Florian Zimmermann for numerous scientific discussions and making
graduate school in Bonn such a great experience. The parties, barbecues, wine tastings,
and hiking tours were a welcome distraction from everyday research. Thank you,
Andreas, for being our personal “tour planer” and “travel guide”.
I am grateful to two special and dear groups of people. First, many thanks to the
members of our voluntary, semester-spanning “Applied Game Theory”-course. It was
a lot of fun. Thank you, Rafael, for reminding us what rivalry in consumption and
excludability of unique private goods means. I also thank Deckard Cain for providing
help with intricate identification problems arising during this course. Second, I want
to thank the participants of our regular cooking and baking parties for making me
forget the Mensa food. Without you, I would have never learned how to totally
mess up a kitchen while preparing a Thanksgiving goose, how to bake 961 Christmas
cookies in one day, how to prepare Indian food until the fuse blows, and what a
kilometer of pasta looks like. Sorry to Patrick if the food was too hot and spicy.
I want to thank Esther for her love, the wonderful time together, and for always
being there. Moreover, I am indebted to her for her constant encouragement, proof-
reading my writings, and being a valuable, diligent, and industrious coauthor.
Ganz besonders möchte ich meiner Großmutter Elisabeth danken, der ich unendlich
viel zu verdanken habe und dies viel zu selten sage und meinen Eltern, die mir immer
den Freiraum gelassen haben, meinen eigenen Weg zu gehen und mich bei allen
Entscheidungen unterstützt haben.
iv
Contents
Introduction 1
1 Fiscal News and Macroeconomic Volatility 5
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 A DSGE-Model with Fiscal Foresight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.1 Shock Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2.2 Conceptualizing Tax Shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2.3 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3 Model Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.3.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.3.2 Fixed Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.3.3 Prior Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.3.4 Posterior Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.4 Business Cycle Effects of Fiscal News . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.4.1 Variance Decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.4.2 Impulse Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Appendix to Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.A Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.B Stationary Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1.C Observation Equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.D Data Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
v
Contents
2 Policy Risk and the Business Cycle 49
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.2 Uncertainty: Potential Transmission Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.3 A DSGE-Model with Policy Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.3.1 Household Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.3.2 Labor Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.3.3 Firm Side . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.3.4 Government Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.4 Policy Risk: Time Series Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.4.1 Estimation Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.4.2 Estimation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.5 Fitting the Model to the Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.5.1 Simulated Method of Moments Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.5.2 Parameter Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.5.3 The Effects of Time-Varying Volatility . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.6 The Aggregate Effects of Policy Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.6.1 Impulse Response Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.6.2 What Drives the Response to Policy Risk? . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.6.3 Why Are the Effects of Uncertainty Small? . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Appendix to Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
2.A Data construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
2.B Econometric Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
2.C Diagnostics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3 The Business Cycle Effects of Terms of Trade Uncertainty 109
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.2 Terms of Trade Risk: Empirical Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.2.1 The Chilean Terms of Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.2.2 Terms of Trade Risk in the Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.3 A Small Open Economy Model of the Chilean Economy . . . . . . . . 120
3.3.1 Household Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.3.2 Final Good Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
vi
Contents
3.3.3 Non-tradable Intermediate Good Producers . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.3.4 Tradable Good Bundler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
3.3.5 Intermediate Tradable Good Producers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
3.3.6 Market Clearing and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
3.3.7 Monetary Policy and Exogenous Processes . . . . . . . . . . . 128
3.3.8 Model Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
3.4 The Aggregate Effects of Terms of Trade Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . 133
3.4.1 The Effects of Time-Varying Volatility . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
3.4.2 Impulse Response Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Appendix to Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
3.A Data Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
3.A.1 Terms of Trade Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
3.A.2 Moment Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
3.B Convergence Diagnostics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
3.C Misspecification Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Bibliography 153
vii

List of Figures
1.1 Intrade Daily Closing Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.2 Evolution of the Tax Rates and the Spending to GDP Ratio. . . . . . 21
1.3 Impulse Responses to Unanticipated and Anticipated Capital Tax Shocks 32
1.4 Impulse Responses to Unanticipated and Anticipated Stationary TFP
Shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.1 Time Series of Exogenous Driving Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.2 Smoothed Standard Deviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.3 Impulse Responses to a Two-standard Deviation Uncertainty Shock to
Capital Taxes, Labor Taxes, and Government Spending . . . . . . . . 74
2.4 Impulse Responses to a Two-standard Deviation Uncertainty Shock to
Monetary Policy, TFP, and Investment-specific Technology . . . . . . 75
2.5 Impulse Responses to a Joint Two-standard Deviation Policy Risk
Shock and to a Joint Technology Risk Shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.6 Impulse Responses to a Two-standard Deviation Uncertainty Shock to
Capital Taxes, Labor Taxes, and TFP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.7 Impulse Responses to a Two-standard Deviation Policy Risk Shock –
Volatile Counterfactual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2.8 Evolution of MCMC Sampler over Time for τ k . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
2.9 Evolution of MCMC Sampler over Time for τn . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
2.10 Evolution of MCMC Sampler over Time for z . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
2.11 Evolution of MCMC Sampler over Time for zI . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
ix
List of Figures
2.12 Evolution of MCMC Sampler over Time for g . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
2.13 Evolution of MCMC Sampler over Time for m . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
2.14 QQ-Plots for Model Misspecification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3.1 World Copper and Timber Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3.2 Chilean Terms of Trade 1965-2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.3 Historical Evolution of the Chilean Terms of Trade Volatility . . . . . 119
3.4 Structure of the Model Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.5 Impulse Responses to a Two-standard Deviation Terms of Trade Un-
certainty Shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
3.6 Impulse Responses to a Two-standard Deviation Terms of Trade Un-
certainty Chock – No Central Bank Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
3.7 Impulse Responses to a One-standard Deviation Terms of Trade Level
Shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
3.8 Impulse Responses to a One-standard Deviation Technology Shock –
Non-tradable Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
3.9 Export Price Index – Price Components and Basket Shares . . . . . . 148
3.10 Evolution of MCMC Sampler over Time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
3.11 QQ-plot for Model Misspecification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
x
List of Tables
1.1 Parameters Fixed Prior to Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.2 Prior and Posterior Distributions of Preference and Technology Pa-
rameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.3 Prior and Posterior Distributions of the Shock Processes . . . . . . . 38
1.4 Model and Data Moments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.5 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.2 Prior and Posterior Distributions of the Shock Processes . . . . . . . 65
2.3 Parameters Fixed Prior to Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.4 Parameters Estimated by SMM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.5 Simulated and Empirical Moments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.6 Simulated and Empirical Moments for the Model without Time-varying
Volatility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.7 Counterfactual Calibration Implying Large Uncertainty Effects . . . . 80
2.8 Simulated and Empirical Moments: Counterfactual with Stronger
Amplification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.9 GMM Estimation of Taylor Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
2.10 Tests for Heteroskedasticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
2.11 Geweke (1992) Convergence Diagnostics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
2.12 Tests for Model Misspecification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.1 Prior and Posterior Distributions of the Shock Processes . . . . . . . 118
xi
List of Tables
3.2 Parameter Values of the Theoretical Economy: Structural Parameters 130
3.3 Model and Empirical Moments: Benchmark Calibration . . . . . . . . 135
3.4 Model and Empirical Moments: No TOT Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
3.5 Convergence Diagnostics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
3.6 Tests for Model Misspecification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
xii
Introduction
The recent “Great Recession” has thrown macroeconomic research into a state
of disarray1 and has clearly shown the need to go beyond traditional business cycle
explanations. However, many of the recently proposed business cycle explanations like
news (Beaudry and Portier, 2006), noise (Blanchard, L’Huillier, and Lorenzoni, 2009),
confidence (Barsky and Sims, forthcoming), mood swings (Beaudry, Nam, and Wang,
2011), and uncertainty (Bloom, 2009) rely on factors that are not directly observed
by the econometrician. One promising way to deal with this issue of unobserved
state variables has been the use of structural estimation, where the co-movement of
observed variables in conjunction with a structural model is used for inference about
the underlying driving processes. The present work contributes to the literature
on non-traditional business cycle explanations by using structural macroeconomic
modeling and structural estimation to analyze the role of fiscal news (Chapter 1),
policy risk (Chapter 2), and terms of trade uncertainty (Chapter 3) for explaining
macroeconomic fluctuations.
Chapter 1.2 The first chapter investigates the role of news about fiscal policy,
and in particular the anticipation of tax rate changes, for macroeconomic fluctuations
in the United States. Recent macroeconomic research has started to analyze the
effects of anticipated shocks on business cycle fluctuations, but has mostly focused
on news about productivity (see e.g. Fujiwara, Hirose, and Shintani, 2011; Khan
and Tsoukalas, 2011; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2010). However, fiscal news have
1See e.g. the debate between Krugman (2009) and Cochrane (2011b).
2This chapter is based on joint work with Benjamin Born and Alexandra Peter (Born, Peter, and
Pfeifer, 2011).
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potentially an important role for explaining aggregate fluctuations for two reasons.
First, legislated fiscal measures are usually publicly debated long before they are
enacted or become effective. Second, surprise fiscal policy shocks have long been
discussed as a potential prominent driver of the business cycle (see e.g. Baxter and
King, 1993; Jones, 2002; McGrattan, 1994, 2011). The importance of surprise fiscal
shocks combined with the regular preannouncement of fiscal measures suggests that
anticipated fiscal policy shocks may be important too, because rational forward-looking
agents should react to news of an event and not only to its eventual realization.
Chapter 1 adds upon the previous literature by explicitly analyzing the business
cycle variance contribution of fiscal news about tax rates and government spending.
To deal with the problem that news shocks are not observed by the econometrician,
we resort to structural estimation of a New Keynesian DSGE model. We find that
while fiscal policy accounts for 12 to 20 percent of output variance at business cycle
frequencies, the anticipated components hardly matter for explaining fluctuations of
real variables. In contrast, anticipated capital tax shocks do explain a sizable part
of inflation and nominal interest rate fluctuations, accounting for 5 to 15 percent
of their total variance. Consistent with earlier studies, we find that news shocks
account for 20 percent of output variance, driven by news about stationary TFP and
non-stationary investment-specific technology.
Chapter 2.3 In the second chapter we analyze the role of policy risk in explaining
U.S. business cycle fluctuations. The aftermath of the financial and economic crisis is
clearly characterized by extraordinary uncertainty regarding U.S. economic policy.
Hence, the argument that policy risk, i.e. uncertainty about monetary and fiscal policy,
has been holding back the economic recovery in the U.S. during the “Great Recession”
has a large popular appeal. But the empirical literature is still inconclusive with
respect to the aggregate effects of (mostly TFP) uncertainty. Studies using different
proxies and identification schemes to uncover the effects of uncertainty produce a
variety of results.
We analyze the role of policy risk in explaining business cycle fluctuations by using
an estimated New Keynesian model featuring policy risk as well as uncertainty about
technology. To deal with the unobserved state “uncertainty”, we directly measure
3The work in this chapter, “Policy Risk and the Business Cycle”, has been conducted jointly with
Benjamin Born (Born and Pfeifer, 2011).
2
uncertainty from aggregate time series by structurally estimating a stochastic volatility
model using Sequential Monte Carlo Methods. While we find considerable evidence of
policy risk in the data, we show that the “pure uncertainty”-effect of policy risk is
unlikely to play a major role in business cycle fluctuations. In the estimated model,
output effects are relatively small due to i) dampening general equilibrium effects
that imply a low amplification and ii) counteracting partial effects of uncertainty.
Finally, we show that policy risk has effects that are an order of magnitude larger
than the ones of uncertainty about aggregate TFP.
Chapter 3. The third chapter leaves the closed economy setting of the first two
chapters and analyzes the business cycle contribution of terms of trade uncertainty.
Over the last decades, world-wide commodity and manufacturing prices have been
going through distinct periods of high and low volatility. In particular, the recent
commodity price boom and the financial crisis have been accompanied by a large
increase in price volatility. The result was a significant increase in the uncertainty
associated with international commodity prices and correspondingly the terms of
trade for many countries.
However, time variation in this variance has mostly been neglected in both public
discussions and academic research. I contribute to closing this gap by studying the
effects of terms of trade uncertainty on Chilean business cycles through the lens
of a small open economy DSGE model. As in Chapter 2, Sequential Monte Carlo
Methods are used to estimate a stochastic volatility model to deal with the latent
state “uncertainty”. My findings are fourfold. First, there is considerable evidence
for time-varying terms of trade uncertainty in the Chilean data, with the variance
of terms of trade shocks more than doubling in a short period of time. Second, I
show that the ex-ante and ex-post effects of increased terms of trade uncertainty can
account for about one fifth of Chilean output fluctuations at business cycle frequencies.
Third, I find that a two-standard deviation terms of trade risk shock, i.e. a 54 percent
increase in uncertainty, leads to a 0.1 percent drop in output. The fact that terms of
trade uncertainty more than doubled during the recent commodities boom suggests
that the contribution of terms of trade risk during this more recent period may have
been substantial. Finally, I show that the economic mechanisms that attenuated
the negative output effects of uncertainty in Chapter 2 also dampen the negative
3
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impact of terms of trade uncertainty. Both the precautionary savings motive of the
representative household and the expansionary response of the central bank mitigate
the drop in GDP.
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Chapter1
Fiscal News and Macroeconomic Volatility
1.1 Introduction
This chapter analyzes the role of news about fiscal policy, and in particular the
anticipation of tax rate changes, for business cycle fluctuations. Recent macroeconomic
research has increasingly shifted from explaining business cycle fluctuations through
contemporaneous shocks to explaining them by anticipated, or news, shocks. Rational
agents, anticipating future changes will already react today to these news (see e.g.
Beaudry and Portier, 2004, 2006; Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2009; Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe, 2010). However, most empirical studies on the effects of anticipated shocks
on business cycles have focused on news about future productivity (see e.g. Forni,
Gambetti, and Sala, 2011; Fujiwara, Hirose, and Shintani, 2011; Khan and Tsoukalas,
2011).1
This is remarkable for two reasons. First, fiscal measures are usually publicly
debated well in advance and often known before becoming effective, i.e. there are
considerable decision and implementation lags. A tax bill typically takes about
one year from the U.S. President’s initial proposal to the law’s enactment and
another year until the tax change becomes effective (Mertens and Ravn, 2011; Yang,
1There is a prominent literature branch dealing with the importance of fiscal foresight. However,
its focus has mostly been on analyzing single tax events (House and Shapiro, 2006; Parker, 1999;
Poterba, 1988) or tracing out the consequences for econometric analyses (Leeper, Walker, and
Yang, 2011; Yang, 2005).
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2005). As a recent example, consider the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(“Obamacare”), whose core contents were debated for almost one year and whose
financing provisions will only phase in gradually over time. Second, surprise fiscal
policy shocks have long been discussed as a potential prominent driver of the business
cycle (see e.g. Baxter and King, 1993; Cardia, Kozhaya, and Ruge-Murcia, 2003;
Jones, 2002; McGrattan, 1994). McGrattan (1994) for example attributes one third
of the U.S. business cycle variance to distortionary taxation, while McGrattan (2011)
argues that changes in business taxation can explain one third of the output drop
during the Great Depression.2 This potential importance of fiscal policy shocks,
combined with the fact that many fiscal policy measures are known well in advance,
makes fiscal news a natural candidate for explaining aggregate fluctuations.
We add upon the previous literature by explicitly analyzing the business cycle
variance contribution of fiscal news. For this purpose, we employ a New Keynesian
DSGE model featuring several real and nominal rigidities as well as various shocks
identified as important drivers of the business cycle and augment it with a government
sector financed through distortionary labor and capital taxes. Our main focus lies
on the effects of fiscal news, but we also control for anticipation in technology,
investment-specific productivity, and the wage markup. The model is estimated by
full information (Bayesian) methods using quarterly U.S. data from 1955 to 2006.
Model-based estimation allows us to circumvent the issue of non-invertibility typically
encountered when estimating structural VARs in the presence of anticipation effects
(Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2007; Hansen and Sargent, 1991; Leeper, Walker, and
Yang, 2011).3
Computing forecast error variance decompositions, we find that while fiscal policy
accounts for 12 to 20 percent of output variance at business cycle frequencies, fiscal
2Although Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2009) find that unanticipated tax shocks contribute little
to macroeconomic fluctuations of the Euro area, this could in principle be the result of ignoring
fiscal foresight.
3Non-invertibility means that the DGSE-model has a VARMA representation that cannot be
inverted to yield a finite-order VAR in the observables. Hence, the true innovations do not
perfectly map into the VAR residuals, meaning that the structural shocks cannot be recovered
using a VAR. Non-invertibility arises, e.g., when the information set of an econometrician
estimating the VAR is smaller than that of the forward-looking agents. For alternative ways to
mitigate this problem, see e.g. Sims (2009), Giannone and Reichlin (2006), and Forni, Gambetti,
and Sala (2011).
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news generally only plays a very limited role. Its contribution to output variance
ranges around 3 percent.
With a variance share of 10 percent at the 5 year forecast horizon, government
spending is the fiscal variable with the largest effect on output variance. However,
this contribution only comes from surprise shocks, with anticipated spending shocks
explaining virtually nothing. Contemporaneous and anticipated capital tax shocks
each contribute 2− 3 percent to output fluctuations. However, they are considerably
more important for explaining inflation and interest rate fluctuations. Depending
on the forecast horizon, surprise capital tax shocks contribute roughly 30 percent to
their variance. Anticipated capital tax shocks are responsible for 5 to 15 percent.
The effect of contemporaneous and anticipated labor taxes, on the other hand, is
negligible.
In line with previous studies that do not consider news shocks (e.g. Smets and
Wouters, 2007), we find that the main drivers of the output variance are preference
and wage markup shocks. News shocks explain on average 20 percent of the variance
of output, with the main effect coming from news about TFP and investment-specific
productivity. This result conforms well with i) VAR evidence (Barsky and Sims,
2011), ii) evidence coming from a factor model (Forni, Gambetti, and Sala, 2011),
and iii) other DSGE-based estimates of the importance of news shocks, who all find
a similar fraction of output fluctuations explained by anticipated shocks.
The two papers most closely related to ours are recent contributions by Mertens
and Ravn (forthcoming) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010). The former use a
VAR to analyze the business cycle contribution of narratively identified anticipated
and unanticipated tax shocks.4 They find that both types of tax shocks together
explain 20 to 25 percent of output variance, with anticipation accounting for the
majority. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010) evaluate the role of news about TFP,
investment-specific technology, wage markup, and government spending shocks in an
estimated RBC model with various real rigidities. In their setup, news shocks account
for 41 percent of output fluctuations. But while they find government spending
shocks to explain 10 percent, evenly distributed across surprise, one and two year
4Mertens and Ravn (forthcoming) classify the Romer and Romer (2010) tax shocks according to
the time passed between the presidential signing of a bill and the tax changes becoming effective
into anticipated and contemporaneous shocks.
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anticipated shocks, they do not consider foresight about the financing side of the
government budget constraint.
Our paper is also related to other DSGE-based papers focusing on the effects of
anticipated technology shocks. Davis (2007), using a New Keynesian model, estimates
news shocks to be responsible for 50 percent of output fluctuations. Fujiwara, Hirose,
and Shintani (2011) extend the New Keynesian model of Smets and Wouters (2007)
and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) to include news about TFP. They
estimate news shocks to explain 9 percent of output variance in the unconditional
variance decomposition. The paper of Khan and Tsoukalas (2011) uses the same basic
New-Keynesian model framework, but additionally allows for news about investment-
specific technology growth. In their estimated model, both types of news shocks
together account for less than 10 percent. Finally, Auray, Gomme, and Guo (2009)
estimate a New Keynesian model with an additional durables sector, featuring news
about TFP in both sectors. They find that technology news in the non-durables
sector explain 52% of output variance.
The outline of the chapter is the following. Section 2.2 introduces the DSGE-model
with fiscal foresight, while Section 2.3 presents the estimation approach and results.
In Section 2.4, we compute variance decompositions and impulse responses. Section
2.5 concludes.
1.2 A DSGE-Model with Fiscal Foresight
We use a medium-scale DSGE-model featuring various real and nominal frictions
as well as a variety of shocks that have been identified as important drivers of the
business cycle (see e.g. Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti, 2010a; Smets and
Wouters, 2007). We incorporate both contemporaneous and anticipated elements into
the shock processes as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010) and allow for non-stationary
shocks. We first discuss the information structure of the shock processes in the next
section before describing the model in detail.
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1.2.1 Shock Structure
Our model features 10 sources of stochastic fluctuations. On the government side,
we include shocks to labor and capital tax rates τn and τk, a shock to government
spending g, and a monetary policy shock ξR. The technology shocks considered
are shocks to stationary neutral productivity zt, non-stationary productivity Xt,
stationary investment-specific productivity zIt , and non-stationary investment-specific
productivity At. In addition, the model includes a preference shock ξpreft and a wage
markup shock µwt .
The monetary policy shock and the preference shock are assumed to only contain
a contemporaneous, unanticipated component. For the other shocks, we follow the
framework proposed by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010) and allow for both con-
temporaneous shocks and shocks that are anticipated 4 and 8 periods in advance.
Anticipation horizons of 4 and 8 quarters fulfill the aim of capturing longer anticipa-
tion horizons while keeping the state space at a manageable level. This is crucial as
each additional anticipation horizon is an additional state variable. While specifically
choosing 4 and 8 quarters of anticipation might be seen as arbitrary, this assumption
can be rationalized by the workings of the political system. Four quarters of antic-
ipation are close to the average length of a tax bill from the President’s proposal
announcement to enactment (Yang, 2005). Eight quarters serves as a plausible upper
bound for the anticipation of shocks to tax rates as Congressional elections take place
every two years. We think this makes it very unlikely that people are able to correctly
predict both the reigning majority and the tax laws being implemented by the next
Congress. The same, of course, applies to spending bills. For reasons of symmetry,
we then assume this anticipation structure for all shock processes.
The general structure for shock i, i ∈
{
τn, τ k, g, z, x, zI , a, w
}
is given by
i = ε0i,t + ε4i,t−4 + ε8i,t−8 , (1.1)
where εji,t−j, j ∈ {0, 4, 8} denotes a shock to variable i that becomes known in period
t− j and hits the economy j periods later. For example, ε4τn,t−4 denotes a four period
anticipated shock to the labor tax rate that becomes known at time t−4 and becomes
effective at time t. The shocks are assumed to have mean 0, standard deviation σji ,
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to be serially uncorrelated, and to be uncorrelated across anticipation horizons, i.e.
E(εji,t−j) = 0 and E(εki,tεli,t−j) = (σki )2 for j = 0, k = l, and 0 otherwise. Moreover,
they are uncorrelated across shock types im, in ∈ i, E(εkim,tεlin,t−j) = 0 ∀j, k, l and
im 6= in, .
The assumed information structure implies that agents foresee future shocks to
the extent of already known but not yet realized shocks εmi,t−j, m > j. The forward-
looking behavior of rational optimizing agents results in them reacting to anticipated
shocks even before they are realized. By imposing a structural model on the data, this
anticipatory behavior enables the econometrician to achieve identification. However,
it is exactly this foresight that makes identifying the shocks with a VAR impossible.
The econometrician attempting to do this only uses current and past values of the
observables and thus has a smaller information set than the agents. In particular,
he is missing the anticipated but not yet realized shocks as states in his VAR.5 To
remedy this issue, structural estimation has been advocated (Blanchard, L’Huillier,
and Lorenzoni, 2009). We will pursue this avenue in Section 1.3 by using Bayesian
methods to estimate the proposed model.
1.2.2 Conceptualizing Tax Shocks
The tax shocks considered in the present work do not necessarily stem from actual
changes in the labor and capital tax rates. Rather, they are interpreted as the
probability weighted effect of tax actions under legislative debate or due to judicative
decisions. They are the product of the likelihood of a tax change and the size of
this effect, as perceived by rational agents forming expectations about the future
path of taxes. Hence, our definition is wider than the one considered by Mertens and
Ravn (forthcoming), who restrict their attention to the shocks directly deriving from
the legislative process. Shocks deriving from e.g. the SEC suing against the legality
of a tax shelter would be excluded from their definition but not from ours.6 Note
that news shocks are distinct from pure uncertainty about future taxes. While the
5Sims (2009) shows that in some cases it may be possible to recover the shocks using a structural
VAR. By including enough lags and forward-looking variables, it may be possible to move the
non-invertible root(s) close enough to unity so that the discrepancy between true structural
errors and the estimated ones becomes small.
6This notion of tax shocks is consistent with concept of “policy expectations” in McGrattan (2011).
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former are associated with an anticipated change in the mean of the tax rate, tax
uncertainty shocks can be conceptualized as mean-preserving spreads.7
Figure 1.1: Intrade Daily Closing Prices: “Will ’Obamacare’ health care reform
become law in the United States?”
Democrats lose 
Senate seat in 
Massachusetts
Obama speach before 
Congress
Democrats unable to 
close ranks
Favorable CBO report
Anti-Abortion clause
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
21-Jan 28-Jan 4-Feb 11-Feb 18-Feb 25-Feb 4-Mar 11-Mar 18-Mar
Notes: This contract will settle (expire) at 100 ($10.00) if a health care reform bill is passed into
law before midnight ET 30 Jun 2010. It will settle (expire) at 0 ($0.00) if a health care reform bill
is not passed into law.
To fix ideas, consider the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 as
an example. On June 9, 2009, a first draft of the health care bill was released. At
that time, people at the latest could anticipate that taxes were going to rise in order
to finance the bill, if it ever passed. However, both the size and the likelihood of
such a change was largely unknown. The first point of uncertainty changed on July
13, 2009, when the Congressional Budget Office published official cost estimates: If
passed, marginal income tax rates were going to increase by 22 percentage points
for households between 100% and 400% of the poverty level.8 Taking these costs as
7For an analysis of uncertainty about fiscal policy in the context of a New Keynesian model, see
Born and Pfeifer (2011); Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011b).
8People at the poverty line would have gotten a 15,000$ subsidy to mandatory health care per
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given, households were experiencing tax shocks with changes in the likelihood of the
passage of the bill. Intrade bets on the passage of the bill show that some people
were constantly reevaluating this likelihood. Figure 1.1 presents the closing prices of
an Intrade betting contract that paid 100, if a health care reform bill was passed into
law before mid-2010 and 0 if a health care reform bill was not passed. Hence, the
closing price is a direct measure of the likelihood of a bill becoming law. There is a
large variance in the probability of passing the bill that varies with the ebb and flow
of the political process. These changes potentially act like a huge sequence of tax
shocks for households. If one considers only the change in the likelihood from the
time directly after the Massachusetts Senate election in January to the final vote of
the bill, this amounts in expectations to a tax shock of 0.7× 22% = 15.4% during
one quarter.9
1.2.3 The Model
The model economy includes four sectors: the household sector with a large
representative household, the labor market featuring a continuum of monopolistically
competitive unions selling differentiated labor services to intermediate firms, the firm
sector including a continuum of intermediate goods firms producing intermediate
goods and a final good firm bundling the intermediate goods, and the government
sector responsible for fiscal and monetary policy.
Household Sector
The economy is populated by a large representative household with a continuum of
members. Household preferences are defined over per capita consumption Ct and per
capita labor effort Lt, where each member consumes the same amount and works the
same number of hours.10 We follow Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006) and assume that
year. This subsidy would have been linearly decreasing until reaching 0$ at 400% of the poverty
line, implying that every additional dollar of income would have decreased the subsidy by 22
cents (CBO, 2009).
9Unfortunately, due to the non-availability of data for the relative price of investment, our sample
does not cover this series of events.
10Due to the symmetric equilibrium, the decisions of the household members are identical. Hence,
we suppress the subscript denoting individual members.
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household members supply their labor uniformly to a continuum of unions j ∈ [0, 1].
The unions are monopolistically competitive and supply differentiated labor services
lt(j) to intermediate goods firms. Overall, total labor supply of the representative
household is given by the integral over all labor markets j, i.e. Lt =
∫ 1
0 lt(j)dj. We
will discuss the labor market structure in detail below.
Following Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), we assume a preference specification that
allows to control the size of the wealth effect, but additionally assume habits in
consumption:
U = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtξpreft
(
Ct − φcCt−1 − γ L
1+σl
t
1 + σl
St
)1−σc
− 1
1− σc . (1.2)
Here, the parameter φc ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of internal habit persistence,
σc ≥ 0 governs the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σl ≥ 0 is related to the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and γ ≥ 0 measures the relative disutility of labor
effort.11 The term
St = (Ct − φcCt−1)σsS1−σst−1 (1.3)
makes the preferences non-separable in both consumption and work effort. This
preference specification introduces the parameter σs ∈ (0, 1] that allows to govern the
magnitude of the wealth effect on the labor supply. As special cases, the specification
nests the preference class discussed by King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988), i.e. σs = 1,
and the preferences proposed by Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988), i.e.
σs = 0, where the latter case implies a zero wealth elasticity of labor supply. We
assume the preference shock ξpreft to follow an AR(1)-process in logs:
log ξpreft = ρpref log ξpreft−1 + εpreft . (1.4)
11In a recent paper, Nutahara (2010) shows that it is important to distinguish between internal and
external habits in a model with news shocks. He finds that internal habits are able to generate
news-driven business cycles, whereas external habits are not.
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The household faces the budget constraint
Ct + zItAtIt +
Bt+1
Pt
= (1− τnt )
∫ 1
0
Wt(j)lt(j)dj +
(
1− τ kt
)
RKt utKt + Φt + Tt
+
(
1− τ kt
)
Ξt +
(
1− τ kt
)
(Rt−1 − 1) Bt
Pt
+ Bt
Pt
. (1.5)
Besides labor income from supplying differentiated labor services lt(j) at the real
wage Wt (j), the household has capital income from renting out capital services
utKt at the rental rate RKt , from receiving firm profits Ξt, and from investing in
bonds Bt+1, which are in zero net supply. Both forms of income are taxed at their
respective tax rates τnt and τ kt . Only net returns of bonds are taxed, such that the
term
(
1− τ kt
)
(Rt−1 − 1) BtPt + BtPt is the after-tax return. In addition, the government
pays lump sum transfers.
The household spends its income on consumption Ct and investment zItAtIt, where
It denotes gross investment at the price of capital goods. We assume that the relative
price of investment in terms of the consumption good is subject to two shocks, a
stationary investment-specific productivity shock zIt and non-stationary investment-
specific technological progress At (see Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell, 1997,
2000). The relative price of investment is equal to the technical rate of transformation
between investment and consumption goods. Changes in this price do not affect
the productivity of already installed capital, but do affect newly installed capital
and become embodied in it. For the non-stationary investment-specific technology
process, we assume a random walk with drift in its logarithm
logAt = logAt−1 + log µat . (1.6)
The drift term µat is subject to contemporaneous and anticipated shocks according to
log
(
µat
µa
)
= ρa log
(
µat−1
µa
)
+ ε0a,t + ε4a,t−4 + ε8a,t−8. (1.7)
The stationary investment-specific technology shock zIt follows an AR(1)-process
log zIt = ρzI log zIt−1 + ε0zI ,t + ε4zI ,t−4 + ε8zI ,t−8. (1.8)
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Depreciation allowances are an important feature of the U.S. tax code, therefore,
we also include them in our model. They are captured by the term Φt in equation
(1.5) and have the form Φt = τ kt
∑∞
s=1 δτ (1− δτ )s−1zIt−sAt−sIt−s, where δτ is the
depreciation rate for tax purposes.12 Since depreciation allowances provide new
investment with a tax shield at historical costs, they may be important in capturing
the dynamics of investment following shocks (Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin,
2011; Yang, 2005).
The household members own the capital stock Kt, whose law of motion is given by
Kt+1 =
[
1−
(
δ0 + δ1 (ut − 1) + δ22 (ut − 1)
2
)]
Kt +
1− κ2
(
It
It−1
− µI
)2 It. (1.9)
Household members do not simply rent out capital, but capital services utKt, where
ut denotes capital utilization. Thus, they decide about the intensity with which the
existing capital stock is used. However, using capital with an intensity that is higher
than normal is not costless, but leads to higher depreciation of the capital stock. This is
captured by the increasing and convex function δ (ut) = δ0+δ1 (ut − 1)+δ2/2 (ut − 1)2,
with δ0, δ1, δ2 > 0. Without loss of generality, capital utilization in steady state is
normalized to 1. Following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), we assume the
presence of investment adjustment costs S (It/It−1) = κ/2
(
It/It−1 − µI
)2
to dampen
the volatility of investment over the business cycle. κ > 0 is a parameter governing
the curvature of the investment adjustment costs and µI is the steady state growth
rate of investment, which is equal to the steady state growth rate of capital. This
specification assures that the investment adjustment costs are minimized and equal
to 0 along the balanced growth path, i.e. S = S ′ = 0 and S ′′ > 0, where the primes
denote derivatives.
The household maximizes its utility, equation (1.2), by choosing Ct, Lt, St, Bt+1,
Kt+1, ut, and It, subject to the budget constraint (1.5), the law of motion for capital
(1.9), and the resource constraint for aggregate labor given by (1.10) below.
12Following Auerbach (1989), we allow the depreciation rate for tax purposes to differ from the
physical rate.
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Labor Market
The labor market is characterized by differentiated labor services and staggered
wage setting. To model these features without letting idiosyncratic wage risk affect
the household members, and thus making aggregation intractable, we assume a
continuum of unions j, j ∈ [0, 1]. The household members supply their labor lt (j)
equally to the unions, which are monopolistically competitive and supply differentiated
labor lt (j) to intermediate firms at wage Wt (j). Every period, a union j is able
to re-optimize its wage with probability (1− θw), 0 < θw < 1. A union j that is
not able to re-optimize indexes its nominal wage to the price level according to
Wt (j)Pt = (Πt−1)χwΠ¯1−χwµytWt−1 (j)Pt−1, where the parameter χw ∈ [0, 1] measures
the degree of indexing, Π¯ is steady state gross inflation, and µyt is the gross growth
rate of output (see e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2003). Thus, in the absence of price
adjustment the wage still partly adapts to changes in productivity and inflation
(Christiano et al., 2008), thereby assuring that no current wage contract will deviate
arbitrarily far from the current optimal wage.
Household members supply the amount of labor services that is demanded at the
current wage. Unions that can reset their wages choose the real wage that maximizes
the expected utility of its members, taking into account the demand for its labor
services lt (j) = (Wt(j)/Wt)−ηw,t Lcompt , where Lcompt is the aggregate demand for
composite labor services, the respective resource constraint
Lt = Lcompt
∫ 1
0
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)−ηw,t
dj, (1.10)
and the aggregate wage level Wt =
(∫ 1
0 Wt (j)
1−ηw,t dj
) 1
1−ηw,t . The time-varying
substitution elasticity ηw,t allows us to include a wage markup shock µwt = (ηw,t−1)−1
that follows
log
(
µwt
µw
)
= ρw log
(
µwt−1
µw
)
+ ε0w,t + ε4w,t−4 + ε8w,t−8. (1.11)
Including a wage markup shock is motivated by the finding that this shock is important
for explaining output fluctuations (see e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2010; Smets
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and Wouters, 2007).
Firm Sector
A continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods firms i, i ∈ [0, 1],
produces differentiated intermediate goods Yit via a Cobb-Douglas production function,
using capital services uitKit and a composite labor bundle Lcompit
Yit = zt (uitKit)α (XtLcompit )
1−α − ψXYt , (1.12)
where α is the capital share, zt is a stationary TFP shock, Xt is a non-stationary
labor augmenting productivity process, and XYt is the trend of output defined in
Appendix 1.B. The fixed cost of production ψ is set such that profits are 0 in steady
state and there is no entry or exit (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005). The
composite labor bundle is aggregated from differentiated labor inputs Lit (j) with a
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator lcompit = [
∫ 1
0 lit(j)
ηw,t−1
ηw,t dj]
ηw,t
ηw,t−1 .
For the non-stationary labor augmenting productivity process Xt, we assume a
random walk with drift in its logarithm
logXt = logXt−1 + log µxt . (1.13)
The drift term µxt is subject to contemporaneous and anticipated shocks according to
log
(
µxt
µx
)
= ρx log
(
µxt−1
µx
)
+ ε0x,t + ε4x,t−4 + ε8x,t−8. (1.14)
Hence, in the deterministic steady state, the natural logarithm of the non-stationary
component of the neutral technology shock grows with rate µx. The stationary
technology shock zt follows an AR(1)-process with persistence ρz
log zt = ρz log zt−1 + ε0z,t + ε4z,t−4 + ε8z,t−8. (1.15)
We assume staggered price setting a la Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). Each period,
an intermediate firm i can re-optimize its price with probability (1− θp), 0 < θp < 1.
If a firm i cannot re-optimize the price, it is indexed to inflation Πt = PtPt−1 according
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to Pit+1 = (Πt)χp (Π¯)1−χpPit, where χp ∈ [0, 1] governs the degree of indexation. The
intermediate firms maximize their discounted stream of profits subject to the demand
from the final good producer, equation (1.17) below, applying the discount factor of
their owners, the household members.
The intermediate goods are bundled by a competitive final good firm to a final
good Yt using a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregation technology with substitution elasticity ηp
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Y
ηp−1
ηp
it di
) ηp
ηp−1
. (1.16)
Expenditure minimization yields the optimal demand for intermediate good i as
Yit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−ηp
Yt ∀ i. (1.17)
Government Sector
Government expenditures are financed by taxing profits and the return to capital
services at the rate τ kt and labor income at the rate τnt . Following McGrattan (1994)
and Mertens and Ravn (forthcoming), we model average tax rates as AR(2)-processes
τnt = (1− ρn1 − ρn2 ) τn + ρn1τnt−1 + ρn2τnt−2 + ε0τn,t + ε4τn,t−4 + ε8τn,t−8, (1.18)
τ kt =
(
1− ρk1 − ρk2
)
τ k + ρk1τ kt−1 + ρk2τ kt−2 + ε0τk,t + ε4τk,t−4 + ε8τk,t−8, (1.19)
where τ k, τn ∈ [0, 1) are parameters determining the unconditional mean. We are
aware that using average effective tax rates for capital and labor income may be
problematic for several reasons. First, the U.S. tax code does not allow for a clean
division between labor and capital taxation, which are theoretical constructs.13 Second,
using average effective tax rates may be particularly problematic for progressive labor
income taxes, where marginal tax rates rather than effective tax rates influence
peoples’ behavior. Nevertheless, due to data availability issues14 and comparability
with the existing literature, we follow the path set forward by Mendoza, Razin, and
13For example, the personal income tax applies to both sources of income.
14In principle, it would be desirable to e.g. use the Barro and Sahasakul (1983) average marginal
tax rates as extended by Barro and Redlick (2011). However, they are only available at annual
frequency.
18
1.2 A DSGE-Model with Fiscal Foresight
Tesar (1994), Jones (2002), and Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010) and construct
average effective tax rates for capital and labor income. While this is clearly a
simplifying assumption, it can be justified on grounds that dynamics of marginal and
average tax rates are very similar (Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar, 1994).
Government spending Gt, which may be thought of as entering the utility function
additively separable, displays a stochastic trend XGt . Log deviations of government
spending from its trend are assumed to follow an AR(1)-process
log
(
gt
g¯
)
= ρg log
(
gt−1
g¯
)
+ 0g,t + 4g,t−4 + 8g,t−8, (1.20)
where gt = GtXGt denotes detrended government spending and ρg is the persistence
parameter.
The stochastic trend in Gt is assumed to be cointegrated with the trend in output.
This assures that the output share of government spending Gt/Yt is stationary, while
at the same time allowing the trend in Gt to be smoother than the one in Yt. In
particular,
XGt =
(
XGt−1
)ρxg(
XYt−1
)1−ρxg
. (1.21)
Lump sum transfers Tt are used to balance the budget. Thus, the government
budget constraint is given by15
Gt + Tt = τnt WtL
comp
t + τ kt
(
RKt utKt + Ξt
)
− Φt. (1.22)
We close the model by assuming that the central bank follows a Taylor rule that
reacts to inflation and output growth:
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)ρR (Πt
Π¯
)φRΠ ( Yt
Yt−1
1
µy
)φRY 1−ρR exp (ξRt ) , (1.23)
where ρR is a smoothing parameter introduced to capture the empirical evidence of
gradual movements in interest rates (see e.g. Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 2000). The
parameters φRY and φRΠ capture the responsiveness of the nominal interest rate to
15Note that private bonds are in zero net supply.
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deviations of inflation and output growth from their steady state values. We assume
that the central bank responds to changes in output rather than its level as this
conforms better with empirical evidence and avoids the need to define a measure of
trend growth that the central bank can observe (see Lubik and Schorfheide, 2007).
ξRt is the i.i.d. monetary policy shock.
1.3 Model Estimation
We use a Bayesian approach as described in An and Schorfheide (2007) and
Fernández-Villaverde (2010). Specifically, we use the Kalman filter to obtain the
likelihood from the state-space representation of the model solution and the Tailored
Randomized Block Metropolis-Hastings (TaRB-MH) algorithm (Chib and Rama-
murthy, 2010) to maximize the posterior likelihood.16
1.3.1 Data
We use quarterly U.S. data from 1955:Q1 until 2006:Q4 and include twelve ob-
servable time series: the growth rates of per capita GDP, consumption, investment,
wages and government expenditure, all in real terms, the logarithm of the level of
per capita hours worked, the growth rates of the relative price of investment and
of total factor productivity, the log difference of the GDP deflator, and the federal
funds rate. Since our main objective are the effects of tax shocks, we also include
capital and labor tax rates.17 Figure 1.2 displays the evolution of the tax rates and
the government spending to GDP ratio over our sample. All three series show a
large persistence. Tests against the null hypothesis of a unit root in both tax rates
are borderline significant, while they cannot reject the null of a unit root in the
government spending to GDP ratio. As there are theoretical reasons to believe that
both the tax rates and the government spending to GDP ratio do not contain unit
roots, we treat them as stationary. However, to account for the relatively persistent
16We used a t-distribution with 10 degrees of freedom as proposal density. The posterior distribution
was computed from a 10,000 draw Monte Carlo Markov Chain, where the first 2,500 draws were
discarded as burn-in draws.
17Detailed data sources and the observation equation that describes how the empirical time series
are matched to the corresponding model variables can be found in Appendices 1.D and 1.C.
20
1.3 Model Estimation
deviations from the unconditional mean, we allow the trend in Gt to be smoother
than the one in Yt.18
Figure 1.2: Evolution of the Tax Rates and the Spending to GDP Ratio.
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n
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Notes: The top panel shows the evolution of the labor tax rate series (τn), the middle panel the
evolution of the capital tax rate series (τk), and the bottom panel the evolution of the spending to
GDP ratio (G/Y ).
1.3.2 Fixed Parameters
Prior to estimation, we fix a number of parameters to match sample means (see
Table 1.1). The curvature of the utility function σc is set to 2. This value is consistent
18We think that the government spending to GDP ratio actually displays mean reversion. Since
the end of our sample in 2006Q4, it has returned to about 20.5 in 2010 and is thus close to its
unconditional mean.
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Table 1.1: Parameters Fixed Prior to Estimation
Parameter Value Target/Motivation (matched to quarterly data)
σc 2 Common in RBC models
γ 0.0216 Set labor effort in steady state to 20%
β 0.99 Common in RBC models
δ0 0.025 Annual physical depreciation of 10%
δ1 0.0486 Set capacity utilization u = 1 in steady state
δτ 0.05 Twice the rate of physical depreciation δ0 (Auerbach, 1989)
α 0.2935 Match capital share in output
ψ 0.0432 Set profits to zero
ηp 10 Set price markup to 11% in steady state
ηw 10 Set wage markup to 11% in steady state
µy 1.0045 Match average sample growth rate of per capita output
µa 0.9957 Match average sample growth rate of relative price of investment
τn 0.1984 Match average sample labor tax rate
τ k 0.3880 Match average sample capital tax rate
G/Y 0.2031 Match average sample mean
Π¯ 1.0089 Match average sample mean
with most DSGE models. The discount factor β is fixed at 0.99. We set the parameter
that governs the disutility of labor effort γ such that labor effort in steady state is
20%. We assume an annual physical depreciation rate of 10%, which corresponds
to a δ0 of 0.025 per quarter. Following Auerbach (1989) and Mertens and Ravn
(2011), we set the depreciation rate for tax purposes δτ to twice the rate of physical
depreciation, i.e. 0.05. The depreciation parameter δ1 is fixed to set the steady state
capacity utilization to 1 (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005). The parameter
α is 0.2935, which matches the capital share in output over our sample, and the fixed
cost parameter ψ is set to ensure zero profits in steady state. We assume a steady
state price and wage markup of 11% and thus set ηp and ηw to 10.
The steady state gross growth rates of per capita output µy and of the relative
price of investment µa are set to their sample means of 1 + 0.45% and 1 − 0.43%.
The parameters τ k and τn, which determine the unconditional mean of the tax rates,
equal the post-war sample means of 0.388 and 0.1984. We set the steady state ratio of
government spending to output G/Y to 0.2031, which also corresponds to the sample
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mean. The steady state inflation rate corresponds to the average sample mean of
1.0089, i.e. annual inflation of 3.6%
1.3.3 Prior Distribution
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 present the prior distributions. Where available, we use prior
values that are standard in the literature (e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2007) and inde-
pendent of the underlying data. The autoregressive parameters of the tax processes,
ρn1 , ρ
n
2 , ρ
k
1, ρ
k
2, are essentially left unrestricted, but we impose stability of the AR(2)-
processes.19 The other autoregressive parameters, ρi, i ∈
{
pref, g, z, x, zI , a, w
}
, are
assumed to follow a beta distribution with mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.2.
We assume the standard deviations of the shocks to follow inverse-gamma distribu-
tions with prior means 0.1 and standard deviations 2. For the parameters of the
Taylor-rule, φRΠ and φRY , we impose gamma distributions with a prior mean of 1.5
and 0.5, respectively, while the interest rate smoothing parameter ρR has the same
prior distribution as the persistence parameters of the shock processes. The habit
parameter φc is assumed to be beta distributed with a prior mean of 0.7, which is
standard in the literature. Following Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010b),
the parameter determining the Frisch elasticity of labor supply σl is assumed to follow
a gamma distribution with a prior mean of 2 and a standard deviation of 0.75. The
prior distribution for the parameter governing the wealth elasticity of labor supply
σs is a beta distribution with mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.2. We impose an
inverse-gamma distribution with prior mean of 0.5 and standard deviation of 0.15 for
δ2/δ1, the elasticity of marginal depreciation with respect to capacity utilization. The
parameters governing the indexation of prices and wages, χp and χw, each are beta
distributed with mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.2. For the Calvo parameters θw
and θp we assume a beta distribution with a prior mean of 0.5, which corresponds to
price and wage contracts having an average length of half a year (Smets and Wouters,
2007). Finally, we follow the literature (e.g. Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti,
2010a; Smets and Wouters, 2007) and impose a gamma prior with mean 4 for the
19Specifically, we impose a uniform prior for each of the corresponding autoregressive roots over the
stability region (−1,+1). Let ξ1 and ξ2 be the roots of such an AR(2)-process. The autoregressive
parameters corresponding to these roots can be recovered from: ρ1 = ξ1 + ξ2 and ρ2 = −ξ1ξ2 .
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parameter controlling investment adjustment costs κ.
1.3.4 Posterior Distribution
The last four columns of Tables 1.2 and 1.3 display the mean, the standard deviation
and the 90%-posterior intervals for each of the estimated parameters. Most estimated
parameters and shock processes are in line with previous studies on the determinants
of business cycle fluctuations, both with those using only contemporaneous shocks
(e.g. Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti, 2010a; Smets and Wouters, 2007) as well
as those including contemporaneous and anticipated shocks (Fujiwara, Hirose, and
Shintani, 2011; Khan and Tsoukalas, 2011; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2010).
However, some estimates deserve further comment. We find a considerable degree
of internal habits with φc = 0.86, which is right between the estimates obtained by
Smets and Wouters (2007) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010). The posterior mean
of the parameter governing the wealth elasticity (σs = 0.1) implies a relatively low
wealth elasticity of labor supply and, thus, preferences that are close to the ones
proposed by Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988).20 Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2010) find an even lower wealth elasticity of almost zero. Khan and Tsoukalas (2011),
on the other hand, estimate the wealth elasticity of labor to be quite high at 0.85.
A possible explanation for these differing estimates is the inclusion of government
spending as an observable. Increases in government spending may entail positive
consumption responses (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés,
2007), a behavior which can be explained by a New-Keynesian model with a low
wealth elasticity (Monacelli and Perotti, 2008). Even in studies finding a negative
consumption response (see e.g. Ramey, 2011), this negative response tends to be
relatively small or hardly distinguishable from 0, also suggesting the presence of
a low wealth effect. Including government spending as an observable restricts the
parameter governing the wealth elasticity to a low value. In our model, this happens
although the consumption response to a government spending shock is estimated to
be negative. On the other hand, without the observable government spending as in
Khan and Tsoukalas (2011), this parameter remains mostly unrestricted with regard
20Note, however, that in the presence of habits, even a value of σs = 0 still implies the presence of
a wealth effect, see Monacelli and Perotti (2008).
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to the effects of government spending on consumption.21
Turning to the nominal rigidities in our model, we find that prices are on average
adjusted about every three quarters, while the Calvo parameter for wages implies a
high degree of wage stickiness. The degree of price indexation is low (χp = 0.06) and
in a similar range as in Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2011). Wages, on the
other hand, are indexed to inflation with a higher proportion than prices (χw = 0.6),
which corresponds well with the estimates in Smets and Wouters (2007).
The parameters of the Taylor rule are in line with previous estimates (e.g. Clarida,
Galí, and Gertler, 2000). They imply a high degree of interest rate smoothing
(ρR = 0.86), a strong response to inflation (φRΠ = 2.96), and a moderate value for
the standard deviation of the monetary policy shock (σR = 0.251%).
With the exception of the non-stationary technology shock, all shocks are estimated
to be highly persistent, with AR(1)-coefficients ranging from 0.94 for the government
spending shock to 0.99 for the preference, the stationary technology, and the non-
stationary investment-specific technology shock. The non-stationary productivity
component has a relatively low serial correlation of 0.34, a value commonly found in
the literature (e.g. Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti, 2011).
The contemporaneous shock as well as the 4 quarter anticipated non-stationary
technology shock have relatively low standard deviations of 0.04% and 0.03%, re-
spectively, whereas the two year anticipated shock is the most important one with a
standard deviation of 0.6%. A similar pattern emerges for the stationary technology
shock. In this case, however, the standard deviation of the unanticipated component
has a similar size as the 8 quarter anticipated component, 0.74% and 0.73%, whereas
the 4 quarter anticipated shock is less important with a standard deviation of 0.18%.
Examining investment-specific technology shows that investment-specific growth
displays the same pattern as neutral technology growth. The shock with the longest
anticipation horizon is the most important one, having the highest standard deviation
(σ8a = 0.14%), albeit in this case it is only slightly higher than the one for the
contemporaneous shock (σ0a = 0.11). The 4 quarter anticipated shock, on the other
hand, is negligible (σ4a = 0.04%). In contrast, for stationary investment-specific
technology anticipation does not play a role, the standard deviations are less than
21A small wealth effect also helps in explaining the empirical behavior of labor market variables
(Galí, Smets, and Wouters, 2011).
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0.05%, while the unanticipated stationary shock component has a higher standard
deviation than the unanticipated non-stationary investment-specific technology shock
(σ0zI = 0.31%).
Another shock, where the anticipated shock components are negligible, is the wage
markup shock. While the standard deviation of the unanticipated shock is relatively
high, the anticipated shocks have very low standard deviations that are below 0.04%.
In contrast, the surprise wage markup shock has a high standard deviation of almost
46%, which is consistent with evidence from Smets and Wouters (2007) and Galí,
Smets, and Wouters (2011), who showed this shock to be the most important driver
of business cycles.22
Next, we direct our focus to the fiscal policy shock processes. Both tax processes
show a very high persistence, with the roots of the autoregressive processes implying
autoregressive parameters of ρn1 = 0.770, ρn2 = 0.228, ρk1 = 1.604, and ρk2 = −0.605,
respectively.23 The posterior estimates suggest that for government spending and
labor taxes fiscal foresight is rather limited. The unanticipated government spending
shock has a volatility of 3%, a value also found by Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010).
The volatilities of the anticipated shock components, on the other hand, are rather
small, σ4g = 0.03% and σ8g = 0.04%. A similar pattern emerges for the labor tax
process τnt . The shock with the largest volatility is the unanticipated component ε0τn,t
with 0.48%, while the anticipated components have a similar size as the anticipated
government spending shocks. Only for the capital tax rate, news shocks display
a higher standard deviation. Particularly, compared to the shocks to the labor
tax process, the shocks εiτk,t−i to the capital tax process τ kt display a much higher
volatility. The unanticipated component ε0τk,t has the highest standard deviation of
0.92%, while the anticipated components have smaller, but still sizeable standard
deviation, σ4τk = 0.46% and σ8τk = 0.65%.
Table 1.4 compares empirical moments of the data to the corresponding moments
22Note that the shock applies to the net markup so a 46% shock increases the markup from 11% to
about 16%. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2009) point out that wage markup shocks cannot be
distinguished from labor supply shocks. For policy makers this distinction matters, since both
shocks entail different policy implications (Galí, Smets, and Wouters, 2011). However, as we are
not interested in optimal policy, it is not important to identify the two shocks separately.
23The high persistence of the labor tax rate has, for example, been documented in Cardia, Kozhaya,
and Ruge-Murcia (2003).
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from the model. Overall, the model is able to replicate the sample moments fairly
well.
1.4 Business Cycle Effects of Fiscal News
We are now in a position to analyze the dynamic effects of fiscal news. Given
the estimated deep parameters of the model, we compute forecast error variance
decompositions to trace out the shocks’ contributions to business cycle volatility.
To better understand the dynamic effects of news shocks, we then analyze their
transmission into the economy in Section 1.4.2.
1.4.1 Variance Decomposition
Results
We use our estimated model to analyze the quantitative importance of the different
anticipated and surprise shocks for explaining business cycles. To this end, we
compute conditional and unconditional forecast error variance decompositions for the
growth rates of output, consumption, investment, hours, wages, the Federal funds
rate, and inflation (see Table 1.5).24
Overall, we find that news shocks on average explain between 10 and 30 percent of
the variance of the variables considered. However, fiscal foresight only plays a very
limited role. Of the three types of fiscal foresight we consider, only the anticipated
capital tax shock has a sizeable variance contribution. While news about future capital
taxes contribute only 2 percent to output growth variance, they matter for inflation
and interest rate variability, explaining more than 10 percent of the variability of
inflation and interest rates at forecast horizons longer than three years. This makes
them the third largest source of inflation and interest rate volatility, only behind
preference and unanticipated capital tax shocks. Together, surprise and anticipated
capital tax shocks explain around 40 to 50 percent of inflation and interest rate
24For ease of exposition we have combined the two anticipated shock components into one and
left out three anticipated shocks (stationary investment-specific, wage markup, and government
spending) that each contributed less than 0.01 percent to the variance of the variables.
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fluctuations. In contrast, news about labor tax and government spending shocks
explain at most 0.01 percent of the variance of any of the seven variables considered.
More important than fiscal foresight are the surprise components of the fiscal
variables. As already noted, besides the preference shock, the surprise capital tax
shock is the most important factor for the variance of the Federal funds rate and
inflation. Moreover, it accounts for 2 to 3 percent of output fluctuations. While the
surprise government spending shock ε0g accounts for almost 10 percent of the output
growth variance at the five year horizon and even more at shorter horizons, it hardly
contributes anything to the other variables’ fluctuations.
Whereas fiscal foresight seems to be of only minor importance for the fluctuations
of output, consumption, and investment, other news shocks contribute significantly
to their variance. The news shocks that matter most are news about stationary
technology, which account for 8 to 12 percent of the variance of output and consump-
tion. News about non-stationary technology mostly affects the volatility of wages,
predominantly at long horizons. At the five year horizon, it is the single most impor-
tant factor affecting wage volatility. News about non-stationary investment-specific
technology explain around 8 percent of the variance of investment at all horizons
and about the same amount of the variance of hours (at the five year horizon). In
contrast, the news components of stationary investment-specific technology and the
wage markup shock account for at most 0.01 percent of the variance of any variable
we consider.
In general, the importance of news shocks increases at longer forecast horizons.
E.g., anticipated shocks account for a larger share of output volatility at the five year
horizon (21%) than at the one year horizon (11%).
Turning to the surprise shocks, we find the most important drivers of business
cycles to be wage markup, preference, and unanticipated technology shocks. At
business cycle frequencies, these shocks combined explain about 60 to 70 percent of
the fluctuations of real variables. E.g., at the 20 period forecast horizon, these three
shocks account for 31, 21, and 16 percent of output volatility, respectively. Inflation
and interest rate variability are mostly explained by preference and capital tax
shocks, whereas wage fluctuations are mainly driven by technology shocks, especially
anticipated non-stationary technology shocks. Lastly, the monetary policy shock
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plays a minor role in accounting for macroeconomic fluctuations, a result similar to
Smets and Wouters (2007). It explains around 15 percent of the Federal funds rate
volatility, but only at the short term, i.e. horizons of about one year, and has much
smaller contributions for the other variables.
Discussion
Using a DSGE-based estimation approach to determine the importance of news
about fiscal policy, we find that fiscal foresight only plays a minor role in explaining
business cycle fluctuations. Specifically, using full information Bayesian estimation
and accounting for different kinds of shocks, we find tax shocks and, in particular,
news about taxes to explain less than 3 percent of output growth fluctuations. This
compares to about 25 percent in the VAR study of Mertens and Ravn (forthcoming),
indicating that the rigid anticipation structure and the strict exogeneity assumption
in the latter paper may be problematic (see also Leeper, Walker, and Yang, 2011).
Our estimates also attribute less than one third of output fluctuations to surprise
tax shocks, which was found by McGrattan (1994). However, her paper only featured
TFP, government spending, and tax rate shocks. In contrast, our analysis features a
richer set of shocks commonly thought to be essential for explaining business cycles
(Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan, 2007; Smets and Wouters, 2007).
Regarding the evidence on the effects of news shocks on the business cycles, our
result of 10 to 30 percent of the variance of output growth being attributable to
anticipated shocks squares well with the evidence found by Forni, Gambetti, and Sala
(2011) and Barsky and Sims (2011). Using a factor model, Forni, Gambetti, and Sala
(2011) find that around 20 percent of output volatility is explained by technology
and 10 percent by news about technology, while Barsky and Sims (2011), in a VAR,
attribute 10 to 40 percent to news shocks.
Fujiwara, Hirose, and Shintani (2011) and Khan and Tsoukalas (2011), using an
estimated DSGE model with nominal rigidities, find a technology news contribution
to output variance of 8.5 and 1.6 percent, respectively, which is lower than our
own estimates. On the other hand, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010) find that news
about technology account for as much as 41 percent of output variance. Part of this
higher number can be attributed to the absence of nominal rigidities in their model
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(Khan and Tsoukalas, 2011). Overall and consistent with these studies, news shocks
contribute a higher share to the unconditional variance of nominal variables (wages,
inflation, interest rate) than to the variance of real variables (output, consumption,
investment, hours). However, allowing anticipation not only for TFP but also for
other shocks, leads to a higher relative contribution of news shocks. Whereas the
contribution of anticipated shocks in the study by Fujiwara, Hirose, and Shintani
(2011) ranges from 4 percent (to the variance of investment) to 15 percent (to inflation
volatility), we find contributions of anticipated shocks (combining all shocks) between
19 percent (investment and consumption volatility) and 52 percent (variance of
wages).
Turning to the role of unanticipated shocks, we see that while the investment-
specific technology shock has been identified as an important driver of business cycles
by previous studies (Davis, 2007; Fisher, 2006; Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti,
2010a), it is of lesser importance in our case and contributes a smaller fraction to
fluctuations than TFP shocks. The contributions of non-stationary investment-specific
productivity vary between 5 and 15 percent, whereas stationary investment-specific
technology explains hardly 1 percent. The difference to the previous studies finding
the high contribution of investment-specific technology stems from our decision to
include the relative price of investment as an observable. Recent studies including
the relative price of investment as an observable find similarly small contributions of
investment-specific technology (Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti, 2011; Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe, 2010).25 However, we have to stress that both the stationary as well
as the non-stationary investment-specific productivity shock pertain to the relative
price of investment and are accordingly mapped to this observable.26 Thus, our
stationary investment-specific technology shock is not directly comparable to the
stationary investment-specific technology shock in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010).
This could explain the starkly differing results regarding the effects of this particular
shock for output and investment fluctuations, 30 to 60 percent in their case vs. less
than 1 percent in our case.
25Models that do not use the relative price of investment as an observable variable usually imply
wrong moments for this series (Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti, 2011). When this problem is
eliminated, the variance contribution of investment-specific technology shocks tends to disappear.
26The observation equation in Appendix 1.C shows the exact mapping.
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1.4.2 Impulse Responses
In order to better understand what drives the results of the previous section, we
analyze the impulse responses to stationary TFP shocks and to capital tax rate shocks.
We choose to focus on these shocks as they are the technology and fiscal policy shock,
respectively, where the anticipated component contributes most to business cycle
variance.27
Figure 1.3 shows the impulse responses to an unanticipated (solid line) and an
eight period anticipated (dashed line) one percentage point cut of the capital tax
rate.28 The top left panel shows the impulse response for the capital tax rate that is
shocked. The actual response of the exogenous capital tax rate is the same after the
surprise and anticipated tax shock, because the only difference between the two cases
is the time at which the tax change that happens at t = 0 is known. But the other
variables react differently, because with anticipation the future realization of the tax
rate is already known at t = −8 and agents immediately start to optimally respond
to this information.
First, consider the solid line representing the impulse responses to a surprise 1
percentage point decrease in the capital tax rate. This tax cut acts expansionary and
leads to an increase in output, investment, and consumption on impact. The effect is
quite large due to the strong estimated persistence of the shock process. Consistent
with the evidence of high multipliers for tax rates (Mountford and Uhlig, 2009; Romer
and Romer, 2010), an initial 1 percentage point decrease in the capital tax rate leads
to a peak output response of 1.25 percent. Labor and capital services increase in a
hump shaped manner after the realization. For capital services, this is driven by the
higher after-tax rental rate that can be earned after the tax cut. Note that the gross
value of the rental rate decreases, reflecting the decreased tax wedge. The increase
27Although we find the preference and wage markup shocks to be the most important drivers of
business cycles, we omit analyzing their impulse responses as their importance and behavior is
already well understood (see e.g. Galí, Smets, and Wouters, 2011; Smets and Wouters, 2007).
The impulse responses to a government spending news shock are very similar to the ones in
Ramey (2011), albeit the negative response of private consumption is more persistent in our
setup.
28For the surprise shock, this roughly corresponds to a one standard deviation shock as σ0τk = 0.923%.
For the eight period anticipated shock, σ8τk = 0.645%, so that we have re-scaled the size of this
shock to make both shocks comparable. Note that the impulse responses are semi-elasticities, i.e.
they are measured in percent of the steady state values of the corresponding variables.
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Figure 1.3: Impulse Responses to Unanticipated and Anticipated Capital Tax Shocks
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Notes: solid line: impulse responses to an unanticipated 1 percentage point cut of the capital tax
rate τk; dashed line: impulse responses to an eight period anticipated 1 percentage point cut of the
capital tax rate τk that becomes known at t = −8 and effective at t = 0. All impulse responses are
semi-elasticities and measured in percent. Inflation and the policy rate are measured as gross rates
so that the responses can be interpreted as percentage point changes.
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in capital services also raises the marginal product of labor, leading to an initial
jump in the real wage as a fraction of unions is able to reset wages in the current
period and to a further rise over time when additional unions are able to reset their
nominal wages. The initial increase of the real wage is amplified by an overshooting
of the nominal wage, which is indexed to past inflation, due to a drop in inflation.
Current inflation falls due to the positive supply side effect of the tax decrease. This
positive effect on inflation is also the reason why the policy rate falls considerably,
accommodating the expansion and further fueling investment and consumption.
Although the impulse responses for the eight period anticipated tax shock look very
similar, there are two major differences. First, agents have more time to adjust and
already react during the anticipation phase. Hence, the impulse responses are now
more drawn out. Reacting immediately to an anticipated tax shock is optimal for
the agents, because the estimated degrees of consumption habits, capital adjustment
costs, capital utilization, and nominal rigidities imply that large abrupt changes in
important choice variables are welfare reducing and must be avoided. As a result of
these more gradual and hence more resource-saving responses, the peak responses of
all variables are now higher than for the case of a comparable surprise tax cut and
generally occur earlier relative to the shock realization at t=0. Note that relative
to the announcement of the shocks, i.e. the point in time where the horizon for the
forecast error variance decomposition starts,29 the peak responses generally occur
later for the news shocks. This peak response at later horizons for news shocks
explains why their importance in the forecast error variance decomposition tends to
be larger at later horizons.
Second, in contrast to the unanticipated shock, agents now substitute labor services
for capital services, leading to an immediate increase in the former and a decrease
in the latter. Only when the tax shock realizes, there is a jump in capital services.
The higher production resulting from the increase in labor services and the resources
saved through the initially lower depreciation resulting from the weaker capital use
allows to increase consumption during the anticipation phase. The net result of this
substitution of labor for capital services with the simultaneous increase in consumption
and investment expenditures is a slight inflationary pressure in the first period. As a
29I.e. t=-8 for the anticipated shock and t=0 for the surprise shock.
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response, the central bank somewhat tightens its policy. However, the negative supply
side effect of the input substitution subsides with the subsequent further increase in
labor supply. This increase is driven by the household’s desire to increase the physical
capital stock through investment while also keeping up consumption. As a result,
inflationary pressures abate and give room to an accommodating policy stance.
Note that physical investment in the capital stock slightly decreases initially. This
behavior is due to the depreciation allowances, whose present value for new investment
decreases with the future tax bill from which it is deducted. But, in contrast to
the results of Mertens and Ravn (2011), this incentive to disinvest is rather mild.
Hence, in our estimated model, the announcement of a tax cut is insufficient to
generate the investment-driven slump during the anticipation phase of a tax cut
found in their model. This difference can be explained by the different estimation
procedures used. Mertens and Ravn (2011) rely on an impulse response matching
technique, where the empirical impulse responses were derived from a VAR using a
narrative identification scheme. The impulse responses to be matched by the model
were only the ones to anticipated and unanticipated labor and capital tax shocks.
In contrast, our estimation uses full information techniques and thus tries to match
all moments given the full set of exogenous driving forces of the model. While the
crucial investment adjustment cost and capital utilization cost parameters are actually
estimated to generate a drop in investment as in Mertens and Ravn (2011), it is
the monetary policy response that dampens this drop. When setting the output
coefficient in the Taylor rule to 0 and the inflation response to 2, the investment
response becomes stronger and leads to an initial drop in output with a subsequent
boom. This indicates the importance of controlling for the stance of monetary policy
when tracing out the effects of fiscal shocks.30
Figure 1.4 displays the impulse responses to one standard deviation surprise (solid
line) and anticipated (dashed line) stationary TFP shocks.31 The result of a surprise
increase in total factor productivity is a prolonged boom driven by both consumption
and investment. Consistent with a typical supply side shock, inflation decreases
considerably with the central bank lowering the policy rate by 20 basis points in
30On this issue, see also Leeper (2010).
31We scaled the news shock by 1.03 to have exactly the same standard deviation as the surprise
shock.
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Figure 1.4: Impulse Responses to Unanticipated and Anticipated Stationary TFP
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Notes: solid line: impulse responses to an unanticipated one standard deviation increase in stationary
TFP z; dashed line: impulse responses to an eight period anticipated one standard deviation increase
in stationary TFP z that becomes known at t = −8 and effective at t = 0. All impulse responses
are semi-elasticities and measured in percent. Inflation and the policy rate are measured as gross
rates so that the responses can be interpreted as percentage point changes. 35
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response. This in turn leads to an increase in the real wage and a subsequent increase
in the labor services used.
For the eight period anticipated increase in technology, we observe an immediate
increase in output, investment, and consumption during the anticipation phase due
to the entailed wealth effect. This boom occurs already before the technology has
actually increased and is fueled by a rise in both capital and labor services.32 In this
regard, the response differs from the response to an anticipated capital tax shock,
where a substitution of capital services for labor services is observed. The reason for
the difference is that, for the anticipated TFP shock, agents have a stronger incentive
to increase investment during the anticipation phase. In contrast, for the anticipated
capital tax shock, investment falls slightly on announcement due to the decrease in
the present value of the depreciation allowances.
Lastly, to better understand the contribution of capital tax and stationary TFP
shocks to business cycle variance, it is worth comparing the relative size and persistence
of the impulse responses of output, inflation, and the nominal interest rate to these
shocks. As can be seen from the the upper right panels of Figures 1.3 and 1.4, the
peak response of output to an average TFP shock is about 80% higher than to an
average capital tax shock, although the latter is somewhat more persistent.33 This
difference in the size of the output responses explains why stationary TFP shocks are
more important for the volatility of output than capital tax shocks. In contrast, both
the inflation and the policy rate responses to capital tax shocks have higher peaks
and show more persistence. In particular, the average surprise TFP shock leads to a
peak reduction in the nominal interest rate of -0.2%, while the average surprise tax
shock leads to a drop of -0.4%. As this larger response is also more persistent, the
difference in response sizes explains why capital taxes are rather important for the
variance of inflation and the nominal interest rate, while they are less important for
explaining output variance.
32This observation is consistent with Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), who show theoretically that
a low estimated wealth elasticity of labor supply facilitates positive comovement of output,
consumption, and hours in response to TFP news.
33Note also that the average anticipated capital tax shock is roughly 40% smaller than the one
depicted due to re-scaling.
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1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we analyzed the contribution of fiscal foresight about labor and
capital tax rates and government spending to business cycle volatility in an estimated
New Keynesian DSGE model. Computing forecast error variance decompositions, we
found that fiscal foresight only plays a limited role for business cycle fluctuations. Its
variance contribution was mostly confined to inflation and interest rate fluctuations,
where anticipated capital tax shocks were responsible for between 5 and 15 percent
of the total variance.
Our results show that accounting for fiscal foresight does not qualitatively alter
the importance of traditional business cycle factors like technology, wage markup,
and preference shocks (see e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2007).
Structural estimation always runs the risk of misspecifying the underlying model
structure. Hence, future work should test whether the results obtained here are
robust against the specification of different fiscal rules where taxes respond to debt
and possibly output as in Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010) and Forni, Monteforte,
and Sessa (2009). Similarly, it might be worthwhile to explore the effects of a more
detailed modeling of the U.S. tax code as suggested by McGrattan (2011). However,
given the need for non-linear modeling and filtering required in this case and the
typically large state space of models with anticipation effects, estimating the effects
of fiscal news in such a model will be an extremely challenging computational task.
Finally, the role of the information structure assumed in the present work should
be further scrutinized as the particular choice of information structures may matter
(Leeper and Walker, 2011).
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Appendix to Chapter 1
1.A Tables
Table 1.2: Prior and Posterior Distributions of Preference and Technology Parameters
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Distribution Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 5 % 95 %
φc Beta 0.7 0.1 0.858 0.014 0.834 0.880
σl Gamma 2 0.75 3.410 0.452 2.704 4.132
σs Beta 0.5 0.2 0.101 0.023 0.069 0.137
κ Gamma 4 1.5 4.860 0.425 4.128 5.526
δ2/δ1 Inv.-Gamma 0.5 0.15 0.280 0.023 0.243 0.316
χw Beta 0.5 0.2 0.590 0.069 0.486 0.704
χp Beta 0.5 0.2 0.059 0.024 0.022 0.098
θw Beta 0.5 0.2 0.938 0.006 0.927 0.948
θp Beta 0.5 0.2 0.662 0.009 0.646 0.676
Table 1.3: Prior and Posterior Distributions of the Shock Processes
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Distribution Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 5 % 95 %
Preference Shock
ρpref Beta 0.5 0.2 0.991 0.003 0.987 0.996
σpref Inv.-Gamma 0.1 2 40.383 11.382 22.511 57.325
Wage Markup Shock
ρw Beta 0.5 0.2 0.976 0.006 0.967 0.986
σ0w Inv.-Gamma 0.1 2 45.692 7.160 34.538 58.147
σ4w Inv.-Gamma 0.1 2 0.037 0.018 0.020 0.058
σ8w Inv.-Gamma 0.1 2 0.032 0.017 0.023 0.045
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Prior and Posterior Distributions of the Shock Processes - Continued
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Distribution Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 5% 95%
Stationary Technology Shock
ρz Beta 0.5 0.2 0.994 0.004 0.989 0.999
σ0z Inv.-Gamma 0.1 2 0.738 0.043 0.663 0.806
σ4z Inv.-Gamma 0.1 2 0.178 0.161 0.024 0.394
σ8z Inv.-Gamma 0.1 2 0.730 0.047 0.648 0.804
Non-stationary Technology Shock
ρx Beta 0.5 0.2 0.336 0.059 0.245 0.438
σ0x Inv.-Gamma 0.1 2 0.040 0.024 0.024 0.061
σ4x Inv.-Gamma 0.1 2 0.034 0.015 0.021 0.047
σ8x Inv.-Gamma 0.1 2 0.601 0.028 0.554 0.645
Stationary Investment-Specific Productivity Shock
ρzI Beta 0.5 0.2 0.968 0.019 0.942 0.992
σ0zI Inv.-Gamma 0.1 2 0.313 0.021 0.274 0.342
σ4zI Inv.-Gamma 0.1 2 0.034 0.015 0.025 0.053
σ8zI Inv.-Gamma 0.1 2 0.037 0.017 0.023 0.053
Non-stationary Investment-Specific Productivity Shock
ρa Beta 0.5 0.2 0.986 0.0062 0.9766 0.996
σ0a Inv.-Gamma 0.1 2 0.114 0.011 0.095 0.130
σ4a Inv.-Gamma 0.1 2 0.036 0.013 0.020 0.056
σ8a Inv.-Gamma 0.1 2 0.139 0.013 0.117 0.160
Taylor Rule and Monetary Policy Shock
ρR Beta 0.5 0.2 0.865 0.009 0.851 0.879
φRΠ Gamma 1.5 3 2.958 0.107 2.779 3.126
φRY Gamma 0.5 3 0.314 0.050 0.235 0.402
σR Inv.-Gamma 0.1 2 0.251 0.011 0.234 0.268
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Prior and Posterior Distributions of the Shock Processes - Continued
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Distribution Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 5% 95%
Government Spending Shock
ρg Beta 0.5 0.2 0.940 0.017 0.912 0.968
ρxg Beta 0.5 0.2 0.912 0.102 0.864 0.984
σ0g Inv.-Gamma 0.1 2 3.024 0.124 2.815 3.217
σ4g Inv.-Gamma 0.1 2 0.033 0.012 0.025 0.044
σ8g Inv.-Gamma 0.1 2 0.038 0.023 0.025 0.058
Labor Tax Shock
ξn1 Uniform 0 0.577 -0.228 0.046 -0.313 -0.164
ξn2 Uniform 0 0.577 0.998 0.001 0.997 0.999
σ0τn Inv.-Gamma 0.1 2 0.476 0.019 0.441 0.503
σ4τn Inv.-Gamma 0.1 2 0.037 0.018 0.024 0.051
σ8τn Inv.-Gamma 0.1 2 0.032 0.015 0.023 0.044
Capital Tax Shock
ξk1 Uniform 0 0.577 0.605 0.147 0.574 0.999
ξk2 Uniform 0 0.577 0.999 0.144 0.634 0.999
σ0τk Inv.-Gamma 0.1 2 0.923 0.045 0.856 0.997
σ4τk Inv.-Gamma 0.1 2 0.460 0.044 0.386 0.531
σ8τk Inv.-Gamma 0.1 2 0.645 0.046 0.571 0.721
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Table 1.4: Model and Data Moments
Model Data Model Data Model Data
ρ(xt, yt) σ(xt) ρ(xt, xt−1)
∆ log (Yt) 1 1.00 0.02 0.01 0.88 0.28
∆ log (Ct) 0.631 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.88 0.21
∆ log (AtIt) 0.89 0.69 0.09 0.02 0.96 0.52
∆ log (At) -0.1792 -0.13 0.01 0.00 0.91 0.49
∆ log (TFPt) 0.1669 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.18
log (Rt) 0.1453 -0.19 0.11 0.01 1.00 0.96
log (Πt) 0.0575 -0.29 0.04 0.01 0.99 0.85
Notes: Time Series xt are the growth rates of output (∆ log (Yt)), consumption (∆ log (Ct)),
investment (∆ log (AtIt)), investment-specific technology (∆ log (At)), TFP (∆ log (TFPt)), the
level of the net nominal interest rate (log (Rt)), and the level of net inflation (log (Πt)).
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Table 1.5: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition(in %)
Pref./Wage Markup Technology Policy
ξpref ε0w ε
0
z ε
4,8
z ε
0
x ε
4,8
x ε
0
zI ε
0
a ε
4,8
a ξ
R ε0g ε
0
τn ε
4,8
τn ε
0
τk ε
4,8
τk
4 Periods
GDP 5.00 35.26 24.03 7.98 0.01 0.65 0.27 1.96 2.09 1.48 18.43 0.46 0.00 2.11 0.25
Cons. 18.93 44.73 16.30 11.58 0.02 2.99 0.07 0.87 0.84 0.31 0.05 1.06 0.01 1.49 0.76
Invest. 37.59 17.99 20.53 3.63 0.00 0.00 0.41 7.75 7.91 2.08 0.04 0.09 0.00 1.86 0.12
Hours 3.29 48.73 4.29 7.96 0.03 0.84 0.07 9.48 5.61 4.11 8.91 0.66 0.00 0.13 5.89
Wages 7.39 2.65 50.01 3.35 0.65 0.09 0.12 8.72 5.51 1.71 0.18 0.05 0.00 17.58 1.99
FFR 16.46 2.39 17.85 1.10 0.00 0.20 0.01 5.62 9.99 15.01 0.75 0.00 0.00 29.51 1.11
Infl. 19.15 6.82 25.09 0.53 0.00 0.08 0.03 4.24 8.05 2.04 0.17 0.03 0.00 31.75 2.02
8 Periods
GDP 11.18 35.13 20.52 9.54 0.01 0.68 0.26 1.83 2.75 1.04 12.76 0.44 0.00 2.96 0.90
Cons. 15.94 46.39 16.20 12.43 0.02 3.16 0.08 0.79 0.74 0.26 0.04 1.10 0.01 1.76 1.08
Invest. 41.33 18.32 15.61 5.40 0.00 0.03 0.35 6.19 7.88 1.29 0.02 0.09 0.00 2.76 0.72
Hours 8.78 52.59 6.56 9.78 0.01 0.98 0.13 6.64 5.49 1.78 2.87 0.68 0.00 0.61 3.09
Wages 6.53 2.41 44.66 11.78 0.53 0.52 0.12 7.65 4.77 1.52 0.16 0.05 0.00 15.14 4.15
FFR 21.19 3.23 12.88 0.86 0.00 0.22 0.01 4.50 10.55 5.54 0.42 0.00 0.00 35.54 5.06
Infl. 22.27 7.10 17.80 1.90 0.00 0.07 0.02 3.01 6.82 1.39 0.15 0.03 0.00 31.29 8.14
20 Periods
GDP 21.15 30.89 16.43 9.13 0.01 0.98 0.21 1.58 3.44 0.87 9.89 0.39 0.00 2.89 2.12
Cons. 19.72 44.09 14.88 11.98 0.02 3.14 0.08 0.72 0.84 0.23 0.04 1.06 0.01 1.80 1.37
Invest. 45.16 16.75 12.51 5.79 0.00 0.17 0.28 5.04 8.13 1.07 0.03 0.09 0.00 2.73 2.24
Hours 22.63 50.14 4.20 4.30 0.00 0.25 0.12 5.14 8.29 0.49 0.71 0.67 0.01 1.52 1.52
Wages 6.16 2.26 18.65 8.87 0.20 48.45 0.06 3.00 2.22 0.64 0.06 0.02 0.00 6.08 3.31
FFR 31.49 4.15 5.45 1.94 0.00 0.12 0.00 1.64 5.08 1.53 0.17 0.00 0.00 30.96 17.48
Infl. 31.97 6.27 9.91 3.44 0.00 0.04 0.01 1.74 3.85 0.76 0.10 0.02 0.00 25.83 16.06
Uncond. Variance
GDP 23.57 26.88 12.88 7.67 0.01 0.73 0.19 5.61 11.02 0.66 6.83 0.28 0.00 2.09 1.58
Cons. 24.27 37.52 12.06 9.74 0.01 2.45 0.07 3.75 6.54 0.20 0.04 0.83 0.00 1.43 1.08
Invest. 44.46 15.95 9.61 5.26 0.00 0.14 0.22 7.14 12.98 0.73 0.02 0.07 0.00 1.85 1.56
Hours 46.58 16.62 2.83 2.68 0.00 0.09 0.06 9.97 18.68 0.11 0.15 0.96 0.01 0.67 0.59
Wages 19.01 4.34 13.37 6.78 0.14 32.83 0.05 6.53 9.74 0.45 0.05 0.02 0.00 4.26 2.42
FFR 31.89 1.64 0.42 0.27 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.46 2.76 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.00 35.25 26.22
Infl. 31.43 1.69 1.00 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.34 2.53 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.00 35.33 26.16
Notes: Variance decompositions are performed at the posterior mean. ε0i represents contemporaneous shock components; ε
4,8
i
represents the sum of the 4 and 8 quarter anticipated shock components. For ease of exposition, we leave out anticipated stationary
investment-specific, wage-markup, and government spending shocks, since these shocks contribute less then 0.01% to the variances of
the variables.
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1.B Stationary Equilibrium
1.B Stationary Equilibrium
In order to derive a state-space representation of the model, the model presented
in the main text is solved by using a first-order perturbation method. However, due
to the two integrated processes At and Xt, which grow with rates
µat =
At
At−1
, µxt =
Xt
Xt−1
, (1.24)
the model has to be detrended first in order to induce stationarity and to have a
well-defined steady state. Yt, Ct and Wt inherit the trend XYt = A
α
α−1Xt, which
corresponds to a growth rate of
µyt = (µat )
α
α−1µxt . (1.25)
Kt and It inherit the trend XKt = A
1
α−1Xt and thus grow with
µkt = µIt = (µat )
1
α−1µxt . (1.26)
Gt inherits XGt =
(
XGt−1
)ρxg(
XYt−1
)1−ρxg due to the assumed cointegrated trend with
output. It hence grows with rate
xgt =
(xgt−1)
ρxg
µyt
. (1.27)
The detrending is performed by dividing the trending model variables by their
respective trend. For the estimation of our structural model, these stationary model
variables are matched to the data presented in Appendix 1.D.
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1.C Observation Equation
The observation equation describes how the empirical times series are matched to
the corresponding model variables:34
OBSt =

∆ log (Yt)
∆ log (Ct)
∆ log
(
zItAtIt
)
log (Lt)
∆ log (Gt)
∆ log
(
zItAt
)
∆ log
(
τ kt
)
∆ log (τnt )
∆ log (TFPt)
∆ log (Wt)
∆ log (Rt)
∆ log (Πt)

×100 = −

log (µy)
log (µy)
log (µy)
log
(
L¯
)
log (µy)
log (µa)
log
(
τ k
)
log (τn)
(1− α) log (µx)
log (µy)
log (R)
log
(
Π¯
)

+

yˆt − yˆt−1 + µˆyt
cˆt − cˆt−1 + µˆyt
iˆt − iˆt−1 + zˆIt − zˆIt−1 + µˆyt
Lˆt
gˆt − gˆt−1 + xˆgt − xˆgt−1 + µˆyt
µˆat + zˆIt − zˆIt−1
τˆ kt
τˆnt
zˆt − zˆt−1 + (1− α)µˆxt
wˆt + wˆt−1 + µˆy
Rˆt
Πˆt

,
where ∆ denotes the temporal difference operator, L¯ denotes the steady state of
hours worked, µy is the steady state growth rate of output35, µa is the steady state
growth rate of the relative price of investment, τ k and τn are the steady state tax
rates, TFPt = ztX1−αt is total factor productivity, and R is the steady state interest
rate. The hats above the variables denote log deviations from steady state.
34The equation for Lt follows from
logLt = log
(
Lt
L¯
L¯
)
≈ Lˆt + log L¯.
The equation for government spending follows from
log Gt
Gt−1
= log gtX
g
t
gt−1X
g
t−1
= log gtx
g
tX
Y
t
gt−1x
g
t−1X
Y
t−1
= log gtx
g
t
gt−1x
g
t−1
µyt .
Note that the presence of xg also implies that there is no perfect linear restriction between
the GDP components following from the resource constraint. Hence, we do not need to add
additional measurement error.
35This is also the growth rate of the individual components of GDP along the balanced growth
path.
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1.D Data Construction
Unless otherwise noted, all data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)’s
NIPA Tables and available in quarterly frequency from 1955Q1 until 2006Q4.
• Capital and labor tax rates: Our approach to calculate average tax rates
closely follows Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994), Jones (2002), and Leeper,
Plante, and Traum (2010). We first compute the average personal income tax
rate
τ p = IT
W + PRI/2 + CI ,
where IT is personal current tax revenues (Table 3.1 line 3), W is wage and
salary accruals (Table 1.12 line 3), PRI is proprietor’s income (Table 1.12 line
9), and CI ≡ PRI/2 + RI + CP + NI is capital income. Here, RI is rental
income (Table 1.12 line 12), CP is corporate profits (Table 1.12 line 13), and
NI denotes the net interest income (Table 1.12 line 18).
The average labor and capital income tax rates can then be computed as
τn = τ
p(W + PRI/2) + CSI
EC + PRI/2 ,
where CSI denotes contributions for government social insurance (Table 3.1
line 7), and EC is compensation of employees (Table 1.12 line 2), and
τ k = τ
pCI + CT + PT
CI + PT ,
where CT is taxes on corporate income (Table 3.1 line 5), and PT is property
taxes (Table 3.3 line 8).
• Government spending: Government spending is the sum of government
consumption (Table 3.1 line 16) and government investment (Table 3.1 line 35)
divided by the GDP deflator (Table 1.1.4 line 1) and the civilian noninstitutional
population (BLS, Series LNU00000000Q).
• Total factor productivity (TFP): The construction of TFP closely follows
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Beaudry and Lucke (2010), i.e.
TFPt =
Yt
KαH1−α
.
To construct K, we use data on capital services for the private non-farm business
sector (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Historical Multifactor Productivity
Tables),36 multiply it by the total capacity utilization rate (Federal Reserve
System, Statistical Release G.17 - Industrial Production and Capacity Utiliza-
tion), and divide it by the civilian noninstitutional population above 16 years
of age (BLS, Series LNU00000000Q). Real GDP per capita Y is nominal GDP
(Table 1.1.5 line 1) divided by the GDP deflator (line 1 in Table 1.1.4) and
the population, and per capita hours H are non-farm business hours worked
(BLS, Series PRS85006033) divided by the population. The capital share α is
set at 0.2935, the mean over the sample compiled by the BLS (Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS), Historical Multifactor Productivity Tables).
• Relative price of investment: The relative price of investment is taken from
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2011). They base their calculations on Fisher (2006).
• Output: Nominal GDP (Table 1.1.5 line 1) divided by the GDP deflator
(Table 1.1.4 line 1) and the civilian noninstitutional population (BLS, Series
LNU00000000Q).
• Investment: Sum of Residential fixed investment (Table 1.1.5 line 12) and
nonresidential fixed investment (Table 1.1.5 line 9) divided by the GDP deflator
(Table 1.1.4 line 1) and the civilian noninstitutional population (BLS, Series
LNU00000000Q).
• Consumption: Sum of personal consumption expenditures for nondurable
goods (Table 1.1.5 line 5) and services (Table 1.1.5 line 6) divided by the GDP
deflator (Table 1.1.4 line 1) and the civilian noninstitutional population (BLS,
Series LNU00000000Q).
36Quarterly data is interpolated from the annual series using cubic spline interpolation.
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• Real wage: Hourly compensation in the nonfarm business sector (BLS, Series
PRS85006103) divided by the GDP deflator (Table 1.1.4 line 1).
• Inflation: Computed as the log-difference of the GDP deflator (Table 1.1.4
line 1).
• Nominal interest rate: Geometric mean of the effective Federal Funds Rate
(St.Louis FED - FRED Database, Series FEDFUNDS).
• Hours worked: Nonfarm business hours worked (BLS, Series PRS85006033) di-
vided by the civilian noninstitutional population (BLS, Series LNU00000000Q).
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Chapter2
Policy Risk and the Business Cycle
2.1 Introduction
The supposedly negative influence of “policy risk”, i.e. uncertainty about fiscal and
monetary policy, has become a recurring theme in the political discourse. The popular
argument espoused in speeches and newspaper articles by politicians and economists
alike is that the uncertainty surrounding future policy stuns economic activity by
inducing a “wait-and-see approach”.1 In the following, we think of uncertainty as
the dispersion of the economic shock distribution. Rational consumers and firms will
react to the fact that future shocks will be drawn from a wider distribution. This
reaction is distinct from the ex-post effect of higher uncertainty resulting from on
average more extreme shock realizations.2 The goal of the present study is to isolate
the first effect and answer the question: Are uncertainty shocks to policy variables
quantitatively important?
1See e.g. The Wall Street Journal, October 29th, 2009: “For these small businesses, and many others
[. . . ], there’s an additional dark cloud: uncertainty created by Washington’s bid to reorganize a
wide swath of the U.S. economy.” (Fields, 2009). For other proponents of this view, see Boehner
(2010); Cantor (2010); Imrohoroglu (2010); Lowrie (2010); McKinnon (2010); see Klein (2010);
Reeve (2010); Wingfield (2010) for dissenting opinions.
2Uncertainty shocks are mean preserving spreads to the shock distribution. They are not associated
with the expectation of shocks going into a specific direction, like expecting an expansionary
stimulus package. Hence, they are also distinct from news shocks (Beaudry and Portier, 2006;
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2010), which are future level shocks of which both the sign and the
magnitude are already perfectly known today.
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Clearly, during the so-called Great Recession U.S. citizens were facing a period
of extraordinary uncertainty regarding economic policy. On the one hand, both the
output decline due to the financial crisis and the fiscal stimuli designed to counteract
this decline had led to a considerable deterioration of the U.S. fiscal situation. Given
this unsustainable fiscal path, many commentators and politicians were arguing for a
quick consolidation of government finances, possibly by raising taxes. On the other
hand, the U.S. unemployment rate stood at 9.6% at the end of 2010, its highest value
since 1983. Hence, there were considerable calls for more fiscal stimulus, preferably
in the form of reduced taxes due to supposedly higher multipliers (see e.g. Romer
and Romer, 2010). At the same time, Republicans and Democrats were fighting over
the continuation of the Bush tax cuts. On the monetary side, the amount of policy
risk was equally high. Hawks and doves at the Federal Reserve System fought over
the extent of quantitative easing and the correct monetary stance given conflicting
signals from core and headline inflation measures.
Scientific evidence on the aggregate effects of uncertainty is still inconclusive and
mostly confined to TFP uncertainty. Empirical studies using different proxies and
identification schemes to uncover the effects of uncertainty have produced a variety
of results. One group of studies reports an important impact of uncertainty about
productivity on real aggregate variables like GDP and employment (Alexopoulos and
Cohen, 2009; Bloom, 2009; Bloom, Floetotto, and Jaimovich, 2010). A one-standard
deviation shock to uncertainty in these studies typically leads to a 1%-2% drop
in GDP, followed by a recovery with a considerable overshooting. In contrast, a
second group of studies reports little to no impact at all (Bachmann and Bayer,
2011; Bachmann, Elstner, and Sims, 2010; Bekaert, Hoerova, and Duca, 2010; Chugh,
2011; Popescu and Smets, 2010). In the theoretical literature, while most studies
have emphasized the contractionary effects of uncertainty on economic activity, it is
generally acknowledged that there are different effects working in opposite directions,
thereby making the overall effect ambiguous. For example, while an increase in
uncertainty may depress investment due to a “wait-and-see approach”, economic
agents may want to self-insure by working more to build up a buffer capital stock,
which ceteris paribus leads to an increase in investment.
We answer the question of whether policy risk shocks are quantitatively important
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in an estimated DSGE-model. We focus on aggregate uncertainty as it has been shown
to have potentially important output effects (Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2011b). We
add to the previous literature in the following ways. First, we are to our knowledge
the first to study the effect of policy risk on business cycles.3 Second, we directly
measure aggregate uncertainty from the respective time series without the need to
resort to proxies. Third, we jointly consider level shocks and uncertainty shocks.
Regarding uncertainty shocks, we focus on policy risk, i.e. uncertainty about future
tax liabilities, government spending, and monetary policy, to test the hypothesis
that policy risk may be an important factor in explaining the prolonged Great
Recession. We also include uncertainty with respect to total factor productivity
(TFP) and investment-specific technology in order to have a benchmark against which
we can judge our findings. Fourth, we integrate these processes into a medium-scale
New Keynesian DSGE-model of the type typically used for policy analysis (see e.g.
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005; Smets and Wouters, 2007) and solve this
model using third-order perturbation methods. We then estimate the model using the
Simulated Method of Moments. This approach allows us to control for the effects of
level shocks to TFP, investment-specific technology, government spending, monetary
policy, and taxes when estimating the importance of policy risk.
We find that the role of policy risk in explaining the prolonged slump is largely
overstated. Although the output effects of policy risk are an order of magnitude larger
than the effects of TFP uncertainty, even a large (two-standard deviation) shock
to policy risk decreases output by a mere 0.025%. The reason for this result is the
existence of strong general equilibrium effects that dampen the effects of aggregate
uncertainty and imply a low shock amplification. Most notably, monetary policy
reacts fast and decisively to current economic conditions, implying an interest rate
response that dampens aggregate fluctuations arising from uncertainty shocks. If we
3We have recently become aware of independently conducted work by Fernández-Villaverde et al.
(2011a), studying a similar issue in a calibrated model. The studies differ in the set of shocks
considered and in the details of the model specification. However, the results are quite similar,
with even large uncertainty shocks generating only a contained output decline. In their baseline
calibration, a two-standard deviation policy risk shock decreases output by 0.06% compared
to 0.025% in our estimated baseline specification. The advantage of our approach is that
we estimate the parameters of our model. Moreover, we allow for time-varying volatility in
technology, allowing us to relate our findings to the literature on TFP uncertainty and to “good
luck” explanations of the Great Moderation.
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allow for a stronger amplification, uncertainty shocks generate considerably larger
output effects, but at the same time imply counterfactually volatile business cycles.
From a methodological viewpoint, the paper most closely related to our work is
Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011b). Their study also employs Sequential Monte Carlo
Methods combined with third-order perturbation to estimate the effect of interest risk
on the Argentinean economy. In terms of results, this chapter is most closely related
to Bachmann and Bayer (2011), who show for the case of idiosyncratic uncertainty
about technology that general equilibrium effects may considerably reduce the effect
of uncertainty shocks typically found in partial equilibrium models (e.g. Bloom, 2009).
This chapter is also related to the work of Primiceri (2005) and Justiniano and
Primiceri (2008). Using a time-varying Bayesian VAR and an estimated DSGE-model,
respectively, the authors document the importance of time-varying volatility for
explaining the time series behavior of output and inflation and the Great Moderation
in particular. We differ from their work in two major points: first, we allow for
a non-linear transmission of volatility shocks into the economy. Second, by using
a third-order approximation instead of a first-order approximation, we are able to
distinguish uncertainty-effects from the ex-post effect of uncertainty in the form of
more extreme level shocks. We show that their result is mainly due to the differing
size of the realized level shocks when the dispersion of the distribution from which
they are drawn changes. In contrast, the pure uncertainty-effect is only of secondary
importance.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 presents a short literature review
on the transmission channels of uncertainty. In Section 2.3, we build a quantitative
business cycle model featuring several channels identified in the theoretical literature
through which aggregate uncertainty may impact economic activity. We measure
policy risk and technological uncertainty directly from aggregate time series using
Sequential Monte Carlo methods in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5, we feed the uncertainty
processes estimated in Section 2.4 as driving processes into the model and fit it to U.S.
data using a Simulated Method of Moments approach. With the estimated model at
hand, we then study the effects of policy risk in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 concludes.
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2.2 Uncertainty: Potential Transmission Channels
Three different mechanisms through which aggregate uncertainty may affect eco-
nomic activity have been identified in the microeconomic literature: Hartman-Abel
effects, real option effects, and precautionary savings. While these categories are
helpful in shaping our thinking about the effects of uncertainty, they are partial
equilibrium effects. In general equilibrium, each of these effects necessarily induces
equilibrating price and quantity changes that may significantly dampen the aggregate
effects. While in a partial equilibrium model uncertainty may have ceteris paribus
largely contractionary effects on investment and output (e.g. Bloom, 2009), in general
equilibrium wages and interest rates may adjust, thereby significantly reducing the
resulting net effect (Bachmann and Bayer, 2011).
The first category are the so called Hartman-Abel-effects (Abel, 1983; Hartman,
1972). Under certain conditions,4 it follows from the firms’ FOC that the expected
marginal revenue product of capital is convex in output prices and TFP.5 Hence, due
to Jensen’s Inequality larger uncertainty about these variables increases the demand
for capital and thus investment. In our model, while capital is predetermined, both
the utilization of capital and labor input can be adjusted, opening up the possibility
of expansionary Hartman-Abel effects.
Second, there may be real option effects at work (Bernanke, 1983), e.g. through
investment being (partially) irreversible and/or partially expandable. For example, if
the resale (purchase) price of capital in the future differs from the current acquisition
price, a firm installing capital that it may sell later, effectively acquires a put option.
Moreover, investment today destroys a call option, namely the opportunity to buy
capital later at a possibly lower price. Hence, in the investment decision these
option values have to be taken into account (Abel et al., 1996). Higher uncertainty
decreases investment as the call option to purchase the capital later, which is “killed”
by investing today, becomes more valuable. However, in the presence of partial
4Constant-returns-to-scale production function with i) a predetermined capital stock, ii) perfect
competition, iii) risk neutrality, and iv) symmetric convex adjustment costs.
5The reason is that labor can flexibly react to shocks and hence the marginal revenue product
reacts stronger than one for one to the movement in the respective variable. To see this, assume
a fixed capital stock of capital and that the output price rises. There is a direct positive effect of
this price increase on profits via quantity times price change. Additionally, there is a positive
indirect effect through the increase in optimal output that is achieved by increasing labor.
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Table 2.1: Overview: Potential Transmission Mechanism
Hartman-Abel eff. Real option effects Precaution. sav.
Call Put Interest rate
Investment + − + +/− +
Consumption ? ? ? ? −
Notes: + indicates a positive effect of uncertainty, − a negative effect, and +/− an ambiguous effect
on the respective variable. ? denotes that the respective effect makes no prediction for this variable
due to its partial equilibrium nature.
reversibility, the value of the put option that is obtained by investing today increases
with higher uncertainty. Hence, the total effect of uncertainty on investment in such
a framework is generally ambiguous.
In our model, several features give rise to option effects. First, capital is predeter-
mined for one period. Second, the relative price of investment and consumption is
stochastic, thereby giving rise to potentially costly irreversibility and expandability.
Third, through the presence of depreciation allowances investment generates a tax
shield at historical costs of investment so that investment effectively “kills” the option
to purchase this tax shield later. Fourth, the interest rate in our model is stochastic,
giving rise to additional countervailing option effects as discussed in Ingersoll and
Ross (1992).
The third effect is the precautionary saving motive (Leland, 1968), defined as
the “additional saving that results from the knowledge that the future is uncertain”
(Carroll and Kimball, 2008). Faced with higher uncertainty, agents may both consume
less and work more in order to self-insure against future shocks, i.e. they build a
buffer stock.6 As the preferences of the agents in our model feature prudence (Garcia,
Restrepo, and Tanner, 2007; Kimball, 1990) uncertainty should increase precautionary
savings in our model.
In the end, due to these three effects acting on different variables and potentially
working in opposite directions as well as the presence of general equilibrium effects,
only a rigorous quantitative evaluation can answer the question what the net effect
6Real option effects and the precautionary saving motive are not disjunct effects. Consumption is
completely irreversible as the consumed good is not available for consumption in later periods
when the marginal utility of consumption may be high.
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of uncertainty on aggregate activity is. We pursue this question by estimating a
structural model featuring time-varying volatility, which we present in the next
section.
2.3 A DSGE-Model with Policy Risk
We use a standard quantitative New Keynesian business cycle model (Smets and
Wouters, 2007). The model economy is populated by a large representative family, a
continuum of unions j ∈ [0, 1] selling differentiated labor services to intermediate firms,
a continuum of intermediate firms producing differentiated intermediate goods using
bundled labor services and capital, and a final good firm bundling intermediate goods
to a final good. In addition, the model features a government sector that finances
government spending with distortionary taxation and transfers, and a monetary
authority which sets the nominal interest rate according to an interest rate rule.
2.3.1 Household Sector
The economy is populated by a large representative family with a continuum of
members, each consuming the same amount and working the same number of hours.
Preferences are defined over per capita consumption Ct and per capita labor effort
Lt. Following the framework in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006), labor is supplied to
a continuum of unions j ∈ [0, 1], which are monopolistically competitive and supply
differentiated labor services lt (j). Household members supply their labor uniformly
to all unions. Hence, total labor supply of the representative family is given by the
integral over all labor markets j, i.e. Lt =
∫ 1
0 lt (j) dj. The labor market structure
will be discussed in more detail below. We assume the preference specification of
Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), but allow for habits in consumption:
U = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt

(
Ct − φcCt−1 − γ L
1+σl
t
1+σl St
)1−σc
− 1
1− σc
 , (2.1)
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where φc ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of internal habit persistence, σc ≥ 0 governs
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σl ≥ 0 is related to the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply, and γ ≥ 0 measures the relative disutility of labor effort. The term
St = (Ct − φcCt−1)σGS1−σGt−1 (2.2)
makes the preferences non-separable in both consumption and work effort, where
σG ∈ [0, 1] parameterizes the strength of the wealth effect on the labor supply. When
σG = 1, the preference specification is equal to the one discussed in King, Plosser,
and Rebelo (1988), while with σG = 0 the preference specification of Greenwood,
Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988) with no wealth effect on the labor supply is obtained.7
The household faces the budget constraint
Ct + zIt It +
Bt+1
Pt
= (1− τnt )
∫ 1
0
Wt (j) lt (j) dj +
(
1− τ kt
)
rkt utKt
+
(
1− τ kt
)
(Rt−1 − 1) Bt
Pt
+ Bt
Pt
+ Φt + Tt +
(
1− τ kt
)
Ξt , (2.3)
where the household earns income from supplying differentiated labor services lt(j)
at the real wage Wt (j) to union j, and from renting out capital services utKt at the
rental rate rkt . In addition, it receives lump sum transfers Tt from the government
and profits Ξt from owning the firms in the economy. All forms of income are taxed
at their respective tax rates τnt and τ kt . The term
(
1− τ kt
)
(Rt−1 − 1) BtPt + BtPt is the
after-tax return on savings in bonds, where the net returns are taxed at the capital tax
rate. Bonds are in zero net supply. The household spends its income on consumption
Ct and investment zIt It, where It is gross investment and zIt denotes a shock to the
relative price of investment in terms of the consumption good. This price is equal
to the technical rate of transformation between investment and consumption goods.
Due to the presence of a temporary shock, it is exogenous and stochastic. Changes
in zIt do not affect the productivity of already installed capital, but do affect newly
installed capital and become embodied in it. We assume the shock to follow an
7As mentioned in Chapter 1, the presence of habits generates a wealth effect even with σs = 0.
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AR(2)-process8
log zIt = ρzI1 log zIt−1 + ρzI2 log zIt−2 + eσ
zI
t νzIt , (2.4)
where σzIt allows for time-varying volatility and is discussed in detail in Section
2.4. Apart from the fact that this form of investment-specific technology may be
an important source of economic fluctuations (Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell,
1997, 2000), a stochastic relative price of investment introduces costly reversibility
and expandability of investment into the model as the future purchase/resale price is
stochastic.
The term Φt captures depreciation allowances, which are an important feature of
the U.S. tax code. We assume depreciation allowances of the form
Φt = τ kt
∞∑
s=1
δτ (1− δτ )s−1 zIt−sIt−s , (2.5)
where δτ is the depreciation rate for tax purposes.9 By providing new investment with
a tax shield, depreciation allowances may be important in capturing the dynamics
of investment following shocks (Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin, 2011; Yang,
2005). Through this tax shield at historical investment prices, combined with a
stochastic relative price of investment zI , depreciation allowances contribute to costly
reversibility and expandability of investment.
The household owns the capital stock Kt, whose law of motion is given by
Kt+1 =
[
1−
(
δ0 + δ1 (ut − 1) + δ22 (ut − 1)
2
)]
Kt + It − κ2
(
It
Kt
− δ0
)2
Kt , (2.6)
where It is gross investment. Household members do not simply rent out capital,
but capital services utKt, where ut denotes the capital utilization, i.e. the intensity
with which the existing capital stock is used. Without loss of generality, capital
utilization in steady state is normalized to 1. Using capital with an intensity higher
8The lag lengths for the individual exogenous driving processes is chosen to provide a good empirical
fit. Details are provided in Section 2.4.
9Following Auerbach (1989), we allow the depreciation rate for tax purposes to differ from the
physical rate.
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than normal incurs costs to the household in the form of a higher depreciation
δ (ut) = δ0+δ1 (ut − 1)+δ2/2 (ut − 1)2, which, assuming δ0, δ1, δ2 > 0, is an increasing
and convex function of the capital utilization. The last term in equation (2.6) captures
capital adjustment costs at the household level of the form introduced by Hayashi
(1982), where κ ≥ 0 is a parameter governing the curvature of the cost function. This
functional form implies that the capital adjustment costs are minimized and equal to
0 in steady state. We choose this type of adjustment costs for two reasons. First,
while this functional form clearly is unable to explain some micro-level phenomena
like lumpy investment, it has nevertheless been shown to provide a good fit of firm
level investment data and performs better than the Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (2005)-formulation with quadratic adjustment costs in investment changes
(Eberly, Rebelo, and Vincent, 2008). Second, with the flow specification of Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), Tobin’s marginal q would be independent of the
capital stock, which would essentially shut off intertemporal linkages and thereby the
option effects (Wu, 2009).
Thus, the household maximizes its utility (2.1) by choosing Ct, Bt+1, ut, Kt+1, It, St, Lt,
subject to the constraints (2.2) - (2.6) and the resource constraint for aggregate labor.
2.3.2 Labor Market
The household supplies labor lt (j) equally to a continuum of unions j, j ∈ [0, 1].
This labor market structure allows to introduce differentiated labor services and
staggered wage setting without letting idiosyncratic wage risk affect the household
members, which would make aggregation intractable. Monopolistically competitive
unions supply differentiated labor lt (j) to intermediate firms at wage Wt (j). Every
period, each union may re-optimize its wage with probability (1− θw) , 0 < θw < 1. If
a union j cannot re-optimize, its nominal wage is indexed to the price level according
to Wt (j)Pt = Πχwt−1Wt−1 (j)Pt−1, where χw ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of indexing.
Hence, when the union has not been able to re-optimize for τ periods, its real wage τ
periods ahead is given by:
Wt+τ (j) =

W optt+τ (j), if able to re-optimize in t+ τ,
τ∏
s=1
Πχwt+s−1
Πt+s Wt(j), otherwise.
(2.7)
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Household members supply the amount of labor services that is demanded at the
current wage. The objective of each union able to reset its wage is to choose the
real wage that maximizes the expected utility of its members, given the demand for
its labor services lt (j) = (Wt(j)/Wt)−ηw Lcompt , where Lcompt is the aggregate demand
for composite labor services and ηw is the substitution elasticity, the respective
resource constraint Lt = Lcompt
∫ 1
0 (Wt(j)/Wt)
−ηw dj, and the aggregate wage level
Wt =
(∫ 1
0 Wt (j)
1−ηw dj
) 1
1−ηw .
2.3.3 Firm Side
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods firms
i, i ∈ [0, 1], which produce differentiated intermediate goods Yit using capital services
Kservit = uitKit−1 and a composite labor bundle L
comp
it according to a Cobb-Douglas
production function with capital share α
Yit = zt (Kservit )
α (Lcompit )
1−α − φ , if zt (Kservit )α (Lcompit )1−α − φ > 0 (2.8)
and Yit = 0 otherwise. The fixed cost of production φ is set to reduce economic
profits to 0 in steady state, thereby ruling out entry or exit (Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans, 2005). The stationary TFP shock zt follows an AR(2)-process
log zt = ρz1 log zt−1 + ρz2 log zt−2 + eσ
z
t νzt . (2.9)
The composite labor bundle is built from differentiated labor inputs Lit (j) according
to a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator Lcompit =
(∫ 1
0 Lit(j)
ηw−1
ηw dj
) ηw
ηw−1 .
We assume staggered price setting a la Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). Each period,
intermediate firms can re-optimize their prices with probability (1− θp) , 0 < θp < 1.
In between two periods of re-optimization, the prices are indexed to the aggregate
price index Pt according to Pit+1 =
(
Pt
Pt−1
)χp
Pit = (Πt)χp Pit, where χp ∈ [0, 1] governs
the degree of indexation. Intermediate goods producers maximize their discounted
stream of profits subject to the demand from composite goods producers, equation
(2.11).
There is a competitive final goods firm which bundles a final good Yt from a
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continuum of intermediate goods using a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregation technology with
substitution elasticity ηp
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Y
ηp−1
ηp
it di
) ηp
ηp−1
. (2.10)
Expenditure minimization yields the optimal demand for intermediate good i as
Yit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−ηp
Yt ∀ i . (2.11)
2.3.4 Government Sector
Government spending, which may be thought of as entering the utility function
additively separable, follows the process
log
(
Gt
G¯
)
= ρg1 log
(
Gt−1
G¯
)
+ ρg2 log
(
Gt−2
G¯
)
+ eσ
g
t νgt , (2.12)
where G¯ is government spending in steady state. The government finances its
expenditures by distortionary taxation of labor at the rate τnt and capital and interest
income at rate τ kt . We assume AR(2)-processes for the tax rates as this has been
found to be a good empirical description for the U.S. (McGrattan, 1994; Mertens and
Ravn, 2011)
τ kt = (1− ρτk1 − ρτk2 )τ¯ k + ρτk1 τ kt−1 + ρτk2 τ kt−2 + eσ
τk
t ντkt (2.13)
τnt = (1− ρτn1 − ρτn2 )τ¯n + ρτn1 τnt−1 + ρτn2 τnt−2 + eσ
τn
t ντnt , (2.14)
where τ¯n and τ¯ k are the unconditional means of the labor and capital tax rates,
respectively. The government also sets lump-sum transfers Tt to balance the budget.
This assumed structure yields the government budget constraint
Tt +Gt + Φt = τnt WtL
comp
t + τ kt
(
rkt utKt + Ξt
)
. (2.15)
Transfers plus government spending plus depreciation allowances equal tax revenues
from taxing labor, capital income, and profits.
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We close the model by assuming that the central bank follows a Taylor rule that
reacts to inflation and output growth.
Rt
R¯
=
(
Rt−1
R¯
)ρR(Πt
Π¯
)φpi( Yt
Yt−1
)φy1−ρR exp (mt) . (2.16)
Here, ρR is a smoothing parameter introduced to capture the empirical evidence of
gradual movements in interest rates (Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 2000; Rudebusch,
1995), Π¯ is the target interest rate set by the central bank, and the parameters φy and
φΠ capture the responsiveness of the nominal interest rate to deviations of inflation
and output growth from their steady state values. We assume that the central bank
responds to changes in output rather than its level as this specification conforms
better with empirical evidence and avoids the need to define a measure of trend
growth that the central bank can observe (see Lubik and Schorfheide, 2007). Finally,
mt is a shock to the nominal interest rate that follows an AR(1)-process
logmt = ρm logmt−1 + eσ
m
t νmt . (2.17)
The definition of equilibrium and the market aggregation are standard and omitted
for brevity.
2.4 Policy Risk: Time Series Evidence
In this section, we present empirical evidence on the importance of time-varying
volatility in modeling macroeconomic time series. We demonstrate that the data tend
to reject the homoscedasticity of macroeconomic driving processes and show that a
stochastic volatility (SV) model is able to capture the salient features of the data.
Using a particle smoother, we are able to recover the historical series of uncertainty
shocks and show that both “good luck” and “good policy” contributed to the Great
Moderation.
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2.4.1 Estimation Methodology
We perform a two-step estimation procedure. Due to the non-linear solution of the
model required to capture uncertainty effects and the high-dimensional state space, it
is computationally infeasible to jointly estimate all model parameters. Hence, we first
estimate the exogenous stochastic driving processes of the model using Sequential
Monte Carlo (SMC) methods. In the next section we feed these processes into the
model presented in Section 2.3 and estimate the parameters of the remaining model
equations with a Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) approach.
The model includes 6 exogenous stochastic driving processes with time-varying
volatility, i.e. capital and labor tax rates, government spending, a monetary policy
shock, total factor productivity, and investment-specific technology. We estimate
these processes on quarterly U.S. time series, starting in 1960Q1 and using the longest
available sample for each series. Details about the data sources can be found in
Appendix 2.A. Because we use a stationary model, we need to extract the deviations
of the non-stationary time series from their respective trend. Hence, we apply a
one-sided HP-filter to the logarithms of government spending and the two technology
processes. Using a one-sided, i.e. “causal” filter (Stock and Watson, 1999) assures that
the time ordering of the data remains undisturbed and the autoregressive structure
is preserved. We allow for AR(2)-processes in all variables, except for the monetary
policy shocks,10 as the partial autocorrelations generally indicate the presence of a
second root different from zero. Figure 2.1 shows the time series of the exogenous
driving processes on which we estimate our laws of motion. In particular for monetary
policy, the presence of time-varying volatility is immediately evident. In Appendix
2.C, we provide further evidence for the presence of time-varying volatility.
There are two major competing approaches to model time-varying standard devia-
tions: GARCH models and stochastic volatility (SV) models (Fernández-Villaverde
and Rubio-Ramírez, 2010). In the standard GARCH model, σ2t is a function of the
squared scaled lagged innovation in the level equation ν2t−1 and its own lagged value:
σ2t = ω + α(σt−1νt−1)2 + βσ2t−1. The GARCH model has one important drawback:
there are no distinct volatility shocks. The only innovations to the volatility equation
10Although theory suggests that monetary policy shocks in the Taylor rule should be unpredictable
and thus i.i.d., we find a moderate degree of first-order autocorrelation.
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Figure 2.1: Time Series of Exogenous Driving Processes
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Notes: From left to right and top to bottom: capital taxes, labor taxes, TFP, investment-specific
technology, monetary policy shocks, and government spending. Tax rates are demeaned; government
spending and technology processes are detrended using one-sided HP-filter.
are past level shocks, meaning that they cannot be separated from volatility shocks.
As we are especially interested in the effects of shocks to the volatility, we cannot use
a GARCH model but instead employ a stochastic volatility model. Specifically, we
model the standard deviations σit as an AR(1) stochastic volatility process (see e.g.
Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2011b; Shephard, 2008)
σit = (1− ρσi) σ¯i + ρσiσit−1 + ηiεit , εit ∼ N (0, 1), (2.18)
where σ¯i is is the unconditional mean of σit, i ∈ {τk, τn, g,m, z, zI}. The shock to
the volatility εit is assumed to be independent from the level shock νit .
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Due to the nonlinearity embedded in the stochastic volatility setup of the shocks,
we cannot simply employ the Kalman filter as in the case of linearity and normally
distributed shocks. For this case, Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2007)
propose to use the Sequential Importance Resampling (SIR) particle filter, a special
application of the more general class of SMC methods, to evaluate the likelihood.11
After obtaining the likelihood of the observables given the parameters, we use a
Tailored Randomized Block Metropolis-Hastings (TaRB-MH) algorithm (Chib and
Ramamurthy, 2010) to maximize the posterior likelihood. The prior distributions of
the parameters, which are relatively weak, are given in Table 2.2.12
We are also interested in backing out the historical values of the latent state σt,
given the whole set of observations. After filtering, it is straightforward to employ the
backward-smoothing routine (Godsill, Doucet, and West, 2004) to obtain a historical
distribution of the volatilities. The smoothed values were computed at the mean of
the posterior distribution using 10,000 particles.
2.4.2 Estimation Results
The estimation results are presented in Table 2.2. Detailed convergence diagnostics
are shown in Appendix 2.C. In general, all parameters are quite precisely estimated as
evidenced by the percentiles. All shocks, except for the monetary policy shock, exhibit
a high degree of persistence in their levels, with less persistence in their volatilities.
Moreover, the estimated processes show considerable evidence of uncertainty, with
ηi ranging between 0.3 and 0.6. As a one-standard deviation uncertainty shock
increases the volatility of the respective process by (exp(ηi)− 1)× 100 percent, such
a shock increases the variance of capital taxes, labor taxes, TFP, investment specific
technology, monetary policy, and government spending by 46%, 92%, 38%, 39%, 34%,
11Technical details of the algorithms used in this subsection can be found in Appendix 2.B.
12For the autoregressive parameters of the level equation ρi1 and ρi2, we impose a uniform prior
for each of the corresponding autoregressive roots over the stability region (−1,+1). Let ξ1
and ξ2 be the roots of such an AR(2)-process. The autoregressive parameters corresponding to
these roots can be recovered from: ρ1 = ξ1 + ξ2 and ρ2 = −ξ1ξ2 . The posterior distribution was
computed from a 20,500 draw Monte Carlo Markov Chain using 3,000 particles, where the first
2,500 draws were discarded as burn-in draws. Acceptance rates were generally between 20% and
45%. We also checked identifiability of the SV-process by simulating data from the process and
trying to recover the true parameters from this artificial data.
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Table 2.2: Prior and Posterior Distributions of the Shock Processes
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Distribution Mean Std. Dev. Mean 5 Percent 95 Percent
Capital Tax Rates
ρ1 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 0.856 0.819 0.893
ρ2 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 0.103 0.070 0.137
ρσ Beta* 0.90 0.100 0.795 0.745 0.860
ησ Gamma 0.50 0.100 0.379 0.333 0.426
σ¯ Uniform -7.00 5.333 -5.071 -5.361 -4.786
Labor Tax Rates
ρ1 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 1.051 1.018 1.084
ρ2 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 -0.052 -0.085 -0.019
ρσ Beta* 0.90 0.100 0.581 0.514 0.670
ησ Gamma 0.50 0.100 0.651 0.587 0.718
σ¯ Uniform -7.00 5.333 -5.901 -6.253 -5.531
Total Factor Productivity
ρ1 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 1.021 0.965 1.080
ρ2 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 -0.175 -0.230 -0.125
ρσ Beta* 0.90 0.100 0.679 0.611 0.781
ησ Gamma 0.50 0.100 0.320 0.272 0.369
σ¯ Uniform -7.00 5.333 -5.349 -5.555 -5.138
Investment-Specific Technology
ρ1 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 1.420 1.369 1.468
ρ2 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 -0.501 -0.536 -0.461
ρσ Beta* 0.90 0.100 0.807 0.765 0.861
ησ Gamma 0.50 0.100 0.332 0.295 0.368
σ¯ Uniform -7.00 5.333 -6.206 -6.427 -5.983
Government Spending
ρ1 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 0.919 0.866 0.972
ρ2 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 -0.028 -0.079 0.018
ρσ Beta* 0.90 0.100 0.719 0.623 0.865
ησ Gamma 0.50 0.100 0.295 0.227 0.368
σ¯ Uniform -7.00 5.333 -4.887 -5.193 -4.585
Monetary Policy Shock
ρ1 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 0.427 0.385 0.469
ρσ Uniform* 0.90 0.100 0.921 0.895 0.947
ησ Beta* 0.50 0.100 0.364 0.330 0.400
σ¯ Gamma -7.00 5.333 -5.188 -5.512 -4.849
Notes: Beta* indicates that the parameter divided by 0.999 follows a beta distribution. Uniform*
indicates that the roots of the autoregressive process are estimated instead of the autoregressive
coefficients and follow the specified prior distribution.
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and 45%, respectively.13 Appendix 2.C shows the results of model misspecification
tests applied to the SV model. In general, the model fits the data well and cannot be
rejected.
The relevance of stochastic volatility in modeling the behavior of the exogenous
driving processes can be seen in the smoothed estimates of the historical variances
of the shocks in Figure 2.2. The end of the 1960s and particularly the 1970s were
plagued by high shock volatilities, both in the technology and the policy shocks.
Particularly during the 1970s, the volatilities increased and reached their sample
maxima for both tax rates and technology shocks. In contrast, the period from
1985 to 2000 was characterized by shock volatilities to the technology variables well
below their unconditional mean, indicating the role of “good luck” in explaining the
Great Moderation. However, from about 1990 on “good policy” also contributed to
this phenomenon as is evidenced by the low volatilities of the tax and government
spending shocks, although the change in volatility is not as pronounced for the latter.
For monetary policy shocks, there is clear evidence of a lower shock volatility following
the Volcker disinflation from 1979-1983, a trend that also continued under Greenspan.
In contrast, the early tenure of Volcker experienced a volatility of monetary shocks
considerably larger than during the first oil price shock. With the height of the
dot-com bubble the volatility of TFP shocks somewhat increased again, while the
investment-specific technology growth remained tranquil over the whole 2000s. The
largest changes in volatility in the 2000s came under George W. Bush who considerably
changed the tax law, resulting in a pronounced increase in the volatility of tax rates.
At the end of our sample, the Great Recession again results in an increase in policy
risk with a rise in the volatility of government spending, tax rates, and monetary
policy to comparable levels as after 9/11. For government spending and taxes, this
mostly reflects the provisions in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act that
contained $288 billion in tax relief to companies and individuals, e.g. in the form of
$116 billion in payroll tax relief.
Note that the SV-framework used in the present study does not imply a mechanical
link between the level shocks and the volatility shocks as a GARCH-model would do.
Of course, as a comparison of Figures 2.1 and 2.2 shows, a large level shock tends to
13Thus, e.g. a one-standard deviation monetary policy risk shock increases the volatility of the
monetary policy shocks from exp(−5.19) = 0.56% to exp(−5.19 + 0.364) = 0.8%.
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coincide with an increase in the conditional variance. However, the reason for this
increase in the estimated conditional variance is not a mechanical effect of this level
shock subsequently entering the volatility equation. Rather, the Bayesian estimation
of the SV-model weighs the likelihood of observing such a large shock being drawn
from a narrow distribution, i.e. without observing a simultaneous/previous volatility
shock, against the likelihood of observing a shock of this size that is drawn from a
wider distribution due to the occurrence of a variance shock.
Figure 2.2: Smoothed Standard Deviations
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mean; shaded area: two standard deviation bands.
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2.5 Fitting the Model to the Data
Using the parameter estimates of the stochastic driving processes obtained in the
previous section, we are now in a position to estimate the deep parameters of the
model presented in Section 2.3.
2.5.1 Simulated Method of Moments Estimation
We use the Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) approach as proposed in Ruge-
Murcia (2010). Intuitively, this method minimizes the weighted distance between the
empirical moments and the moments resulting from artificial data simulated from
the model (details can be found in Appendix 2.B).
In order to simulate data, we first need to solve the model non-linearly. Due to
the high-dimensional state space of our model, we employ perturbation methods to
obtain an approximation of the policy function around the deterministic steady state
(see e.g. Judd, 1998). Specifically, we need to obtain a third-order approximation,
because we are interested in the pure effects of volatility shocks, i.e. when holding
the level shocks constant. Loosely speaking, a first-order approximation yields no
effects of uncertainty; a second-order approximation yields both a constant effect and
an effect mediated through the corresponding level shock. Only in the third-order
approximation does time-varying uncertainty play a separate role (for a more detailed
explanation, see Appendix 2.B).
Table 2.3 presents the values of parameters we fix prior to the estimation. We set
gross steady state inflation Π¯ to 1 and the discount factor β to 0.99. Regarding the
depreciation parameters, δ0 = 0.05 is chosen to imply a 10% annual depreciation
rate, δ1 = 0.0351 sets the steady state capital utilization to 1, and the depreciation
rate for tax purposes δτ is set to twice the rate of physical depreciation (Auerbach,
1989). The fixed-cost parameter φ = 0.038 implies that firms make zero profit in
steady state and the labor disutility parameter γ = 19.1 sets the steady state share
of hours worked to total time to 20%. Regarding the preference parameters, we set
the parameter governing the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σc to 2 and set
σG = 0.001, the value chosen in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009).14 Hence, preferences
14When attempting to estimate this parameter, it hit the lower bound of 0 as in Schmitt-Grohé and
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Table 2.3: Parameters Fixed Prior to Estimation
Param. Value Target/Motivation Param. Value Target/Motiv.
Π¯ 1 Zero infl. steady state σc 2 Standard value
β 0.99 Standard value ηp 10 11% Markup
δ0 0.025 10% annual deprec. ηw 10 11% Markup
δ1 0.0351 u¯ = 1 α 0.295 Sample mean
δτ 0.05 Auerbach (1989) τn 0.1984 Sample mean
φ 0.038 0 profits in SS τ k 0.388 Sample mean
γ 19.1 SS labor of 0.2 G/Y 0.2031 Sample mean
σG 0.001 Jaimovich-Rebelo (2009)
are close to the GHH-specification and imply a small wealth effect on the labor
supply, which is consistent with evidence from studies focusing on the effects of news
(Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2010) and government spending (Monacelli and Perotti,
2008). The elasticity of substitution parameters for differentiated labor services and
intermediate goods are set to 10, resulting in a steady state markup of 11%. The
capital share α, the steady state tax rates τ k and τn, and the steady state share of
government spending to output are set to their respective sample means.
The empirical moments to be matched are the standard deviations and first- and
second-order autocovariances of output, consumption, investment, inflation, the real
wage, and the nominal interest rate. Moreover, we target the covariance of output
with the other variables. All variables are logged and detrended using a one-sided
HP-filter with smoothing parameter λ = 1600. The second and fourth columns of
Table 2.5 display the respective sample moments.15
2.5.2 Parameter Estimates
The parameter estimates are shown in Table 2.4. All parameters except for the
capital adjustment cost parameter κ are precisely estimated as seen in columns 4
Uribe (2010). Hence, we fix the parameter to a small value that still assures a balanced growth
path.
15Some of the target moments are transformed to correlations for better interpretation. The relative
standard deviations with respect to the standard deviation of output are only implicitly targeted
through the standard deviations of the respective series.
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Table 2.4: Parameters Estimated by SMM
Parameter Description Mean -1 std.-dev. +1 std.-dev.
φc Consumption habits 0.9665 0.9660 0.9671
δ2/δ1 Capital utilization costs 0.0414 0.0314 0.0546
κ Capital adjustment costs 10.0857 0.8007 127.0438
θp Calvo parameter prices 0.9644 0.9641 0.9646
θw Calvo parameter wages 0.7785 0.7615 0.7947
χp Price indexation 0.4170 0.3809 0.4539
χw Wage indexation 0.9751 0.9725 0.9774
σl Frisch elasticity parameter 0.0683 0.0652 0.0716
ρR Interest smoothing 0.4889 0.4541 0.5238
φpi Taylor rule inflation 1.9691 1.9058 2.0422
φy Taylor rule output growth 1.2195 0.8416 1.7671
and 5.16 Consumers have strong habits in consumption with φc = 0.97, which is at
the upper end of values generally considered plausible. Capital utilization costs show
little convexity with δ2/δ1 = 0.04, while capital adjustment is costly as indicated by
κ = 10.09, ensuring that investment is not excessively volatile. Prices are estimated
to be quite sticky with θp = 0.96, while the degree of wage stickiness is moderate with
an average duration of 4.3 quarters. The high degree of price stickiness compared
to e.g. Smets and Wouters (2007) reflects the absence of real rigidities like a non-
constant elasticity of substitution in our setup. The degree of indexation to past
inflation is considerably higher for wages than for prices, with the former being almost
perfectly indexed to past inflation. An estimated value of σl = 0.07 indicates almost
linear disutility of labor. In the Taylor rule, there is a moderate degree of interest
smoothing. The reaction coefficients of monetary policy are in line with values found
in the literature.
The first and third column of Table 2.5 show the fit of the model. Output is 92%
as volatile in the simulated model as in the data, while investment is 108% as volatile.
The volatility of consumption is well-matched, while its correlation with output is
16The confidence bands rely on the asymptotic normality of the estimator as shown in equation (2.36).
However, this is only a rough approximation as most parameters, e.g. the Calvo parameters, have
bounded support. Unfortunately, SMM is computationally too intensive to rely on bootstrapping
the standard errors.
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Table 2.5: Simulated and Empirical Moments
Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data
σ(xt) ρ(xt, yt) σxt/σyt ρ(xt, xt−1) ρ(xt, xt−2)
Y 1.44% 1.57% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.90 0.84 0.75
C 0.93% 0.95% 0.71 0.85 0.65 0.60 0.99 0.90 0.95 0.74
I 5.74% 5.30% 0.91 0.85 3.98 3.37 0.88 0.93 0.74 0.80
Π 0.22% 0.27% 0.23 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.91 0.50 0.75 0.32
W 0.82% 0.90% 0.23 0.10 0.57 0.57 0.97 0.84 0.91 0.69
R 0.40% 0.39% 0.28 0.34 0.28 0.25 0.73 0.86 0.49 0.67
Notes: Time Series Xt are output (Yt), consumption (Ct), investment (It), inflation (Πt), the real
wage (Wt), and the nominal interest rate (Rt). Small letters denote variables that are logged and
detrended using a one-sided HP-filter with smoothing parameter λ = 1600.
too low. The volatilities of the real wage, inflation, and the nominal interest rate are
on target. Their correlation with output is also well matched. Only the real wage
is somewhat too procyclical. The autocorrelations are also in general well-matched.
Only consumption exhibits a slightly too high autocorrelation.
2.5.3 The Effects of Time-Varying Volatility
With the estimated model at hand, we can perform a simple counterfactual experi-
ment to demonstrate the importance of time-varying volatility for explaining U.S.
macroeconomic time series. However, the effects of time-varying volatility reflect both
the ex-ante uncertainty effect of knowing that the shocks are drawn from a wider
distribution and the ex-post effect of more extreme shock realizations. In the next
section, we will therefore separate these two by using the model to keep the level
shocks constant.
In Figure 2.2, we found clear evidence of a decrease in the variance of both the
technological shocks and the policy shocks since the mid 1980s, which contributed
to the lower volatility of output and inflation during the Great Moderation. Using
our estimated DSGE-model, we can ask what a counterfactual economy without
time-varying volatility would have looked like. For this purpose, we completely shut
off time-varying volatility by setting uncertainty shocks to zero. We then simulate the
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model again using the new set of driving forces where both the uncertainty effect and
the effects of the corresponding more extreme level shocks are absent due to σit = σ¯i
for all i ∈ {τk, τn, g,m, z, zI}. This unconditional sample mean of the log-volatility
of the level shocks σ¯i lies between the high volatility pre-Great Moderation period’s
value and the value in the subsequent low volatility Great Moderation phase. The
corresponding simulated moments are presented in Table 2.6. The co-movement of
the model variables still fits the data quite well. However, compared to the actual
data, such an economy fails to generate sufficient volatility: output, consumption, and
investment are only about 65%, 73%, and 75% as volatile as the data, respectively.17
In contrast, as seen in Table 2.5, the model with time-varying volatility captures the
data moments well. These results clearly indicate the importance of time-varying
volatility in explaining U.S. macroeconomic time series (see e.g. Justiniano and
Primiceri, 2008; Primiceri, 2005).
Table 2.6: Simulated and Empirical Moments for the Model without Time-varying
Volatility
Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data
σ(xt) ρ(xt, yt) σxt/σyt ρ(xt, xt−1) ρ(xt, xt−2)
Y 0.99% 1.57% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.90 0.85 0.75
C 0.71% 0.95% 0.67 0.85 0.72 0.60 0.99 0.90 0.95 0.74
I 3.91% 5.30% 0.89 0.85 3.97 3.37 0.92 0.93 0.79 0.80
Π 0.18% 0.27% -0.19 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.91 0.50 0.76 0.32
W 0.53% 0.90% 0.56 0.10 0.54 0.57 0.97 0.84 0.91 0.69
R 0.30% 0.39% -0.11 0.34 0.30 0.25 0.78 0.86 0.61 0.67
Notes: Time Series Xt are output (Yt), consumption (Ct), investment (It), inflation (Πt), the real
wage (Wt), and the nominal interest rate (Rt). Small letters denote variables that are logged and
detrended using a one-sided HP-filter with smoothing parameter λ = 1600.
17If we had used a linearized version of the model, this effect would not have been observed, as
periods of high volatility would offset periods of low volatility. However, due to the non-linearity
of our model, this is not the case here.
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2.6 The Aggregate Effects of Policy Risk
We now turn to analyzing the effects of aggregate uncertainty on business cycle
fluctuations. First, having estimated the deep parameters of the model, we conduct
policy experiments to trace out the effects of uncertainty shocks. We then study their
transmission into the economy and analyze the underlying amplification mechanisms.
We find that the model is in principle able to generate large effects of uncertainty, but
that the estimated parametrization implies that the aggregate effects of uncertainty are
quantitatively small. The reason for the small aggregate response to uncertainty shocks
is the presence of general equilibrium effects that imply only a weak amplification.
2.6.1 Impulse Response Analysis
We first analyze the pure uncertainty effect resulting from time-varying volatility
by separating it from the ex-post effect of more extreme shock realizations. We do
so by computing impulse response functions to uncertainty shocks while keeping
constant the realizations of the level shocks.
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show the impulse response functions to two-standard deviation
policy risk and technology risk shocks with each column representing the impulse
responses to a different shock. The ex-post level effect has been shut off, which
is reflected in the flat impulse response for τ k, τn, g, m, z, and zI depicted in the
bottom row.18 The left column of Figure 2.3 shows that a capital tax risk shock acts
like a positive demand shock. Output and inflation both increase on impact and
slowly return to zero. Initially the output response is mostly driven by the positive
response of investment, which has a peak response on impact of 0.014%. Consumption
increases less strongly and follows a hump-shape, peaking after 12 quarters. Due to
the estimated strong degree of habit persistence in consumption, the consumption
response decays only slowly and drives the output response after about four years,
when investment is already almost back to its initial level. The middle and right
columns show the impulse responses to labor tax risk and government spending risk,
respectively. Both emulate the characteristics of a negative supply shock, with output,
consumption, and investment exhibiting a hump-shaped decline, while inflation rises.
18In the subsequent graphs, we generally omit the flat level impulse responses.
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Figure 2.3: Impulse Responses to a Two-Standard Deviation Uncertainty Shock to
Capital Taxes, Labor Taxes, and Government Spending (from Left to
Right Column)
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Notes: Level shocks are held constant. All responses are in percent, except for pi, which is in
percentage points.
Labor tax risk induces the strongest output response of all uncertainty shocks
considered, with output showing a peak decline of 0.02% and investment dropping by
four times as much. The reason for this relatively strong response, compared to e.g.
the government spending risk shock, is that a two-standard deviation labor tax risk
shock increases uncertainty about labor taxes by about 120%, compared to around
60% for the other uncertainty shocks. Due to the relatively low persistence of the
underlying shock process for labor tax risk, the effect on inflation subsides after 10
quarters, while the effect on consumption is again considerable more drawn out.
The left column of Figure 2.4 displays the response to a two-standard deviation
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Figure 2.4: Impulse Responses to a Two-standard Deviation Uncertainty Shock to
Monetary Policy, TFP, and Investment-specific Technology (from Left to
Right Column)
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Notes: Level shocks are held constant. All responses are in percent, except for pi, which is in
percentage points.
monetary policy risk shock. This shock has a contractionary effect on output, mostly
driven by a decline in investment that peaks at -0.03% after 7 quarters. In contrast,
consumption reacts sluggishly, peaking only after 30 quarters. Inflation initially drops,
overshoots after 10 quarters and then slowly returns, driven by a large persistence in
the underlying risk shock process.
The historical volatility estimates shown in Figure 2.2 indicated that uncertainty
about the future path of economic policy increased for all policy instruments during
the Great Recession. We simulate such a situation in the form of a simultaneous
two-standard deviation increase in policy risk.19 Results are shown in Figure 2.5. A
19Due to the nonlinearity inherent in our model and the solution method that preserves this
nonlinearity up to third order, the resulting impulse responses are not necessarily identical to
the sum of the impulse responses to the individual uncertainty shocks.
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Figure 2.5: Impulse Responses to a Joint Two-standard Deviation Policy Risk Shock
(Solid Blue Line) and to a Joint Technology Risk Shock (Dashed Red
Line)
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simultaneous two-standard deviation policy risk shock (solid lines) acts like a negative
supply shock. It leads to an immediate decrease in output of 0.025%, before output
slowly returns to its initial level as the shock subsides. This decrease in output is
driven by both consumption and investment, with investment dropping initially by
0.1%. While the capital stock reacts sluggishly due to the presence of relatively high
capital adjustment costs, capital services decline immediately due to an accompanying
decline in capital utilization. At the same time inflation rises. As a consequence, the
real wage rises for a few periods, reflecting the indexation to the rising inflation, and
then starts to decrease, reaching its minimum after 15 quarters. Due to monopolistic
competition in the labor market and the non-separability of the utility function, the
initial increase in the real wage does not induce an increase in labor supplied by the
household. Rather, household members decrease their labor supply and consume
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more leisure. The real interest rate, computed as the difference between the policy
rate and inflation, declines initially and then follows a hump-shaped pattern, reaching
its peak after 7 quarters. The initial decline in the real interest rate reflects both the
interest smoothing present in the estimated Taylor rule as well as the response of
the central bank to the initial decline in output. Only when output starts to recover
does the real interest rate rise to bring down inflation. The similarity in both the
size and the shape of the impulse response functions of a policy risk shock and the
labor tax risk shock indicates that the latter dominates the effects of the other policy
risk shocks.20
It is instructive to compare the policy risk results to the benchmark of uncertainty
about technology. The middle and right columns of Figure 2.4 show the impulse
responses to a two-standard deviation risk shock to total factor productivity and
investment-specific technology, respectively. The response to TFP risk is qualitatively
similar to what could have been expected from the previous literature: it triggers an
investment driven decline in output while inflation increases. In contrast, investment-
specific technology risk triggers exactly the opposite effect: output increases initially
and peaks after 4 quarters, with the response again being mainly driven by the
investment response. It is noteworthy that the response to TFP uncertainty is an
order of magnitude smaller than the effects of uncertainty about the investment-
specific technology shocks. This result suggests that the role of investment-specific
technology risk might be underappreciated in the uncertainty literature.21 Figure
2.5 also shows the impulse responses to a joint technology risk shock of the type
occurring in the middle of the 1970s. The comparison of technology risk (dashed
lines) with policy risk (solid lines) shows that policy risk generates responses that are
20While strictly speaking the impulse responses to single shocks are not additive, the opposite signs
of the output response for some sources of uncertainty have important consequences for periods
of generally heightened uncertainty. The simultaneous increase in uncertainty from different
sources does not necessarily translate into a large output response. In times like the Great
Recession, where policy risk jointly increased, different sources of uncertainty may partially offset
each other, resulting in a low overall effect. For example, Figure 2.3 documents that capital
taxation risk acts expansionary and could more than offset the negative effect of government
spending risk on output and investment.
21While the effects of level shocks to investment-specific technology have received considerable
attention in recent years (Fisher, 2006; Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti, 2010a; Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe, 2011), we are to our knowledge the first to study the effects of uncertainty
about investment-specific technology.
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one order of magnitude larger.
Summarizing, our results show that the finding of relatively minor effects of
uncertainty on aggregate activity for the case of TFP (Bachmann and Bayer, 2011;
Bachmann, Elstner, and Sims, 2010; Bekaert, Hoerova, and Duca, 2010; Chugh, 2011;
Popescu and Smets, 2010) also holds true for policy risk and investment-specific
technology risk.
2.6.2 What Drives the Response to Policy Risk?
Of the transmission channels discussed in Section 2.2, the precautionary savings
motive does not play a dominant role. In all sets of impulse responses, consump-
tion and investment move in the same direction, while in the case of a dominant
precautionary savings motive we would expect agents to decrease their consumption
in order to self-insure against aggregate uncertainty by investing in a buffer-stock.
Of course, it is conceivable that the precautionary savings motive counteracts the
observed effects, which then would have been larger in its absence.
While it is virtually impossible to disentangle the different real option, Hartman-
Abel, and general equilibrium effects, we can gain some insight into the transmission
of uncertainty by shutting off various features of the model. First, as can be seen
by fixing the relative price of investment to consumption at 1, the real option effect
embedded in the depreciation allowances via the stochastic resale price of capital
hardly plays a role. However, while their role in providing current investment with a
tax shield at historical investment prices does not seem to create strong real option
effects in our model, this does not mean that depreciation allowances do not play an
important role. With their effect on Tobin’s marginal q and the capital utilization
decision, they have an important amplifying effect on the investment response and
hence on output. When shutting them off completely, i.e. setting δτ = 0, capital
drops less and the negative consumption response is cut in half (figures omitted for
brevity).
Second, the low wealth effect on the labor supply implied by the preferences
being close to the GHH-form (σG ≈ 0) has a considerable effect on the responses
to uncertainty, amplifying the response to some shocks and dampening the one to
others. As shown in Figure 2.6, when setting the preferences to the standard King-
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Figure 2.6: Impulse Responses to a Two-standard Deviation Uncertainty Shock to
Capital Taxes, Labor Taxes, and TFP (from Left to Right Column)
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Notes: solid blue line: KPR-preferences (σG = 1); red dashed line: preferences close to GHH
(σG ≈ 0). Level shocks are held constant. All responses are in percent, except for pi, which is in
percentage points.
Plosser-Rebelo specification (σG = 1), the negative response to labor tax risk declines
by two orders of magnitude. At the same time, the effect of uncertainty shocks that
mainly affect the capital margin, i.e. capital tax and TFP risk, substantially increases,
with the former now being the dominant policy risk factor. The output response to
government spending, monetary policy and investment-specific technology risk stays
largely unaltered (figures omitted for brevity).22
22This finding of an important role of the preference specification for the transmission of uncertainty
shocks suggests that adopting a certain form of utility function may already predetermine the
sign of the output response to an uncertainty shock. Hence, future studies dealing with the effects
of uncertainty should devote more attention to tracing out which preference specification may
be the most suitable one. Our estimation results hint at a utility function featuring a low wealth
effect on the labor supply. This is in line with an increasing number of studies from the fiscal
policy (Monacelli and Perotti, 2008), open economy (Chang and Fernández, 2010; García-Cicco,
Pancrazi, and Uribe, 2010), and news literature (Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2009; Schmitt-Grohé
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Table 2.7: Counterfactual Calibration Implying Large Uncertainty Effects
Parameter Description Estimated mean Counterfactual
φc Consumption habits 0.96 0.9
κ Capital adjustment costs 10.1 5
θp Calvo parameter prices 0.96 0.9
σl Frisch elasticity parameter 0.07 4
ρR Interest smoothing 0.49 0.9
φy Taylor rule output growth 1.22 0
As noted in Section 2.2, the theoretical literature predicts an ambiguous effect of
uncertainty as real option, Hartman-Abel, and general equilibrium effects drive the
dynamics and may work in opposite directions. That this is actually the case for the
specific types of uncertainty considered can be seen from, e.g., the impulse response of
consumption to a capital tax shock depicted in the middle left panel of Figure 2.6. The
consumption response is mostly negative for the case of σG ≈ 0 but unambiguously
positive for σG = 1. This suggests that different partial effects are dominating the
respective responses for the different parameterizations. While a contractionary effect
dominates in the GHH-case, an expansive effect prevails in the KPR-case. The strong
dependence of uncertainty effects on the specific parametrization underscores the need
for model estimation as opposed to calibration in order to trace out the aggregate
effects of uncertainty.
2.6.3 Why Are the Effects of Uncertainty Small?
We identify strong general equilibrium effects – constraining the amplification
of uncertainty shocks – as the main reason for the small effect of uncertainty on
economic activity. While the model is in principle capable of generating large real
effects of uncertainty, strong stabilizing effects are required to match the data moments.
Therefore, SMM estimates the model parameters to imply strong equilibrating effects.
Consider the simple counterfactual experiment displayed in Table 2.7. Here, we
decrease habit persistence, capital adjustment costs, price rigidities, and the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply. To dampen the general equilibrium response of the nominal
and Uribe, 2010), which also suggest the presence of a low wealth effect on the labor supply.
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interest rate, we shut off the reaction to output growth and considerably increase the
interest smoothing. In this case, as shown Figure 2.7, policy risk leads to a drop in
output of 1.5%, which is mostly driven by a large decline in investment. While this
Figure 2.7: Impulse Responses to a Two-standard Deviation Policy Risk Shock under
Counterfactually Volatile Calibration
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calibration allows for larger effects of uncertainty, it comes at a cost: the model with
this calibration implies unrealistically large business cycles. As shown in Table 2.8,
output would be almost three times as volatile as found in the data, investment five
times, and wages almost four times as volatile.
Hence, given the estimated exogenous driving processes, SMM estimates the
parameters to imply a shock amplification more in line with the actually observed
data. First, consumption habits, capital adjustment costs, and price rigidities are
estimated to be quite high, generating a high persistence and thereby limiting the
reaction of consumption, investment, and inflation to shocks and thus the deviations
from the ergodic mean that are realized over time. Second, the parameter governing
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Table 2.8: Simulated and Empirical Moments: Counterfactual with Stronger Amplifi-
cation
Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data
σ(xt) ρ(xt, yt) σxt/σyt ρ(xt, xt−1) ρ(xt, xt−2)
Y 4.47% 1.57% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.66 0.90 0.38 0.75
C 0.65% 0.95% 0.45 0.85 0.15 0.60 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.74
I 24.90% 5.30% 0.99 0.85 5.58 3.37 0.63 0.93 0.34 0.80
Π 0.29% 0.27% 0.76 0.17 0.07 0.17 0.80 0.50 0.53 0.32
W 3.55% 0.90% 0.85 0.10 0.79 0.57 0.83 0.84 0.57 0.69
R 0.31% 0.39% -0.90 0.34 0.07 0.25 0.82 0.86 0.57 0.67
Notes: Time Series Xt are output (Yt), consumption (Ct), investment (It), inflation (Πt), the real
wage (Wt), and the nominal interest rate (Rt). Small letters denote variables that are logged and
detrended using a one-sided HP-filter with smoothing parameter λ = 1600.
the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is estimated to be low so household’s labor supply
reacts quite flexibly to shocks. Third and most importantly, monetary policy reacts
fast and decisively to current economic conditions and in particular to output. The
resulting transmission of both uncertainty and level shocks into the economy then
implies less pronounced business cycles.
The decisive reaction to output growth is evident from the large coefficient estimate
in the Taylor rule. The monetary authority’s aggressive reaction to changes in output
has a considerable dampening effect on the business cycle as it prevents output from
deviating too far from steady state. When keeping all parameters at their baseline
values but setting φy = 0, thus shutting off the response of interest rates to output
growth, triples the negative output response following a policy risk shock (figures
omitted for brevity). The main reason for this behavior is the response of the real
interest rate. The uncertainty shock acts like a negative supply shock, agents reduce
their labor and capital input, and inflation rises. The monetary authority responds
to this increase in inflation by raising the nominal interest rate without considering
the negative impact on output. As a result, the real interest rate now has a positive
impact response, amplifying the original shock’s contractionary effect on output. In
contrast, if the monetary authority also reacts to changes in output, the interest rate
hike is more muted and the negative output response lower. The real interest initially
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declines to counteract the contractionary effect on output and only rises after several
quarters.
The fast reaction of nominal interest rates to exogenous shocks can be seen from the
relatively low degree of interest smoothing, meaning that current economic conditions
affect nominal interests more than past interest rates. This low amount of interest
smoothing exerts a considerable influence on the economy’s response to uncertainty
shocks, allowing a stronger counteracting reaction of the nominal interest rate, which
dampens the uncertainty effects in a similar way as the output feedback of monetary
policy. When giving more weight to past interest rates compared to the currently
desired nominal interest, the nominal interest rate responds more sluggishly to shocks
to the system, thereby temporarily allowing for larger deviations from steady state.
Hence, our result lend support to the findings of Bachmann and Bayer (2011).
Their study showed for the case of idiosyncratic uncertainty about technology that
general equilibrium effects, most importantly the endogenous feedback to wages and
interest rates may considerably dampen the output effects of uncertainty shocks. Our
results indicate that this also holds true for the case of aggregate uncertainty in an
estimated DSGE-model.
These results suggest a potential issue for studies using a “proof-of-concept”-
approach. Such studies typically show that uncertainty may matter by putting
one source of uncertainty along one level shock into a model and then designing a
transmission mechanism that enables this source to explain the whole business cycle.
Our findings indicate that more attention needs to be devoted to what happens if
other shocks, both uncertainty and level are present. As soon as other competing
sources of aggregate fluctuations documented in the literature are added to these
models, the effects of uncertainty are bound to decrease. Moreover, the approach of
considering only one source of uncertainty and designing a particular amplification
mechanism to generate an output drop in response may neglect that specially designed
amplification mechanisms may interact with other types of shocks in undesired ways.23
23For example, expansionary output effects of uncertainty, which in our model e.g. arise with capital
tax risk, might be amplified in the same way.
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2.7 Conclusion
The current chapter analyzes the effects of policy risk, i.e. aggregate uncertainty
about labor and capital tax rates, monetary policy, and government spending on
aggregate activity. We find that aggregate policy risk has only minor effects on
the business cycle. Although its effects are an order of magnitude larger than the
ones of technological uncertainty, a two standard-deviation policy risk shock still
only generates a 0.025% drop in output. The reason for this small effect is that
our parameter estimates imply strong general equilibrium effects that dampen the
aggregate effects of uncertainty on economic activity. Most notably, the monetary
authority’s estimated strong and rapid response to current conditions implies a
nominal interest rate reaction that considerably reduces aggregate fluctuations. While
our model is capable of generating strong uncertainty effects, such a calibration would
imply unrealistically large business cycle fluctuations. Thus, SMM estimates the
amplification of uncertainty shocks to be rather low.
The small effect of uncertainty on output does not imply that time-varying volatility
is unimportant. In accordance with the previous literature (e.g. Justiniano and
Primiceri, 2008; Primiceri, 2005), our findings suggest that the Great Moderation can
be explained through a combination of “good luck” and “good policy”. The historical
variance estimates indicate that the standard deviation of both technology and policy
shocks significantly decreased since the mid-1980s. However, most of the effect of
this time-varying volatility comes in the form of a different size of the realized level
shocks instead of through the uncertainty-effect.
As our analysis focuses on aggregate uncertainty, it does not necessarily contradict
studies finding large effects of idiosyncratic uncertainty. However, these studies
clearly require different transmission mechanisms that do not give rise to large general
equilibrium effects (see also Bachmann and Bayer, 2011).
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Appendix to Chapter 2
2.A Data construction
Unless otherwise noted, all data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)’s
NIPA Tables and available in quarterly frequency from 1960Q1 until 2010Q3.
Data for the exogenous processes
Capital and labor tax rates. Our approach to calculate average tax rates closely
follows Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994), Jones (2002), and Leeper, Plante, and
Traum (2010). Details can be found in Appendix 1.D.
Government spending. Government spending is the sum of government con-
sumption (Table 3.1 line 16) and government investment (Table 3.1 line 35) divided
by the GDP deflator (Table 1.1.4 line 1) and the civilian noninstitutional population
(BLS, Series LNU00000000Q).
Monetary policy shock. Computed as the residual from a Taylor rule as in
Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) (see Appendix 2.B). The sample only starts in
1961Q1 as we lose the first year of data due to the use of four time lags as instruments
in the GMM estimation.
Total factor productivity (TFP). The construction of TFP closely follows
Beaudry and Lucke (2010). Details can be found in Appendix 1.D.
Relative price of investment. The relative price of investment is taken from
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2011) and only available until 2006Q4. They base their
calculations on Fisher (2006).
The different sample lengths are not an issue as we estimate each exogenous process
separately. Using the longest available sample assures that we make optimal use of
the available information for each series.
Data for SMM
Output. Nominal GDP (Table 1.1.5 line 1) divided by the GDP deflator (Table
1.1.4 line 1) and the civilian noninstitutional population (BLS, Series LNU00000000Q).
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Investment. Sum of Residential fixed investment (Table 1.1.5 line 12) and nonresi-
dential fixed investment (Table 1.1.5 line 9) divided by the GDP deflator (Table 1.1.4
line 1) and the civilian noninstitutional population (BLS, Series LNU00000000Q).
Consumption. Sum of personal consumption expenditures for nondurable goods
(Table 1.1.5 line 5) and services (Table 1.1.5 line 6) divided by the GDP deflator (Table
1.1.4 line 1) and the civilian noninstitutional population (BLS, Series LNU00000000Q).
Real wage. Hourly compensation in the nonfarm business sector (BLS, Series
PRS85006103) divided by the GDP deflator (Table 1.1.4 line 1).
Inflation. Computed as the log-difference of the GDP deflator (Table 1.1.4 line 1).
Nominal interest rate. Geometric mean of the effective Federal Funds Rate
(St.Louis FED - FRED Database, Series FEDFUNDS).
Additional data for GMM
Interest term spread. We use the difference of the quarterly geometric mean of
the 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (FRED Database, Series GS10) and
the quarterly geometric mean of the 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate
(FRED Database, Series TB3MS).
Money growth rate. Growth rate of the M2 Money Stock (FRED Database, Series
M2SL).
Commodity inflation. Commodity inflation is computed as the growth rate of the
X12-seasonally adjusted Producer Price Index: All Commodities (FRED Database,
Series PPIACO).
Output gap. The output gap is constructed as the percentage difference between
real GDP (FRED Database, Series GDPC96) and Real Potential Gross Domestic
Product (FRED Database, Series GDPPOT).
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The Particle Filter
For ease of exposition, let xt be a generic observable AR(1) process
xt = ρxt−1 + eσtνt , νt ∼ N (0, 1) (2.19)
where the unobserved/latent state σt follows a stochastic volatility process
σt = (1− ρσ) σ¯ + ρσσt−1 + ηεt , εt ∼ N (0, 1), (2.20)
where σ¯ is is the unconditional mean of σt. The shock to the volatility εt is assumed
to be independent from the level shock νt.
Hence, a filter is required to obtain the so-called filtering density p (σt|xt; Θ). Due
to the nonlinearity embedded in the stochastic volatility setup of the shocks, we
cannot simply employ the Kalman filter as in the case of linearity and normally
distributed shocks. Instead, we employ the Sequential Importance Resampling (SIR)
particle filter, a special application of the more general class of Sequential Monte
Carlo methods, to evaluate the likelihood (Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez,
2007; Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2011b). Given the structure in (2.19) and (2.20)
and some initial value x0, the factorized likelihood of observing xT can be written as
p
(
xT ; Θ
)
=
T∏
t=1
p
(
xt|xt−1; Θ
)
=
∫
p (x1|x0, σ0; Θ) dσ0
T∏
t=2
∫
p (xt|xt−1, σt; Θ) p
(
σt|xt−1; Θ
)
dσt
=
∫ 1
eσ0
√
2pi
exp
[
−12
(
x1 − ρx0
eσ0
)2]
dσ0
×
T∏
t=2
∫ 1
eσt
√
2pi
exp
[
−12
(
xt − ρxt−1
eσt
)2]
p
(
σt|xt−1; Θ
)
dσt , (2.21)
where xt is a (t×1) vector that stacks the observations on x up to time t, Θ stacks the
parameters, and the last equality follows from the assumption of normally distributed
shocks. Although we do not have an analytical expression for p (σt|xt−1; Θ) , t =
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1, . . . , T , and can therefore not compute it directly, we can employ the particle filter
to estimate the likelihood by iteratively drawing from p (σt|xt−1; Θ).
The underlying idea of the particle filter is to use an approximation of the filtering
density p (σt|xt; Θ) with a simulated distribution generated from empirical data. This
distribution can be formed from mass points, or particles,
p
(
σt|xt; Θ
)
'
N∑
i=0
ωitδσit (σt),
N∑
i=0
ωit = 1, ωit > 0 (2.22)
where δ is the Dirac delta function and ωit is the weight attached to the respective
draw/particle σit (Godsill, Doucet, and West, 2004). We can then use a Sequential
Importance Resampling (SIR)-approach to update particles from time t to t+ 1 and
obtain the new filtering distribution at t + 1 (see e.g. Fernández-Villaverde et al.,
2011b). A convenient by-product of this filtering approach is that we also approximate
p (σt|xt−1; Θ), the distribution we need to build the likelihood.
The SIR is a two-step procedure that, by using a prediction and a resampling/filtering
step for each time period, ultimately allows to iteratively draw from p (σt|xt−1; Θ).
Starting with p (σ0|x0; Θ) = p (σ0; Θ), the prediction step uses the law of mo-
tion for the states f(σt+1|σt), equation (2.20), to obtain the conditional density
p (σ1|x0; Θ) = p (ε1) p (σ0|x0; Θ). That is, given N draws
{
σit|t
}N
i=1
from p (σt|xt; Θ),
(here p (σ0|x0; Θ)) and a draw of exogenous shocks εit ∼ N (0, 1), we can use equation
(2.20) to compute
{
σit+1|t
}N
i=1
.24
Next, the resampling/filtering step uses importance resampling to update the
conditional probability from p (σt|xt−1; Θ) to p (σt|xt; Θ). The crucial idea is that if{
σit|t−1
}N
i=1
is a draw from p (σt|xt−1; Θ) and {σ˜it}Ni=1 is a draw with replacement from{
σit|t−1
}N
i=1
using the resampling probabilities
ωit =
p
(
xt|xt−1, σit|t−1; Θ
)
∑N
i=1 p
(
xt|xt−1, σit|t−1; Θ
) , (2.23)
then
{
σt|t
}N
i=1
= {σ˜it}Ni=1 is a draw from p (σt|xt; Θ). The resampling with probabilities
24The notation t+ 1|t indicates a draw at time t+ 1 conditioned on the information available at
time t.
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given in (2.23) serves two purposes. First, the reweighting implements an importance
sampling approach, i.e. draws are obtained from a proposal density that is easy
to draw from and are then subsequently reweighted to reflect the density to be
approximated (see Arulampalam et al., 2002, for a derivation).25 Second, without
the resampling step, there would be an increase in the unconditional variance of ωt
over time, yielding only one particle with non-zero weight (known as degeneracy or
sample impoverishment, see Arulampalam et al. (2002)). By resampling, we keep
only those particles with high ωit (i.e. those that are closer to the true state vector).
Having now obtained draws from p (σt|xt; Θ), we can again start with the prediction
step to obtain draws for time period t+ 1.
After T iterations, we get an estimate of our likelihood as26
p
(
xT ; Θ
)
' 1
N
N∑
i=1
1
eσ0|0
√
2pi
exp
[
−12
(
x1 − ρx0
eσ0|0
)2]
×
T∏
t=2
1
N
N∑
i=1
1
eσt|t−1
√
2pi
exp
[
−12
(
xt − ρxt−1
eσt|t−1
)2]
. (2.24)
Particle Smoother
We employ the backward-smoothing routine suggested by Godsill, Doucet, and West
(2004) to draw from the smoothing density p(σT |xT ; Θ) to get a historical distribution
of the volatilities. Specifically, we start with the factorization
p(σT |xT ; Θ) = p(σT |xT ; Θ)
T−1∏
t=1
p(σt|σt+1:T , xT ; Θ) . (2.25)
The second factor can be further simplified
p(σt|σt+1:T , xT ; Θ) = p(σt|σt+1, xt; Θ)
= p(σt|x
t; Θ)f(σt+1|σt)
p(σt+1|xt)
∝ p(σt|xt; Θ)f(σt+1|σt) , (2.26)
25In our case, we use the prior density p
(
σt|σt−1; Θ
)
as the importance density.
26See Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2007) and Doucet and Johansen (2009) and the
references contained therein for the conditions required for a central limit theorem to apply,
yielding a consistent estimator of p
(
xT ; Θ
)
.
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where the first equality results from the Markovian properties of the model and f
denotes the state transition density following from equation (2.20). Equation (2.22)
describes how to approximate p(σt|xt; Θ) by forward filtering. Therefore, we can
approximate p(σt|σt+1:T , xT ; Θ) ∝ p(σt|xt; Θ)f(σt+1|σt) by
p(σt|σt+1, xT ; Θ) '
N∑
i=1
ωit|t+1δσit(σt) , (2.27)
where the new weights ωit|t+1 are given by
ωit|t+1 =
ωitf(σt+1|σit)∑N
j=1 ω
j
t f(σt+1|σjt )
. (2.28)
and the ωit are the weights obtained in the filtering step. Denote with σ˜it the ith draw
from the smoothing density at time t. At time T, we can obtain draws σ˜iT by drawing
from p(σT |xT ) with the weights ωiT . Then, going backwards in time, we can use the
above recursions to iteratively obtain draws σ˜it by resampling using the weights given
in (2.28).
Tailored Randomized Block Metropolis Hastings Algorithm
Let Θ, p
(
xT |Θ
)
, and pi(Θ) denote the vector of parameters to be estimated, the
likelihood function, and the prior distribution of the parameters, respectively. The
posterior distribution pi(Θ|xT ) can be computed as
pi
(
Θ|xT
)
∝ p
(
xT |Θ
)
pi (Θ) . (2.29)
Given this usually analytically intractable posterior, most macroeconomic applications
employ a Random Walk Metropolis-Hastings (RW-MH) algorithm to generate draws
from the posterior distribution. However, the standard RW-MH algorithm often has
poor mixing properties, leading to highly autocorrelated draws, and is therefore often
very inefficient. Hence, to increase the efficiency, we use the Tailored Randomized
Block Metropolis Hastings (TaRB-MH) algorithm proposed by Chib and Ramamurthy
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(2010).27 Instead of in each iteration step simultaneously drawing an entire new
parameter vector from a proposal density, the parameter vector is randomly split
up into several blocks. Each block is then subsequently updated by a separate MH
run, conditional on the previous step’s values of the parameters in the other blocks.
Ideally, the blocks should be formed according to the correlation between parameters,
with highly correlated parameters belonging to the same block. However, we have
no a priori knowledge about the correlation between parameters and resort to a
blocking scheme where both the number of blocks and its composition are randomized
in each step. This algorithm provides a good compromise between the standard
RW-MH and tailored multiple block MH algorithms that use multiple blocks, which
are particularly designed for the problem at hand. The second feature that improves
on the standard RW-MH is that in each step the proposal density is “tailored” to
the location and the curvature of the posterior density in that block by using a
non-derivative based global optimizer. We deviate from Chib and Ramamurthy
(2010) by using the CMAES algorithm (Hansen, Müller, and Koumoutsakos, 2003)
instead of a simulated annealing as the former has been shown to be more efficient
(Andreasen, 2010).28 Moreover, it requires considerably less tuning than a simulated
annealing. The TaRB-MH algorithm proceeds as follows.
1. At each iteration step n, n = 1, . . . , N , the elements of the parameter vector θ
are separated into random blocks (θn,1, θn,2, . . . , θn,pn) by perturbing their initial
ordering and assigning the first parameter in the perturbed vector to the first
block and each following parameter with probability p = 0.5 to a new block,
leaving us with 2.5 blocks on average as we estimate 5 parameters.
2. At each iteration step n, each block θn,l, l = 1, . . . , pn is sampled by a Metropolis-
Hastings step using a proposal density adapted to the posterior in the following
way. Denote with θn,−l the most current value of all blocks except for the lth
one, i.e. their value at the end of step n− 1. To generate a new draw for θn,l,
27Using the TaRB-MH decreased the inefficiency factors from values around 10 to below 2.
28For an intuitive introduction to the working of the CMAES algorithm, see Binsbergen et al.
(2010).
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the CMAES-algorithm is used to find
θˆn,l = arg max
θn,l
log
[
p
(
xT |θn,l, θn,−l
)
pi (Θ)
]
. (2.30)
That is, we use a global optimizer to maximize the posterior over the current
block l, given the value of all other parameters at the end of step n− 1. Having
found the “conditional mode” θˆn,l, we compute the curvature of the target
posterior distribution in the standard way as the negative inverse of the Hessian
at the “conditional mode”
Vn,l =
−∂ log
[
p
(
xT |θn,l, θn,−l
)
pi (Θ)
]
∂θn,lθ′n,l
−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
θn,l=θˆn,l
. (2.31)
Following Chib and Ramamurthy (2010), we use a multivariate t-distribution
with ν degrees of freedom as proposal density for θn,l, ql
(
θn,l| θn,−l, xT
)
. Mean
and variance are set to the “conditional mode” and the negative inverse of the
Hessian at this point:
ql
(
θn,l| θn,−l, xT
)
= t
(
θn,l| θˆn,l, Vn,l, ν
)
. (2.32)
In the Metropolis-Hastings-step, a proposed value θ∗n,l is accepted as the new
value of the block with probability
αl
(
θn,l, θ
∗
n,l
∣∣∣ θn,−l, xT) = min
p
(
xT |θ∗n,l, θn,−l
)
pi
(
θ∗n,l
)
p (xT |θn,l, θn,−l) pi (θn,l)
t
(
θn,l| θˆn,l, Vn,l, ν
)
t
(
θ∗n,l
∣∣∣ θˆn,l, Vn,l, ν) , 1
 .
(2.33)
If the proposed value θ∗n,l is rejected, we set θn+1,l = θn,l. This step is repeated
for all pn blocks before the algorithm starts over with step 1.
Setting ν = 5 and iterating over steps 1 and 2, we can - after a suitable burn-in-
period - obtain samples from the desired posterior distribution, which is the invariant
distribution of the resulting Markov Chain. In our case, a burn-in of 2500 proved
sufficient.
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Model Solution
Let st denote the ns × 1 vector of state variables in deviations from steady state,
including the exogenous shocks and the perturbation parameter Λ, and let sit denote
its ith entry. The policy function/law of motion for an arbitrary model variable X̂t
then has the form
X̂t =
ns∑
i=1
ξXi s
i
t +
1
2
ns∑
i=1
ns∑
j=1
ξXi,js
i
ts
j
t +
ns∑
i=1
ns∑
j=1
ns∑
l=1
ξXi,j,ls
i
ts
j
ts
l
t , (2.34)
where the ξ’s are scalars that depend on the deep parameters of the model and
hats denote percentage deviations from steady state. Equation (2.34) shows why
lower-order approximations would not be sufficient for our purpose.
As is well known, a first-order approximation exhibits certainty equivalence. This
implies ξXv = 0, where v denotes the position of a volatility shock in the state vector
s. That is, up to first order, uncertainty shocks do not enter the policy function at
all.
For a second-order approximation, it is well known from Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2004) for the homoskedastic case that uncertainty only enters the policy function
through a constant term via the second derivative with respect to the perturbation
parameter, i.e. through ξΛ,Λ 6= 0. However, things are more complicated in the
heteroscedastic case where shocks to the variance occur, leading to an additional
effect. Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramírez (2010) prove
that in this case, the volatility shocks additionally only enter the policy function
with non-zero coefficients in their interaction term with the respective level shock.
Algebraically, only the cross-product of σˆi × νˆi is different from 0. In contrast, all
other cross-terms with the uncertainty shocks are zero, i.e ξXv,j 6=u = 0, where v and
u denote the positions of a volatility and its corresponding level shock in the state
vector s, respectively. Hence, the effect of uncertainty is always mediated through
level shocks. It is not possible to shock the variance of the level shocks independently
from the level shock as its effect would be 0 by construction.
Only in the third-order approximation do the volatility shocks enter the policy
function separately from the level shocks in a non-constant form. Most importantly,
the term ξi,Λ,Λ is in general different from 0 for all volatility shocks.
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Simulated Method of Moments
The idea of the Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) is the following. Let xt
be a time t vector of observables from a stationary and ergodic distribution and
let {xt}Tt=1 be the corresponding sequence. Furthermore, let m (xt) denote a k × 1
vector of empirical moments computed from this data. Denote with {xsimt (θ)}aTt=1 the
corresponding time series of length aT generated from simulating the model using
the p × 1 parameter vector θ ∈ Θ, with Θ ⊂ Rp. Let m (xsimt (θ)) be the vector of
simulated moments computed from the artificial data. The SMM estimator is the
value of θ that satisfies
θ̂ = arg min
θ∈Θ
[
m (xt)−m
(
xsimt (θ)
)]′
W
[
m (xt)−m
(
xsimt (θ)
)]
, (2.35)
where W is a p× p positive definite weighting matrix. Under the assumption that
the model with θ = θ0 is a correct representation of the true process that generated
m (xt) and the regularity conditions spelled out in Duffie and Singleton (1993), θˆ is a
consistent estimator of θ0 with asymptotic distribution
√
T
(
θ̂ − θ0
)
d−→ N
(
0, (1 + 1/τ) (J ′WJ)−1 J ′WSWJ (J ′WJ)−1
)
, (2.36)
where
S = lim
T→∞
V ar
(
(1/
√
T )
T∑
t=1
m(xt)
)
, (2.37)
and J = E(∂m(xsimt )/∂θ) (see Ruge-Murcia, 2010).
This estimator is asymptotically efficient when using the weighting matrix
W =
(
V longrun
)−1
=
[
lim
T→∞
V ar
(
1√
T
T∑
t=1
m (xt)
)]−1
. (2.38)
The ideal weighting matrix places the most weight on the linear combination of
moments that are the most precisely measured in the data. However, for two reasons,
we use only the diagonal of the optimal weighting matrix:
W diag = diag
(
V longrun
)−1
. (2.39)
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2.B Econometric Methods
First, we would like to put more weight on moments that are actually observed in
the data and that are economically meaningful, rather than on a linear combination
of moments (see also Cochrane, 2005). Second, in practice, fully specified weighting
matrices often lead to diverging parameter estimates. As shown in Ruge-Murcia
(2010), using only the main diagonal of the optimal weighting matrix leads to a loss
in efficiency but nevertheless delivers good results in most cases.
The simulation proceeds as follows. Starting at the deterministic steady state, we
simulate the model for 3015 quarters using shocks drawn from the estimated shock
distributions. Shocks larger than two standard deviations are trimmed. To assure
non-explosive behavior of the simulations, we use the pruning algorithm of Kim et al.
(2008). We discard the first 2000 quarters as a burn-in in order to reach the ergodic
distribution. We then use the remaining 1015 quarters to compute the respective
moments. The results are robust to using a longer burn-in period. The choice of
using five times the length of the original data sample (i.e. a = 5) to compute the
moments is motivated by the simulations in Ruge-Murcia (2010), who finds this choice
to deliver a good balance between the precision of the estimates and computation
time.
Impulse Responses
The nonlinearity of our model complicates the computation of impulse responses
compared to linear models. We follow Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011b) and
generate impulse responses as the response to a two standard deviation shock to
uncertainty at the ergodic mean. First, we simulate the model for 2,000 quarters by
drawing shocks from the respective estimated distributions. Shocks larger than two
standard deviations are trimmed to assure convergence, which technically depends on
the shocks being bounded. To assure non-explosive behavior of the simulations, we
use the pruning algorithm of Kim et al. (2008). We discard the first 2,000 quarters as
a burn-in in order to reach the ergodic distribution and use the next 675 quarters to
compute the ergodic mean. Starting at the ergodic mean, we compute the IRFs as
the percentage difference of the respective variables between the system shocked with
the respective shock and the baseline model response, i.e. the model response without
shocks. To account for sampling uncertainty, we generate 50 different IRFs with
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different starting values of the random number generator and take the cross-sectional
average as our impulse response.
GMM
We construct the monetary policy shocks by specifying the Federal Reserve’s policy
reaction function and estimating it by the generalized method of moments (GMM).
Our approach is similar to the one used in Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000), with
the difference that Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) use a forward-looking policy
reaction function, while we use a rule that reacts to contemporaneous variables to
stay consistent with our DSGE-model. Specifically, the policy reaction function to be
estimated is given by
rt = ρrt−1 + (1− ρ) [r¯ + φpi (pit − p¯i) + φyygapt ] + εt , (2.40)
where pit is inflation with target rate p¯i, ygapt is the output gap, rt−1 allows for interest
smoothing, r¯ ist the target nominal interest rate, and εt is an error term. Using
the vector of instruments zt, the set of moment conditions for our GMM estimation
procedure can be written as
E [{rt − ρrt−1 − α− βpit − γygapt } zt] = 0 (2.41)
where α = (1− ρ) (r¯ + φpip¯i) collects all constant terms, β = (1 − ρ)φpi, and γ =
(1− ρ)φy.
Hence, we regress the average effective Federal Funds Rate in the first month of
the quarter on the lagged FFR, the inflation rate, and the output gap, where all rates
are annualized. The set of instruments includes four lags of the FFR, the inflation
rate, the output gap, commodity price inflation, money growth, and the interest term
spread. Because we are only interested in the residuals of the policy reaction function
ε̂t, we do not need to separately identify the target nominal rate r¯ and target inflation
p¯i.
Table 2.9 presents the estimation results, which are all in the range typically
reported in the literature. There is strong evidence of interest smoothing with
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2.C Diagnostics
Table 2.9: GMM Estimation of Taylor Rule
Coefficient Mean Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
ρ 0.898 0.018 48.926 0.000
α 0.001 0.001 0.874 0.383
β 0.1741 0.027 6.361 0.000
γ 0.102 0.017 5.950 0.000
R-squared 0.890 Mean dependent var 0.058
Adjusted R-squared 0.888 Sum squared resid 0.027
S.E. of regression 0.012 J-statistic 18.545
Durbin-Watson stat 2.314 pval(J-statistic) 0.552
Note: Kernel: Bartlett, Bandwidth: Fixed (4), No prewhitening; Simultaneous weighting matrix &
coefficient iteration; Convergence achieved after: 28 weight matrices, 29 total coef iterations.
ρ = 0.898. The point estimates of the feedback parameters are φpi = 1.718 and
φy = 1.003. The test of overidentifying restrictions shows that the model cannot be
rejected at conventional significance levels.
2.C Diagnostics
Testing for Heteroskedasticity
Table 2.10 presents evidence of the need to model time-varying volatility. Despite
our relatively short sample size and the low power of tests for heteroskedasticity, the
null hypothesis of homoskedastic shocks can be rejected at the 10% level for all series
except labor taxes. This result is consistent with evidence that the standard deviation
of structural shocks has changed over time (see e.g. Justiniano and Primiceri, 2008;
Primiceri, 2005).
Convergence Diagnostics
Table (2.11) shows the results from the Geweke (1992)-convergence diagnostics
that compares the means of the first 20% of draws with that of the last 50% of the
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Table 2.10: Tests for Heteroskedasticity
τ k τn z zI g m
White 0.000* 0.932 0.001* 0.042* 0.360 0.068*
WW 0.169 0.523 0.265 0.005* 0.076* 0.068*
BPK 0.004* 0.890 0.126 0.770 0.511 0.298
Notes: Asterisks indicate significance at the 10% level. White refers to the standard White (1980)-
test, WW refers to the Wooldridge (1990)-version of this test, and BPK refers to the Breusch and
Pagan (1979)/Koenker (1981)-test.
draws. In general, all MCMC chains have converged to their stationary distribution
as indicated by the p-values of the χ2-test for equal means. Figures 2.8 to 2.13 show
the corresponding mean plots.
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Table 2.11: Geweke (1992) Convergence Diagnostics
Parameter 4% taper 8% taper 15% taper 4% taper 8% taper 15% taper
Capital Tax Rates Labor Tax Rates
ρ1 0.160 0.165 0.145 0.909 0.890 0.887
ρ2 0.947 0.941 0.937 0.926 0.913 0.904
ρσ 0.623 0.596 0.566 0.648 0.652 0.653
ησ 0.929 0.927 0.919 0.327 0.319 0.271
σ¯ 0.760 0.744 0.738 0.922 0.921 0.917
Total Factor Productivity Investment Specific Technology
ρ1 0.891 0.887 0.879 0.199 0.174 0.124
ρ2 0.679 0.681 0.665 0.353 0.340 0.297
ρσ 0.643 0.615 0.583 0.546 0.534 0.520
ησ 0.456 0.453 0.391 0.638 0.649 0.638
σ¯ 0.772 0.765 0.706 0.304 0.260 0.187
Government Spending Monetary Policy Shock
ρ1 0.608 0.598 0.572 0.192 0.200 0.181
ρ2 0.605 0.606 0.558
ρσ 0.550 0.561 0.562 0.231 0.227 0.155
ησ 0.293 0.267 0.232 0.885 0.870 0.860
σ¯ 0.412 0.402 0.369 0.066 0.078 0.071
Notes: Numbers are p-values of the χ2-test for equal means of the first 20% of draws and the last
50% of the draws (after the first 2500 draws are discarded as burn-in).
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Figure 2.8: Evolution of MCMC Sampler over Time for τ k
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Figure 2.9: Evolution of MCMC Sampler over Time for τn
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Figure 2.10: Evolution of MCMC Sampler over Time for z
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Figure 2.11: Evolution of MCMC Sampler over Time for zI
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Figure 2.12: Evolution of MCMC Sampler over Time for g
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Figure 2.13: Evolution of MCMC Sampler over Time for m
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Model Misspecification Diagnostics
Following Kim, Shephard, and Chib (1998), we can test the specification of our
SV-model. Using N draws from the prediction density p (xt|xt−1; Θ), we can compute
the probability that x2t+1 will be less or equal than the actually observed value of(
xobst+1
)2
:
Pr
(
x2t+1 6
(
xobst+1
)2 ∣∣∣xt ; Θ) ' ut+1 = 1
N
Pr
(
x2t+1 6
(
xobst+1
)2 ∣∣∣xt, σt+1|t ; Θ) , (2.42)
∀t = 1, . . . T − 1. If the SV-model is correctly specified, the sequence of ut converges
in distribution to i.i.d. uniform variables as the number of particles N goes to infinity
(Rosenblatt, 1952). Under the null hypothesis of a correctly specified model, the ut
can be transformed to i.i.d. standard normal variables using the inverse normal CDF.
Hence, we can perform a simple test for misspecification by testing the resulting
series for their normality. Figure 2.14 shows the corresponding QQ-plots.
Table 2.12 presents the results from three commonly used normality tests. In
general, a correct specification of the model tends to not be rejected. Only for z,
the Jarque-Bera and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests reject normality. However, this
effect is driven by the outliers visible in the bottom left corner of Figure 2.14. In
contrast, when shutting off the time-varying volatility and setting the volatility to
its unconditional mean, the specification is generally rejected (results are not shown
here).
Table 2.12: Tests for Model Misspecification
JB KS SW
τ k 0.066 0.039** 0.125
τn 0.141 0.960 0.135
z 0.037** 0.035** 0.085
zI 0.377 0.076 0.586
g 0.500 0.747 0.528
m 0.052 0.377 0.012**
Note: Asterisks indicate significance at the 5% level. JB refers to the Jarque and Bera (1987)-test,
KS refers to the Kolmogorov (1933)/Smirnov (1948)-test, and SW refers to the Shapiro and Wilk
(1965)-test.
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Figure 2.14: QQ-Plots for Model Misspecification
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Notes: From left to right and top to bottom: capital taxes, labor taxes, TFP, investment-specific
technology, monetary policy shocks, and government spending.
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Chapter3
The Business Cycle Effects of Terms of
Trade Uncertainty
3.1 Introduction
The 2006-2008 commodities boom led to an increase in international commodities
prices that was unprecedented not only in magnitude but also in duration and breadth
of commodity groups affected (Baffes and Haniotis, 2010; World Bank, 2011). In
2006, real copper and timber prices more than doubled (see Figure 3.1). At the
height of the boom in 2008, oil prices were 94% higher than a year earlier. Ever since,
analysts have been concerned with how these price changes translate into changes in
international relative prices faced by different countries, i.e. the terms of trade, and
their consequences for the business cycle (see e.g. International Monetary Fund, 2011;
World Bank, 2011). In contrast, less attention has been devoted to the fact that this
commodity price boom has been accompanied by a large increase in price volatility
and that, over the last decades, world-wide commodity and manufacturing prices have
been going through distinct periods of high and low volatility (Arezki, Lederman,
and Zhao, 2011). The right row of Figure 3.1 displays the monthly growth rates of
copper and timber prices, whose average magnitude has significantly risen since 2003.
This suggests that the uncertainty associated with international commodities prices
has increased significantly in the last few years.
That commodities prices are highly volatile is a well known fact: “What com-
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modity prices lack in trend, they make up for in variance” (Deaton, 1999, p. 27).
However, time variation in this variance has mostly been neglected in both public
discussions and academic research. This is surprising since recent research suggests
that changes in uncertainty about macroeconomic variables may be an important
factor in explaining business cycles of advanced (Bloom, 2009) and emerging countries
(Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2011b). I attempt to close this gap by studying the
effects of terms of trade uncertainty, i.e. the time-varying volatility of terms of trade
shocks, on business cycles through the lens of a small open economy DSGE model à
la Lubik (2003), Santacreu (2005), and Monacelli and Perotti (2010). In particular, I
analyze the response of output and its components following an exogenous increase in
terms of trade uncertainty. This exogenous increase in uncertainty is conceptualized
as a mean-preserving spread to the shock distribution.1
The empirical analysis in this study is based on quarterly Chilean aggregate data
from 1996:Q2-2011:Q2. Chile is an interesting case to study the effects of terms of
trade uncertainty for three reasons. First, although the Chilean economy is relatively
diversified,2 commodities compose a significant part of its exports. Hence, its terms
of trade, although not entirely driven by commodities, exhibit significant and well-
documented time-varying volatility. After average annual fluctuations in the terms
of trade of ±10% from 1997 to 2003, they have almost doubled since (Desormeaux,
García, and Soto, 2010). Second, Chile is small enough to plausibly assume that terms
of trade variations are exogenous from its point of view. Of course, on the global
level, changes in the relative price of exported to imported goods reflect changes in
demand and supply conditions for the respective goods. But countries like Chile are
small and do not have sufficient market power to affect prices.3 Hence, in the present
study I do not attempt to identify the underlying shock processes driving the terms
of trade, which may be “standard productivity or demand shocks at the global level
or in large economies, but may also reflect rare events like the OPEC oil embargo,
1Note that, as explained in Chapter 2, this ex-ante effect of higher uncertainty about the future
terms of trade is conceptually different from the ex-post effect of larger shock realizations.
2During the recent commodities price boom, copper exports increased in their importance due to a
large rise in prices, somewhat decreasing the diversification. See Figure 3.9.
3Actually, the assumption of exogenous terms of trade might be valid for most countries. Supporting
evidence comes from Mendoza (1995), who showed that, except for the U.S. and some fuel
exporters, imports and exports do not Granger cause the terms of trade.
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3.1 Introduction
Figure 3.1: World Copper and Timber Prices and Their Monthly Changes
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Notes: Price indices (2005=100) are measured in constant 2005 U.S. dollars; price changes are
measured in percent.
the collapse of planned economies, or natural disasters ” (Mendoza, 1995), or the rise
of China over the last decade. Rather, I consider the terms of trade as a sufficient
statistic for global demand and supply conditions faced by the small open economy.
The third reason that Chile is a well suited case for my analysis is that Chile is a
highly integrated open economy with a flexible exchange rate regime and good data
availability.
My findings are threefold. First, constructing a monthly terms of trade data series
from 1965-2010, I find that there is considerable evidence for time-varying terms of
trade uncertainty in the Chilean data, with the variance of terms of trade shocks
more than doubling in a short period of time. Second, I show that the ex-ante and the
ex-post effects of increased terms of trade uncertainty in total can account for about
one fifth of Chilean output fluctuations at business cycle frequencies. Third, I find
that a two-standard deviation uncertainty shock, corresponding to a 54% increase
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in uncertainty about future terms of trade, leads to a 0.1% drop in output. This
effect corresponds to more than 10% of the output effect of an average positive terms
of trade level shock, which leads to a GDP increase of 0.9%. It is also three to
four times larger than the effect found for political uncertainty in the U.S., another
type of uncertainty that has gained a lot of attention recently (see Chapter 2 and
Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2011a).4 Moreover, while the 54% increase in uncertainty
is representative for the whole terms of trade sample ranging from 1965:1-2010:12, the
fact that terms of trade uncertainty more than doubled during the recent commodities
boom suggests that its actual contribution during this more recent period may have
been substantial.
Regarding the transmission mechanism, the negative output response is mostly
driven by firms in the non-tradable sector choosing higher markups over marginal
costs to avoid being stuck with too low prices when large terms of trade shocks realize.
In contrast, export good producers have less leverage in that the final price of their
bundled good is given by the world market price. Increasing their price too much
would result in the tradable good producer substituting import goods for domestic
export goods. However, the negative effect on output is considerably dampened by
two counteracting effects. First, the precautionary savings motive of the households
leads them to increase their savings in foreign assets by increasing net exports. This
buffer stock of foreign assets only slowly returns to its initial value as the increased
uncertainty subsides. Second, the central bank reacts to the depressing output effects
of increased terms of trade uncertainty and the corresponding deflationary response
of consumer prices by lowering the domestic nominal interest rate. As a results,
the nominal interest rate considerably falls with a peak response of about −1% in
annualized terms.
The current chapter is related to two strands of the literature on terms of trade
effects.5 The first strand considers the effects of level shocks to the terms of trade
on the business cycle. The seminal work is Mendoza (1995), who analyzed business
cycles through the lens of a multi-sector small open economy RBC model with terms
4To put this number into perspective, a GDP drop of 0.1% in the U.S. would correspond to a 0.5
percentage point increase in the Federal Funds Rate (Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2011a).
5It is also related to the literature on the business cycle effects of uncertainty reviewed in Chapter
2.
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of trade shocks. He found that terms of trade shocks can account for 45− 60% of
GDP fluctuations. Kose (2002) extended Mendoza’s model to allow for more factor
mobility between sectors and found that 88% of aggregate output fluctuations can
be explained by world price shocks. In contrast, Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) and
Lubik and Teo (2005) estimate New Keynesian open economy models featuring terms
of trade shocks and find their business cycle contribution to be negligible.
The second strand of the literature from growth theory analyzes the effects of
terms of trade uncertainty on economic growth using panel growth regressions.6
Apart from studying growth instead of business cycles, these studies differ from
the present chapter in that they analyze cross-country variation in terms of trade
uncertainty instead of time-variation within one country. Mendoza (1997) constructs
an endogenous growth model of savings under uncertainty, where the mean and the
variance of the terms of trade determine the savings rate and consumption growth.
Depending on the parameter values, the model either generates positive or negative
effects of terms of trade uncertainty on the consumption growth rate.7
He then argues that the calibration generating negative effects on growth is the
plausible one and uses the structure of his model to show that panel growth regressions
indicate that countries with higher terms of trade risk have lower consumption growth.
Bleaney and Greenaway (2001) show that the conclusions derived by Mendoza (1997)
do not generalize to output growth and that the predicted relationship crucially
depends on the degree of risk aversion. Studying a country sample in sub-Saharan
Africa, which largely depends on commodity exports, they only find weak, marginally
significant evidence for a negative effect of terms of trade uncertainty on output
growth. Dehn (2000a,b) studies the effects of commodity price uncertainty - instead
of the whole terms of trade - on economic growth. Using a similar distinction as in
this chapter, separating “ex-post commodity” shocks from “ex-ante manifestation of
commodity price uncertainty”, he finds that “ex-ante uncertainty” does not exert an
influence on economic growth.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2, I create a monthly terms of trade
6There is also a micro-econometric literature on the effects of exchange rate variability on investment
in developing countries (see e.g. Servén, 2003).
7The welfare effects of higher terms of trade uncertainty are always unambiguously negative
and large, because uncertainty affects the trend growth rate. However, due to its restrictive
assumptions, the model is not suited for business cycle analysis.
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series for Chile and estimate a stochastic volatility process on this series to document
that time-varying uncertainty at business cycle frequencies is an important stylized
fact of the Chilean economy. I then integrate this terms of trade process into a
New Keynesian multi-sector model calibrated to the Chilean economy in Section 3.3.
Section 3.4 presents counterfactual experiments showing the importance of terms of
trade risk for the Chilean business cycle. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Terms of Trade Risk: Empirical Evidence
This section presents empirical evidence on the evolution of both the Chilean
terms of trade and the associated terms of trade risk over time. For this purpose, I
construct a monthly terms of trade series for the last four and a half decades. Fitting
a stochastic volatility model to the cyclical component of the terms of trade, I show
that they have been extremely volatile at business cycle frequencies and that this
volatility has been changing considerably over time.
3.2.1 The Chilean Terms of Trade
To analyze the role of terms of trade risk shocks, I construct a monthly terms
of trade series for Chile ranging from 1965:1 to 2010:12.8 The import price index
is based on two categories: oil and other imports, where other imports are proxied
by the world import unit values9 corrected for oil imports. The export price index
is constructed from nine different world market price series: copper, metal prices,
agricultural raw materials, food commodities, fish meal, beverages, timber, paper
pulp, and industrial goods. These indices represent most of the Chilean exports,
8Construction of this series follows Bennett and Valdés (2001), who construct a chain-weighted
Laspeyres-Index for Chilean import and export prices up to 1999. The importance of accounting
for the changing composition of exports and imports can be seen in the varying export shares
documented in Appendix 3.A. If trade shifts away from highly volatile commodities, using a
fixed basket as in Dehn (2000a) would overstate the actual terms of trade volatility faced by
Chile.
9Unit values are real price measures obtained by dividing an index of current import or export
values by a corresponding volume index, both constructed using balance of payments data.
They are commonly used to measure terms of trade and are usually more reliable than national
account-based price data (Mendoza, 1995).
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Figure 3.2: The Chilean Terms of Trade 1965-2010
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parameter λ = 14,400.
are disaggregated as far as data availability permits, and are deflated using the U.S.
producer price index (PPI). Appendix 3.A details the construction of these indices.
The top row of Figure 3.2 shows the evolution of the Chilean import and export
price indices. Real import prices varied considerably over time, having their trough
in 1970 at about 70 and, after the two clearly visible oil price shocks in 1973/4 and
1979, reach their peak in early 1980. Since then, import prices have still fluctuated
considerably, but have come down from a persistently high level in 1985-1995 to a
level of about 80 during the 2000s. In contrast, real export prices were high at the
beginning and the end of the sample, reaching their peak at about the time of the
first oil price crisis in early 1974, and were relatively low in the meantime. From 1965
to 1985 there seems to be a long-term downward trend in export prices that is masked
by a sequence of short but pronounced spikes. In contrast, the period from 1980
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until the mid-2000s was relatively tranquil at a low price level.10 At the end of the
sample, starting in 2006, export prices picked up again and started fluctuating more,
with the commodities boom and the subsequent financial crisis being clearly visible.
It is important to note that the changes in import and export prices do not merely
reflect oil price changes or changes in the U.S. PPI deflator. Dehn (2000a,b) estimates
commodity price uncertainty indices using a GARCH model and finds that the “high
incidence of shocks in particular years reflects instability in many commodities rather
than oil shocks or deflator shocks” (Dehn, 2000b). While for example the oil price is
directly responsible for the increase in import prices, the world-wide rise in export
prices in 1973/74 visible in the Chilean terms of trade is driven by both adverse
supply shocks and the strong demand from rapidly growing industrialized countries
(Cashin, Liang, and McDermott, 2000).
The bottom row shows the resulting terms of trade series, defined as the relative
price of exports over imports, and their HP-filtered cyclical component, where the
low frequency movements visible in the left panel have been filtered out, because
the analysis of this chapter is confined to business cycle frequencies. The cyclical
component shows that during the 1960s and 1970s Chile faced a sequence of terms of
trade shocks that lead to deviations from the long-term trend of more than ±40%.
Fluctuations of the same magnitude again occurred from 2006 to 2010, with the
Great Recession leading to the largest recorded drop in Chilean export prices during
the considered sample. However, even during the more tranquil intermediate period,
the terms of trade regularly fluctuated by about 15-20%. This substantial change in
the volatility of the terms of trade during the sample period suggests that terms of
trade risk may have potentially played a large role for Chile.
3.2.2 Terms of Trade Risk in the Data
To quantify the terms of trade risk present in the cyclical component, I fit an
AR(2)-process11 with first-order stochastic volatility σtott (see e.g. Shephard, 2008):
10This was not a global phenomenon. For commodity exporters in general there is no consistent
evidence for a lower degree of export price uncertainty compared to the previous period (Dehn,
2000b).
11The sample partial autocorrelation function suggest the presence of two highly significant autore-
gressive roots. As lags 3, 4, and 12 are only marginally significant, I opt for a parsimonious
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log (tott) = ρ1log (tott−1) + ρ2log (tott−2) + eσ
tot
t νtott , ν
tot
t ∼ N (0, 1) (3.1)
σtott = (1− ρσtot) σ¯tot + ρσtotσtott−1 + ξtotεtott , εtott ∼ N (0, 1) , (3.2)
where σ¯tot is is the unconditional mean of σtott . The shock to the volatility, εtott , is
assumed to be independent from the level shock, νtott .
Using a stochastic volatility process to model time-varying uncertainty instead of a
GARCH process implies that uncertainty is exogenous in the sense that there is a
separate stochastic volatility shock process, εtott , that increases the variance of the
error term independently of all other shocks. In contrast, in the GARCH framework,
where the variance equation does not feature a separate shock term but only lagged
level shocks, νtott−i, i > 0, uncertainty would be fully endogenous in the sense that a
higher variance is always caused by past level shocks. Hence, to the degree that part
of the time-varying uncertainty in the data is endogenous, using a stochastic volatility
model will overstate the effect. The present chapter can thus be interpreted as a
thought experiment: what is the effect of terms of trade risk if all the time-varying
volatility is exogenous?
Estimation of (3.1)-(3.2) is performed using Bayesian likelihood-based techniques.
Due to the non-linearity embedded in the stochastic volatility setup of the shocks, I use
the Sequential Importance Resampling (SIR) particle filter to evaluate the likelihood.12
After obtaining the likelihood of the observables given the parameters, I use a Tailored
Randomized Block Metropolis-Hastings (TaRB-MH) (Chib and Ramamurthy, 2010)
to maximize the posterior likelihood. The prior distributions of the parameters, which
are relatively weak, are given in Table 3.1.13 To back out the historical values of the
specification and select two lags.
12Technical details of the algorithms used in this subsection can be found in Appendix 2.B.
13For the autoregressive parameters of the level equation, ρ1 and ρ2, I impose a uniform prior for
each of the corresponding autoregressive roots over the stability region. The autoregressive
parameter for the volatility equation ρσtot is assumed to be Beta-distributed with mean 0.9
and standard deviation 0.1. For the standard deviation of the terms of trade risk shock, ξtot,
a Gamma-distributed prior with mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.1 was imposed. The
unconditional mean of the log-volatility σ¯tot is assumed to be uniformly distributed with mean
−7 and standard deviation 5.3. The posterior distribution was computed from a 30, 500 draw
Monte Carlo Markov Chain using 3, 000 particles, where the first 5, 500 draws were discarded as
burn-in draws. The acceptance rate was 38%.
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latent state σtott given the whole set of observations, the backward-smoothing routine
(Godsill, Doucet, and West, 2004) was used. The smoothed values were computed at
the mean of the posterior distribution using 10, 000 particles.
Table 3.1: Prior and Posterior Distributions of the Shock Processes
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Distribution Mean Std. Dev. Mean 5 Percent 95 Percent
ρ1 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 1.221 1.178 1.264
ρ2 Uniform* 0.00 0.577 -0.348 -0.385 -0.314
ρσtot Beta* 0.90 0.100 0.929 0.913 0.944
ξtot Gamma 0.50 0.100 0.267 0.239 0.297
σ¯tot Uniform -7.00 5.333 -3.423 -3.588 -3.258
Note: Beta* indicates that the parameter divided by 0.999 follows a beta distribution. Uniform*
indicates that the roots of the autoregressive process were estimated instead of the autoregressive
coefficients and followed the specified prior distribution.
The estimation results are presented in Table 3.1. Detailed convergence diagnostics
are shown in Appendix 3.B. In general, all parameters are precisely estimated as
evidenced by the narrow percentiles. Considering that the data is monthly, the
terms of trade show a moderate degree of persistence with the sum of the AR-
coefficients being 0.873. Moreover, the estimated process shows considerable evidence
of uncertainty with ξtot = 0.27. A one-standard deviation terms of trade risk shock
increases the volatility of the terms of trade from 3.3 percent per month by 31 percent
to 4.3 percent per month. With a point estimate of the autoregressive parameter
of 0.93, such an increase in volatility has a half-life of about 9 months. Appendix
3.C shows the results of model misspecification tests applied to the SV model. The
model fits the data well and cannot be rejected at conventional levels.14
Figure 3.3 shows the historical evolution of the latent state σtott derived from
the particle smoother. Terms of trade risk considerably varied over the sample.
Particularly the decade from 1965 to 1975 was plagued by high terms of trade
volatility. At its peak in 1968, the average monthly terms of trade shock had a size of
17%. While this volatility subsequently decreased to a value below its unconditional
14Details about the test can be found in Appendix 2.C. In contrast, a model without stochastic
volatility, i.e. ξtot = 0 is clearly rejected by the data.
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Figure 3.3: Historical Evolution of the Volatility of the Chilean Cyclical Terms of
Trade Component
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mean in 1972, it again peaked at almost 15% about two years later, shortly before
the first oil crisis. From 1979 until 2006 the volatility of the terms of trade shocks
was mostly below its unconditional mean, but still experienced significant but smaller
spikes during the second oil crisis in 1979, in 1987, and in 1997. Since 2006 terms
of trade volatility increased again to an average of about 7.5%, but with temporary
spikes of more than 10%.15
To answer the question whether terms of trade risk was an important factor in
Chilean business cycles, I integrate the estimated terms of trade process into a
calibrated DSGE model. This allows me to conduct policy experiments and to
15Figure 3.3 could also be interpreted as implying two distinct regime shifts around 1975 and
2006. In the absence of a clear interpretation of what these two distinct regimes could be and
what might have caused the regime to shift, I treat the time series as originating from one
stationary stochastic process. Tracing out the implications of potential regime shifts in e.g. a
Markov-switching model is left for future research.
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consider counterfactual economies that do not face terms of trade risk.
3.3 A Small Open Economy Model of the Chilean
Economy
I use a small open economy framework with a non-tradable sector similar to
Lubik (2003), Santacreu (2005), and Monacelli and Perotti (2010). An overview
about the structure is given in Figure 3.4. The model economy is populated by a
representative household, who owns the monopolistically competitive firms in the
domestic intermediate tradable goods sector (indexed by superscript h) and in the
intermediate non-tradable goods sector (indexed by superscript N). Moreover, the
domestic economy features a final good firm producing a consumption/investment
good out of the domestic intermediate non-tradable goods, a homogenous import
good, and a homogenous, domestically produced bundled tradable good. The latter
is produced by a tradable good bundler, which sells its output to both the domestic
final good producer and to the world market. Foreign variables are denoted with an
asterisk. In contrast to e.g. Galí and Monacelli (2005), who consider a semi-small
open economy where the export firms have pricing power in the foreign market, I
consider the case of a small open economy. The domestic economy sells a homogenous
bundled tradable good to the world market and has no pricing power. Hence, it takes
the terms of trade, i.e. the price of exports relative to its imports, as given. Modeling
the terms of trade as an exogenous process is similar to Lubik and Schorfheide (2007).
In their model, firms have pricing power in foreign markets but the terms of trade are
nevertheless specified as being exogenous as a way to deal with model misspecification.
In my framework, only a homogenous export good is exported to competitive world
markets, meaning that the terms of trade are truly exogenous and not a modeling
short-cut. That the assumption of exogenous terms of trade may not be too restrictive
in the Chilean case is suggested by Del Negro and Schorfheide (2009), who compare
a DSGE model to a DSGE-VAR and conclude that modeling the terms of trade as
exogenous is not at odds with the data.16
16Medina and Naudon (2011) use the same exogeneity assumption in their assessment of the
consequences of terms of trade shocks on labor market outcomes.
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Figure 3.4: Structure of the Model Economy
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3.3.1 Household Sector
The representative agent derives utility from consumption Ct and leisure 1− Lt,
where labor Lt = Lht + LNt is supplied to the intermediate tradable goods sector and
the intermediate non-tradable goods sector, respectively. I assume the preference
specification of Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) and allow for habits in consumption:
U = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
Ct − φcCt−1 − ψ (L
h
t +LNt )1+σl
1+σl St
)1−σc
− 1
1− σc ,
where E0 is the mathematical expectations operator, φc ∈ [0, 1] indexes the degree
of internal habit persistence, ψ ≥ 0 scales the disutility of labor, σc is related to the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the household’s risk aversion, and σl is a
parameter governing the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The strength of the wealth
effect on the labor supply is parametrized by the parameter σG in the law of motion
for St
St = (Ct − φcCt−1)σG S1−σGt−1 , (3.3)
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which makes utility non-separable in leisure and consumption.17
The household faces the following budget constraint in real terms:
Ct + Iht + INt +
Bt
PCPI,t
+RERt
Bft
P ∗CPI,t
+ ΦD2 RERt
(
Bft
P ∗CPI,t
− B
f
P ∗CPI
)2
= (3.4)
W ht L
h
t +WNt LNt +RhtKht−1 +RNt KNt−1 +
Bt−1
PCPI,t−1
Rt−1
ΠCPI,t
+RERt
Bft−1
P ∗CPI,t−1
R∗t−1
Π∗CPI,t
+ Ξt .
It uses its income for consumption Ct, investment in the tradable intermediate
good and the non-tradable good sector, Iht and INt , and to invest in financial assets.
Markets are incomplete and the household has access to domestic and foreign bonds,
Bt and Bft , denominated in domestic and foreign currency, respectively, which pay
a gross nominal risk-free rate of Rt and R∗t . PCPI,t and P ∗CPI,t are the foreign and
domestic price levels and ΠCPI,t and Π∗CPI,t the corresponding consumer price gross
inflation rates. RERt = S
nomex
t P
∗
t
Pt
denotes the real exchange rate with Snomext being
the nominal exchange rate. The last term on the left hand side represents the costs of
holding a net foreign asset position, where Bf
P ∗CPI
determines the foreign bond holdings
in steady state and ΦD controls the size of the costs. Following Fernández-Villaverde
et al. (2011b) these costs are assumed to be paid to some foreign international
institution that handles the portfolio for the household.
The household receives income from supplying labor Lht at real wage W ht to the
intermediate tradable good sector and LNt at real wage WNt to the non-tradable
intermediate good sector. Moreover, it owns the firms in the economy and receives
their profits Ξt. The household is assumed to own the capital stock in both sectors,
Kht and KNt , which it rents out to firms at the rental rates Rht and RNt . The law of
motion for the capital stock is given by
Kmt = (1− δ)
(
Kmt−1
)
+ Imt−3 −
φk
2
(
Imt−3
Kmt−4
− δ
)2
Kmt−4,∀m = h,N , (3.5)
17In the absence of habits, with σG = 0 one obtains the preference specification of Greenwood,
Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988), where the wealth effect on the labor supply is completely shut
off, while with σG = 1 the preference specification is identical to the King, Plosser, and Rebelo
(1988)-preferences.
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where 0 < δ < 1 is the depreciation rate. Both sectors have distinct capital stocks with
three periods time to build (Kydland and Prescott, 1982) and Hayashi (1982)-capital
adjustment costs, where φk is a parameter governing the costs of adjustment.18 I
introduce time to build, because the model will be calibrated to monthly frequency
and I want to avoid capital freely relocating from one sector to the other within one
month.19
3.3.2 Final Good Sector
A competitive final good firm produces a final good, Ft, from composite tradable
goods, XTt , and composite non-tradable goods, XNt , using a CES production function
with substitution elasticity η
Ft =
[
(1− ωN)
1
η
(
XTt
) η−1
η + ω
1
η
N
(
XNt
) η−1
η
] η
η−1
, (3.6)
where ωN is the share of non-traded goods in the final good. From the zero profit
condition follows the definition of the final goods price index
PCPI,t =
[
(1− ωN)
(
P Tt
)1−η
+ ωN
(
PNt
)1−η] 11−η
,
where P Tt and PNt are the domestic currency prices of the tradable and the non-
tradable good. The composite non-tradable good XNt is bundled from a set of
i, i ∈ [0, 1] differentiated intermediate non-tradable goodsXNt (i) using a Dixit-Stiglitz
aggregator XNt =
(∫ 1
0
(
XNt (i)
) ε−1
ε di
) ε
ε−1
with substitution elasticity ε. Expenditure
minimization yields the optimal demand for variety i
XNt (i) =
(
PNt (i)
PNt
)−ε
XNt , (3.7)
18Regarding the choice of Hayashi (1982)-capital adjustment costs, see the discussion in Chapter 2.
19Casares (2007) is an earlier paper also using a combination of time to build and a different type
of quadratic adjustment cost. Using only time to build is insufficient to match the typical hump
shaped impulse responses after monetary policy shocks (Casares, 2006).
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where PNt =
(
1∫
0
(
PNt (i)
)1−ε
di
) 1
1−ε
is the aggregate price index for the non-tradable
good.
The tradable goodXTt is a composite of the domestic bundled intermediate goodXht
and the import good Xft , produced using a CES production function with substitution
elasticity ν
XTt =
[
(1− ω) 1ν
(
Xht
) ν−1
ν + ω 1ν
(
Xft
) ν−1
ν
] ν
ν−1
, (3.8)
where ω is the share of the import good in the tradable good. Cost minimization
yields the optimal demand functions
Xht = (1− ω)
(
P ht
P Tt
)−ν
XTt (3.9)
Xft =ω
(
P ft
P Tt
)−ν
XTt , (3.10)
where the composite tradable goods price index is given by
P Tt =
[
(1− ω)
(
P ht
)1−ν
+ ω
(
P ft
)1−ν] 11−ν
(3.11)
and P ht and P
f
t are the domestic currency prices of the domestic intermediate good
and the import good, respectively. This implies that the relative price of tradable
goods to import goods is a function of the exogenous terms of trade:
P Tt
P ft
=
(1− ω)(P ht
P ft
)1−ν
+ ω
 11−ν . (3.12)
3.3.3 Non-tradable Intermediate Good Producers
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive non-tradable good producers
i, i ∈ [0, 1], that produce differentiated goods XNt (i) from capital KNt−1 (i) and labor
LNt (i) using a Cobb-Douglas production function
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XNt (i) =
 zNt
(
KNt−1 (i)
)α (
LNt (i)
)1−α −ΨN , if zNt (KNt−1 (i))α (LNt (i))1−α > ΨN
0, otherwise
,
where zNt is a sector-specific technology shock, α is the capital share in the production
function, and ΨN is a parameter determining the fixed costs of production. I
assume staggered price setting à la Calvo (1983)/Yun (1996): each period, a fraction
1−θN , θN ∈ [0, 1], of firms is able to reset their price. Firms maximize the discounted
sum of profits subject to the demand for their variety i from the final good producer,
equation (3.7).
3.3.4 Tradable Good Bundler
There is a competitive tradable good bundler which bundles the domestic tradable
good Dht from a continuum j of differentiated intermediate tradable goods Xht (j)
using a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator Dht =
(∫ 1
0
(
Xht (j)
) ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
with substitution
elasticity ε. Expenditure minimization yields the optimal demand for variety j of the
domestic intermediate good
Xht (j) =
(
P ht (j)
P ht
)−ε
Dht , (3.13)
where P ht =
(
1∫
0
(
P ht (j)
)1−ε
dj
) 1
1−ε
is the producer price index in the domestic tradable
good sector. The tradable good bundler subsequently sells the bundled good Dht to
the domestic final good producer, which demands Xht , and to the rest of the world,
which demands Xh∗t :
Dht = Xh∗t +Xht .
3.3.5 Intermediate Tradable Good Producers
The differentiated intermediate tradable goods, Xht (j), are produced by a contin-
uum of monopolistically competitive producers j, j ∈ [0, 1], from capital Kht−1 (j) and
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labor Lht (j) using a Cobb-Douglas production function
Xht (j) =
 zht
(
Kht−1 (j)
)α (
Lht (j)
)1−α −Ψh, if zht (Kht−1 (j))α (Lht (j))1−α > Ψh
0, otherwise
,
where zht is a sector-specific technology shock, α is the capital share in the production
function, and ΨT is a parameter determining the fixed costs of production. As in
the non-tradable sector, each period a fraction 1− θh, θh ∈ [0, 1], of firms may reset
their price. Firms able to reset their price do so to maximize their discounted sum of
profits subject to the demand function (3.13).
3.3.6 Market Clearing and Definitions
Market clearing in the final good market and the domestic bundled tradable good
market implies
Ft = Ct + Iht + INt , (3.14)
and
Xht +Xh∗t =
zht
(
Kht−1
)α (
Lht
)1−α −Ψh
Oht
, (3.15)
while market clearing in the non-tradable sector requires
XNt =
zNt
(
KNt−1
)α (
LNt
)1−α −ΨN
ONt
, (3.16)
where the Omt withm = h,N measure the price dispersion introduced in the respective
sectors by staggered price setting. These terms follow the laws of motion
Omt = θmΠεm,tOmt−1 + (1− θm)
(
Πoptm,t
)−ε ∀m = h,N . (3.17)
The law of motion for producer price inflation (PPI) in the respective sectors is
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given by
1 = θmΠε−1m,t−1 + (1− θm)
(
Πoptm,t
)1−ε ∀m = h,N . (3.18)
The consumer price index, ΠCPI,t, is linked to the tradable price inflation and the
sectoral relative price between tradables and non-tradables via:
ΠCPI,t =
(ΠT,t)1−η (1− ωN) + ωN
(
PNt
PTt
)1−η
(1− ωN) + ωN
(
PNt−1
PTt−1
)1−η

1
1−η
, (3.19)
while tradable inflation, ΠT,t, is linked to the domestic intermediate goods PPI and
the terms of trade through
ΠT,t =
[
(Πh,t)1−υ
(1− ω) + ω (tott)1−υ
(1− ω) + ω (tott−1)1−υ
] 1
1−υ
. (3.20)
The terms of trade, tott, are defined as
tott =
P ht
P ft
. (3.21)
The balance of payments implies that the current account equals the change in
international net asset position:
RERt
Bft
P ∗t
= X
h∗
t P
h
t
PCPI,t
−RERtXft +RERt
Bft−1
P ∗t−1
Rft−1
Π∗t
−RERtφD2
(
Bft
P ∗t
− B
∗
P ∗
)2
. (3.22)
Domestic bonds, Bt, are in zero net supply. I assume that the law of one price
holds, i.e. P ft = StP ∗f,t and for simplicity that P ∗f,t = P ∗CPI,t so that I don’t need to
specify an exogenous law of motion for non-tradables prices in the rest of the world.
Domestic total output Yt is given as
Yt = PNt XNt + P ht Dht , (3.23)
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while total domestic investment is defined as
It = INt + Iht . (3.24)
Prices relative to the domestic CPI measured in local currency are denoted with
small letters, i.e.
pNt =
PNt
PCPI,t
, pTt =
P Tt
PCPI,t
, pht =
P ht
PCPI,t
, pft =
P ft
PCPI,t
.
Finally, for the impulse response analysis in Section 3.4.2 it is convenient to define
imports, Imt, and exports, Ext, in terms of CPI prices:
Imt = Xft pft , Ext = Xh∗t pht .
3.3.7 Monetary Policy and Exogenous Processes
Monetary policy is conducted according to a Taylor rule that responds to inflation,
output growth, and the real exchange rate
Rt
R¯
=
(
Rt−1
R¯
)ρR (ΠCPI.t
Π¯CPI
)φRΠ ( Yt
Yt−1
)φRY (RERt
RER
)φRRER1−ρR . (3.25)
This specification is similar to Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) in that the government
reacts to changes in output growth rather than potential output, which typically
cannot be observed. It differs from their specification in that the central bank is
assumed to react to movements in the real exchange rate instead of the nominal
exchange rate to allow for the central bank leaning against deviations of the real
exchange rate from its long-run equilibrium level. This is consistent with Chilean
policy for at least most of the 1990s (Frankel and Rapetti, 2010; Ilzetzki, Reinhart,
and Rogoff, 2008).20 The domestic technology processes and the foreign variables are
assumed to follow exogenous AR(1)-processes
20Medina and Soto (2007) also include this term in their specification of the Chilean central bank’s
monetary policy reaction function. De Gregorio and Labbé (2011) analyze such a rule as it
particularly fits the behavior of the Chilean central bank during the 1990s.
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log
(
zht
)
= ρzlog
(
zht−1
)
+ εhz,t, εhz,t ∼ N
(
0, σ2z
)
(3.26)
log
(
zNt
)
= ρzlog
(
zNt−1
)
+ εNz,t, εNz,t ∼ N
(
0, σ2z
)
(3.27)
log
(
R∗t
R∗
)
= ρR∗log
(
R∗t−1
R∗
)
+ εR∗t , εNz,t ∼ N
(
0, σ2R∗
)
(3.28)
log
(
Π∗t
Π∗
)
= ρΠ∗log
(
Π∗t−1
Π∗
)
+ εΠ∗t , εNz,t ∼ N
(
0, σ2Π∗
)
. (3.29)
Finally, the terms of trade are assumed to follow an exogenous stochastic volatility
process as discussed in Section 3.2. The equations are repeated for convenience:
log (tott) = ρ1log (tott−1) + ρ2log (tott−2) + eσ
tot
t νtott , ν
tot
t ∼ N (0, 1)
σtott = (1− ρσtot) σ¯tot + ρσtotσtott−1 + ξtotεtott , εtott ∼ N (0, 1) .
3.3.8 Model Calibration
The model is calibrated to Chilean data from 1996:Q2-2011:Q2, because this is the
longest sample for which a consistent National Accounts series of nominal private
consumption is available. Unfortunately, in September 1999 the official IMF exchange
rate regime classification changed from managed floating to independently floating.
Regarding Chile’s de facto exchange rate regime, Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2008),
classify Chile’s regime as a “De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal
to +/-5%“ (category 10) from 1992:2 to 2007:12 with a short intermediate period
of “Pre-announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2% “ (category
9) from 1998:9-1999:9 and “Managed floating” (category 12) from 1999:9-2001:12.21
21In particular, from 1992:1 to 1998:6, there was a PPP rule with a de facto band of ±5% to the
dollar. It was replaced by a ±8% preannounced crawling band in December 1998 until a unified
exchange market with a de facto band of ±5% around the U.S. dollar was implemented in 1999:9
(Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff, 2008). In the latter period, exchange rate interventions seem
to have been mostly confined to short periods of turbulence in financial markets: in late 2001
during the Argentinean convertibility crisis, in late 2002 near the presidential elections in Brazil,
during the 2008 financial crisis, and in 2011 to replenish foreign reserves relative to GDP, which
had decreased due to the increase in the denominator (De Gregorio, 2011).
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Table 3.2: Parameter Values of the Theoretical Economy: Structural Parameters
Parameter Value Target/Source Value
Steady state inflation rate ΠCPI 1 Steady state inflation 1
Foreign inflation Π∗CPI 1 Steady state inflation 1
Discount factor β 0.995 Annual risk free rate 3%
Depreciation rate δ 0.0052 I/Y 22.3%
Curvature of labor σl 1.6 Neumeyer/Perri (2005)
Jaimovich/Rebelo preferences σG 0.001 Jaimovich/Rebelo (2009)
Risk aversion σc 5 Neumeyer/Perri (2005)
Consumption habits φc 0.7 Standard value
Labor disutility ψ 14.2757 Hours worked steady state 0.33
Fixed costs tradable sector Ψh 0.1136 Steady state profits 0
Fixed costs non-tradable sector ΨN 0.0742 Steady state profits 0
Price elasticity ε 11 Markup 10%
Capital share α 0.33 Labor share 67%
Price rigidities tradables θh 6/9 Price duration 6 months
Price rigidities non-tradables θN 8/9 Price duration 9 months
Foreign Debt B∗/P ∗CPI -9.02 B∗/Y annual 0.4
Capital adjustment costs φk 800 Relative volatility I/Y
Debt adjustment costs φD 1 Relative volatility Im/Y
Trade price elasticity η 1.1 Relative volatility Ex/Im
Price elasticity non-tradables ν 0.44 Stockman/Tesar (1995)
Weight domestic goods ω 0.3 Total trade share 0.6
Weight tradable goods ωN 0.4 Non-tradables in final good
Taylor rule inflation φRpi 2.85 Del Negro/Schorfheide (2009)
Taylor rule output growth φRy 0.16 Del Negro/Schorfheide (2009)
Taylor rule real exchange rate φRRER 0.3 Covariance ΠCPI,t, Y
Taylor rule interest smoothing ρR 0.8 Del Negro/Schorfheide (2009)
Autocorr. intern. interest rate ρR∗ 0.99 Sample autocorrelation
St.dev. intern. interest rate σR∗ 1.83e-004 Sample standard deviation
Autocorr. foreign inflation ρΠ∗ 0.4136 Sample autocorrelation
St.dev. foreign inflation σΠ∗ 0.0030 Sample average
Autocorr. technology shock ρz 0.95 Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011b)
St.dev. technology shock σz 0.02 Output volatility
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Despite these slight changes in the de facto exchange rate regime, Chile’s exchange
rate regime nevertheless can be broadly categorized as a flexible one for the whole
sample period.22
I calibrate the model to a zero inflation steady state and set both domestic gross
inflation, ΠCPI , and foreign gross inflation, Π∗CPI , to 1 in steady state. The discount
factor is set to generate a 3% risk free rate in steady state as in Medina and Soto
(2007).23
The depreciation rate, δ = 0.0052, is chosen to match the sample mean investment
to output-ratio of 22.3%. Following Neumeyer and Perri (2005), the curvature
parameter governing the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is set to 1.6. The wealth
elasticity of labor supply is chosen to be 0.001 (Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2009), while
the risk aversion parameter is assumed to be 5 as in Neumeyer and Perri (2005). The
habit persistence parameter, φc = 0.7, is set to an intermediate value taken from
the literature. It corresponds to the average estimates typically found in business
cycle studies for a variety of countries like e.g. Sweden (Adolfson et al., 2007, 2008)
and the U.S. (Smets and Wouters, 2007). The labor disutility parameter, ψ, pins the
ratio of hours worked to total hours to one third. Fixed costs in both sectors, Ψm,
are chosen to set profits in steady state to 0 to rule out entry/exit (see Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005). The price elasticity parameter, ε = 11, corresponds
to a steady state markup of 10%. The capital share parameter, α = 0.33, targets
a labor share of 2/3. The Calvo parameter in the non-tradable sector, θN = 8/9,
targets a price duration of 3 quarters. For the tradable sector, which is more exposed
to the terms of trade shocks and would thus adjust prices more frequently in a model
of state-dependent pricing decisions, I assume a price duration of only 2 quarters,
22For a similar categorization of Chile, see Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Végh (2010). I opt to not start
the sample in 1999Q3 because this would leave only 48 quarters of data and increase the risk of
the HP-filter introducing significant artifacts at the beginning and the end of the data set.
23For my sample, constructing the international interest rate as in Fernández-Villaverde et al.
(2011b) and Neumeyer and Perri (2005) as the average real interest rate on three month T-bills
plus the sovereign spread for Chile from the global Emerging Market Bond Index results in a
yearly international interest rate of 1.57%. This low number largely reflects the extended period
of negative real interest rates in the U.S.. Calibrating the model to this interest rate would
imply an unrealistically high discount factor, an annual deprecation rate of less than 4%, and
an unrealistic degree of interest sensitivity. In contrast, using an annual international interest
rate of 3% results in a depreciation rate of 6.24%, which is more consistent with other studies of
Chile that assume 6% (see e.g. Medina and Naudon, 2011; Medina and Soto, 2007).
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corresponding to θh = 6/9.24 I set the steady state level of real foreign bond holdings
to correspond to an average external debt level of 40% of GDP, the sample average
from 1999 to 2009 (Banco Central de Chile, 2010).25 The capital adjustment cost
parameter, φk, and the portfolio adjustment cost parameter, φD, are chosen to target
the investment volatility relative to output and the volatility of imports/exports
relative to GDP. The portfolio adjustment cost parameter, φD, can be interpreted as
a shortcut for a financial friction faced by the domestic economy as in García-Cicco,
Pancrazi, and Uribe (2010).26 There is a large debate about the correct value of the the
trade price elasticity, η, with estimates ranging from 0.9 (Heathcote and Perri, 2002)
up to 2 (Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland, 1994). Hence, I choose the value to match the
relative volatility of imports to exports. Following Stockman and Tesar (1995), the
non-traded goods price elasticity is ν = 0.44, which was their cross-sectional average
for 30 countries. This implies that traded and non-traded goods are complements.
The weight of the bundled domestic tradable goods in the composite tradable good
is ω = 0.3 to generate a steady state ratio of total trade to output of 60%. I choose
the weight of non-tradable goods in the final good to be ωN = 0.4, the middle of the
range found for the share of non-traded goods in final consumption in Stockman and
Tesar (1995).27
Regarding the conduct of monetary policy, the Taylor rule parameters for interest
24Micro estimates typically tend to be smaller. For the Chilean economy, the average price duration
in micro-data is estimated to be around one quarter (Medina, Rappoport, and Soto, 2007).
However, Medina, Rappoport, and Soto (2007) acknowledge that their data contains sales, which
may be responsible for the discrepancy between micro and macro estimates (Nakamura and
Steinsson, 2008). Note that the period for which the model is calibrated is a relatively low
inflation environment, with inflation expectations ranging around the Chilean target rate of
3% (Desormeaux, García, and Soto, 2010). In this environment, the assumption of non-state-
dependent pricing may be a good approximation to state-dependent pricing decisions (Burstein,
2006).
25This sample is restricted by data availability.
26The resulting persistence parameters, which appear quite large even after considering that the
model is calibrated at monthly frequency, reflect the general problem of matching the volatility in
the data given the large variance of the underlying shocks. Medina and Naudon (2011) study the
effect of terms of trade shocks on the Chilean labor market. Their model, using lower adjustment
costs, leads to large fluctuations after a non-mining terms of trade shock that are off by a factor
of four.
27Following Stockman and Tesar (1995), most studies use a larger value of 0.5. But as noted in
their paper, there is evidence for an increase in services trade relative to the service share in
output. For example, finance and insurance were counted as non-tradable goods but have since
arguably experienced a large internationalization.
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smoothing, ρR = 0.8, for inflation feedback, φRpi = 2.85, and output feedback,
φRy = 0.16, are taken from the DSGE-VAR estimates of Del Negro and Schorfheide
(2009). However, their sample ran from 1999:Q1 to 2006:Q4, while my sample also
includes the earlier crawling-band exchange rate period and the two most recent
central bank interventions in the foreign exchange market. Hence, I choose the reaction
parameter to deviations from the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate, φRRER,
to match the covariance of inflation with output. The autocorrelation, ρR∗ , and the
standard deviation, σR∗ , of the international nominal interest rate are computed as
the sample standard deviation and autocorrelation of the 3 month T-Bill rate plus
the EMBI sovereign spread for Chile.28 Similarly, the autoregressive coefficients for
foreign inflation, ρΠ∗ , and its volatility, σΠ∗ , are chosen to match the autocorrelation
and standard deviation of U.S. monthly consumer price inflation. The autoregressive
coefficient, ρz, of the technology processes is set to 0.95 as in Fernández-Villaverde
et al. (2011b) and its standard deviation is set to match output volatility. Finally, I
assume that PCPI,0 = P ∗CPI,0, i.e. that the steady state price levels in the beginning
of time were the same, which together with the normalization of the terms of trade
implies RER = 1 in steady state.
3.4 The Aggregate Effects of Terms of Trade
Uncertainty
Due to the inherent nonlinearity embedded in the stochastic volatility process, the
terms of trade volatility shocks only enter the model’s policy functions independently
from the level shocks at third order. Hence, the model is solved using a third order
perturbation to the policy function.29 Given the solution to the model, I simulate
the model in Section 3.4.1 in order to compare empirical and model moments and
28This concept of the international interest rate available to the small open economy is the same
as in Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011b), except that I consider nominal interest rates. Data
availability for the EMBI spread limits the sample for this series from 1999:5 to 2011:9.
29For details see Appendix 2.B. Using a non-linear solution to the model of the previous section is
also compatible with the finding of De Gregorio and Labbé (2011) that the relationship between
copper price volatility and GDP growth volatility fluctuated over the past 30 years. Due to the
nonlinearity of the model, all exercises in this section are conducted starting at the mean of the
ergodic distribution, which is approximated by the mean over 2000 simulation periods.
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to quantify the importance of time-varying terms of trade volatility on the Chilean
business cycles. In Section 3.4.2 I then conduct an impulse response function analysis
and conduct policy experiments to trace out the role of the ex-ante terms of trade
uncertainty effect and its transmission in the economy.
3.4.1 The Effects of Time-Varying Volatility
Table 3.3 compares the empirical data moments for the Chilean economy over
the sample from 1996:Q2 to 2011:Q2 with the moments generated by the model
under its baseline parametrization. Model moments are computed from the quarterly
aggregates of the model’s monthly variables over a time series 10 times the length
of the empirical data, i.e. 620 quarters. Following the convention in the terms of
trade literature (see e.g. Mendoza, 1995), all components of GDP are measured in
import prices.30 The model fits the data quite well. Consumption is a bit too volatile,
but is still the least volatile component of output, although it was not explicitly
targeted. In contrast, net exports are not volatile enough. The reason is that imports
in the model are about as pro-cyclical as exports, leading to a-cyclical net exports.
In contrast, Chilean net exports are positively correlated with output measured in
import prices. This mirrors the too pro-cyclical behavior of imports.31 The model
actually shares this weakness with the models of Mendoza (1995) and Kose (2002),
which also generate consistently too low correlations between the trade balance and
GDP measured in import prices.
The volatility of CPI inflation, which was also not explicitly targeted, is at 1.66%
a bit above the value in the data, suggesting that higher nominal rigidities like
sticky wages might be required to better match inflation volatility. However, the
autocorrelation of inflation is almost exactly on target. The covariance of the other
variables with output is better matched, although the model generates somewhat
30This convention together with the terms of trade fluctuations explains for example the high
quarterly volatility of output. For comparison, Mendoza (1995) reported an annual cyclical
volatility of output measured in import prices of 24.18% for Chile from 1965-1990 and of 9.61%
for the U.S. during the same sample.
31A well-known stylized fact of international business cycles is that net exports, measured as nominal
exports minus nominal imports over nominal GDP, tend to vary counter-cyclically with real
GDP for most countries and time periods (see e.g. Backus and Kehoe, 1992; Neumeyer and Perri,
2005). In Chile this correlation is a-cyclical with −0.07.
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too much co-movement. In contrast, the persistence of the cyclical component of the
individual variables, except for net exports, is a bit too low.32 Finally, the simulated
model generates a net export share of 4.2% compared to 4.7% in the data (not shown
in the table).
Table 3.3: Model and Empirical Moments: Benchmark Calibration
Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data
σ(xt) σxt/σyt ρ(xt, yt) ρ(xt, xt−1)
Y 7.80% 7.42% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.53 0.77
C 7.13% 5.59% 0.91 0.75 0.99 0.82 0.56 0.69
I 9.45% 8.22% 1.21 1.11 0.96 0.57 0.58 0.80
Ex 10.04% 9.34% 1.29 1.26 0.90 0.86 0.35 0.82
Im 7.57% 7.38% 0.97 0.99 0.97 0.49 0.59 0.77
NX 2.43% 2.99% 0.31 0.40 -0.01 0.60 0.99 0.72
ΠCPI 1.66% 1.30% 0.21 0.18 0.22 0.17 0.04 0.05
Notes: Time Series xt are output (Yt), consumption (Ct), investment (It), exports (Xft ), imports
(Xht ), and net exports (NXt), all measured in import prices, and CPI inflation ΠCPI . All variables
are logged (except for NX) and detrended using a HP-filter with smoothing parameter λ = 1600.
Given the calibrated model at hand, one can now quantify the contribution of
terms of trade risk to the business cycle. Table 3.4 shows the moments from a
counterfactual model economy where the stochastic volatility in the terms of trade
has been shut off, i.e. ξtot = 0. In this case of no ex-ante terms of trade uncertainty
and no ex-post realizations of larger shocks, output volatility drops by two percentage
points, mostly driven by a drop in the investment volatility. In contrast, export
volatility decreases relatively less compared to the other GDP components, with the
result that the relative volatility of net exports increases. This suggests that agents
in an economy facing large terms of trade risk use exports to insulate themselves
against these movements.
32To some degree, this reflects the general problem of DSGE-models mostly driven by a single
exogenous shock process to generate the correct idiosyncratic movement of variables beyond
their co-movement with output (Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992; Nakamura, 2009).
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Table 3.4: Model and Empirical Moments: No TOT Risk
Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data
σ(xt) σxt/σyt ρ(xt, yt) ρ(xt, xt−1)
Y 5.96% 7.42% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.52 0.77
C 5.44% 5.59% 0.91 0.75 0.99 0.82 0.56 0.69
I 7.27% 8.22% 1.22 1.11 0.94 0.57 0.58 0.80
Ex 8.20% 9.34% 1.37 1.26 0.86 0.86 0.32 0.82
Im 5.79% 7.38% 0.97 0.99 0.96 0.49 0.58 0.77
NX 2.44% 2.99% 0.41 0.40 -0.01 0.60 0.99 0.72
ΠCPI 1.47% 1.30% 0.24 0.18 0.20 0.17 -0.01 0.05
Notes: Time Series xt are output (Yt), consumption (Ct), investment (It), exports (Xft ), imports
(Xht ), and net exports (NXt), all measured in import prices, and CPI inflation ΠCPI . All variables
are logged (except for NX) and detrended using a HP-filter with smoothing parameter λ = 1600.
3.4.2 Impulse Response Analysis
Figure 3.5 depicts the impulse response functions after a two standard deviation
terms of trade uncertainty shock.33 As can be seen in the bottom row, the standard
deviation of the terms of trade shock increases by about 54%, while the level of the
terms of trade stays constant. Hence, the response of the other variables is solely
due to the ex-ante effect of a wider shock distribution from which future shocks are
drawn. The top row shows that such an increase in terms of trade uncertainty leads
to a 0.1% drop in output. Initially, this drop is mostly driven by an immediate drop
in investment, which then recovers over the following year, followed by a period of
overshooting. This behavior of investment is similar to the one reported by Bloom
(2009) for the case of an uncertainty shock to idiosyncratic productivity in the United
States. The investment response pattern in the two sectors (not shown here) is
about the same as the aggregate response, given the symmetric technology, the
complementarity between traded and non-traded goods and the constant relative
price between export and import goods. At the same time, consumption also drops
and reaches its trough at more than −0.1% after about 8 months. The drop in output
affects both tradable and non-tradable goods due to the complementarity between
33Appendix 2.B describes the construction of the impulse response functions.
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both.
Looking at the domestic use of tradable and non-tradable goods, XTt and XNt , we
see an expenditure switching effect with domestic use of the non-tradable good XNt
falling more than the use of the tradable good XTt . This expenditure shift reflects
an increase in the relative price of non-tradables pNt , while the price of tradable
pTt drops. The reason for non-tradable goods becoming more expensive compared
to tradable goods is that the domestic producers of non-tradable goods have more
leverage in setting higher markups to self-insure against future demand changes. For
them, it is better to increase their markup when facing large uncertainty about future
terms-of-trade, because a too low price set today would be associated with potentially
selling a higher amount of goods at a loss tomorrow. In contrast, setting too high
a price only results in selling fewer goods at a price still well above marginal costs.
This is also the mechanism responsible for the negative effect of fiscal uncertainty in
Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011b).34 In contrast, export good producers have less
leverage in that the final price of their bundled good is given by the world market
price. Increasing their price too much would result in the tradable good producer
substituting import goods for domestic export goods.
Moreover, agents on impact decrease domestic absorption through importing less
of the foreign import good Xft and exporting more of the domestic tradable good Xht .
They do this to immediately build up a buffer stock of foreign bonds by increasing
net exports. This buffer stock of about 0.2% of GDP only slowly returns to its
initial value as the increased uncertainty subsides. Hence, the precautionary motive
to self-insure against increased uncertainty dampens its negative output effects by
necessitating an increase in domestic production of the export good. It also assures
that production of the export good cannot fall too much as otherwise the buffer stock
of foreign capital would be drawn down too fast. Labor in both sectors (omitted for
brevity) reflects this differential change in production, with lN falling by −0.15% at
its trough after 7 months and lh initially increasing by 0.16% to produce the increased
amount of exports.
At the same time the terms of trade uncertainty shock acts deflationary, with
34It is also related to the work of Basu and Bundick (2011), who show that time-varying markups
are key to generating negative responses to uncertainty shocks in closed economy DSGE-models
with convex adjustment costs.
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Figure 3.5: Impulse Responses to a Two-standard Deviation Terms of Trade Uncer-
tainty Shock
20 40
−0.08
−0.05
−0.02
0.01
0.04
Y
20 40
−0.1
−0.07
−0.04
C
20 40
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
I
20 40
−0.1
0.1
0.3
Ex
20 40
−0.12
−0.08
−0.04
Im
20 40
−0.1
−0.07
−0.04
XN
20 40
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
XT
20 40
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
LN
20 40
−0.05
0.025
0.1
Lh
20 40
0
4
8
NX/Y
20 40
−0.05
−0.035
−0.02
RER
20 40
−0.08
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
R
20 40
−0.04
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
Π
cpi
20 40
0.01
0.03
0.05
pN
20 40
−0.04
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
pT
20 40
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
B*
20 40
−0.5
0
0.5
tot
20 40
0
20
40
60
σtot
Notes: Level shocks are held constant. All responses are in percent, except for ΠCPI and R, which
are in percentage points.
monthly inflation decreasing by 0.04% or about 0.5% percentage points on an annu-
alized basis. The central bank reacts to these depressing output effects of increased
terms of trade uncertainty and the corresponding deflationary response of consumer
prices by lowering the domestic nominal interest rate, which considerably falls. The
peak response after 8 months is almost −0.08% or about one percentage point in
annualized terms.
Hence, the central bank mitigates the negative effects of terms of trade uncertainty
by expansionary monetary policy, in whose absence the output drop would be much
larger. This can be seen in Figure 3.6, where the central bank’s response to output
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growth and real exchange rate deviations from the long run-equilibrium has been shut
of, i.e. φRy = φRRER = 0. In general, the shape of the impulse responses is the same
as in the baseline case. However, the magnitude of the responses is considerably larger.
Output drops by almost 0.3%, driven by significant decreases in consumption and
investment. The larger response of the aggregate variables is driven by large changes
in relative prices. In contrast, the nominal interest rate and inflation responses
have about the same magnitude as before. This reflects the fact that the Taylor
rule describes the off-equilibrium response of the central bank. Rational economic
agents anticipate this behavior and choose their actions accordingly. As a result, in
equilibrium interest rates and inflation may be observed to be (almost) the same as
under an alternative policy rule.35
The dampening effect of monetary policy observed in the baseline case in Figure
3.5 is an example of the result shown in Bachmann and Bayer (2011) that general
equilibrium responses of wages and interest rates often considerably attenuate the
output effects of uncertainty shocks. This is the same effect that was also shown to
be at work in Chapter 2, where is was responsible for the small effects of policy risk.
An output response of 0.1% for about 1 year might seem small. However, to put this
number into perspective, it is three to four times the effect of a joint policy risk shock
in the United States (see Chapter 2) and comparable to a 50 basis points increase
in the Federal Funds Rate or twice the effect of Quantitative Easing (Fernández-
Villaverde et al., 2011a). Moreover, Figure 3.3 in Section 3.2 suggests that there may
be periods in which uncertainty about terms of trade can be a lot more important.
The simulated increase in uncertainty by 54% is rather representative for the time
in the middle of the sample, where volatility fluctuations were relatively subdued.
In contrast, at the beginning and the end of the sample, the volatility more than
doubled in a short period of time, suggesting that the importance of terms of trade
uncertainty may have been a lot larger during these periods.
The impulse responses to the level shocks show that the model behaves in the
35This result underlies Cochrane (2011a), who criticizes single-equation estimation and identification
of Taylor rules based on this potential observational equivalence in equilibrium. As discussed in
the online appendix to his paper, one way to circumvent the identification issue is to look at
the equilibrium response of variables other than inflation and the nominal interest rate, because
their behavior may be different under alternative policy rules. This phenomenon is clearly visible
in Figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.6: Impulse Responses to a Two-standard Deviation Terms of Trade Uncer-
tainty Shock with φRy = φRRER = 0
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expected way consistent with the previous literature. Figure 3.7 depicts a one standard
deviation terms of trade level shock, corresponding to an increase of the price of
export goods relative to import goods by 4%. All aggregates measured in import
prices (top row) increase significantly. The aggregate GDP components are plotted
in import prices for better comparability to the results in the literature on terms
of trade shocks like e.g. Mendoza (1995). With a value of about 1, the “output
multiplier” of the terms of trade shock is somewhat larger in my model than the
0.6 in Mendoza’s model. His lower terms of trade multiplier reflects i) the higher
elasticity of substitution between tradables and non-tradables, ii) the higher share
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Figure 3.7: Impulse Responses to a One-standard Deviation Terms of Trade Level
Shock
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of non-tradables assumed in his model which tends to dampen the role of the terms
of trade, and iii) the accommodating response of monetary policy that lowers the
nominal interest rate when the inflation rate and the real exchange rate drop.
In terms of CPI prices, the GDP response depicted in the left panel of the second
row is 0.9% at its peak, showing that much of the change in output at import prices
reflects the higher purchasing power of domestic export goods. Net exports as a share
of GDP initially drop due to an increase in the denominator that is stronger than
the numerator as exports react sluggishly. But subsequently, the higher purchasing
power of exports dominates and the trade balance turns positive with the agents
building up a higher net foreign asset position (omitted for brevity) on which they
draw upon in the following periods when the shock subsides to fund part of their
increased imports. Due to complementarity between domestic and foreign goods,
domestic use of both tradable and non-tradable goods increases. The use of tradable
goods rises relatively more due to the fall in the relative price of tradables brought
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about by the positive terms of trade shock as the cost of imports decreases.
Figure 3.8: Impulse Responses to a One-standard Deviation Technology Shock in the
Non-tradable Sector
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Finally, Figure 3.8 shows the impulse responses to a sectoral TFP shock in the
non-tradable sector. As a result, output, consumption, and investment increase.
Consistent with Galí (1999), the correlation between technology and labor in the
sector affected by the TFP shock is negative. Due to price rigidities, labor partially
reallocates to the tradable sector, whose goods are in relatively high demand as
evidenced by the increase in the relative price of tradables. In contrast, the relative
price of non-tradables, pNt , falls. The move of labor from the production of non-
tradables to tradables leads to a substitution of domestic export goods for import
goods in the production of tradable goods, which is reflected in an initial fall of both
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imports and exports. Because imports fall relatively more than exports, the net result
is an increase in net exports. The impulse responses to a technology shock in the
tradable sector are similar and omitted for brevity.
3.5 Conclusion
The current chapter has shown that terms of trade uncertainty is an important,
yet underappreciated factor for explaining business cycles in small open economies.
For the case of Chile, I have presented evidence for considerable time-variation in
the volatility of terms of trade shocks, with the variance more than doubling during
the recent commodities boom of 2006-2008. Using a calibrated open economy DSGE-
model I have shown that the ex-ante and ex-post effects of time-varying terms of trade
uncertainty can account for about 20% of business cycle fluctuations. An average
exogenous increase in uncertainty of 54% leads to a decrease in output of −0.1%, a
magnitude comparable to an exogenous 50 basis points increase in the Federal Funds
rate for the United States.
The negative output effect after such an exogenous uncertainty shock was shown
to be driven by the price-setting behavior of firms, who increase their markups.
The reason for the relatively mild recession generated by an increase in terms of
trade uncertainty was a dampening effect due to both the household’s precautionary
motive and the central bank’s interest rate response. The fact that the terms of
trade volatility more than doubled during the recent commodities boom suggests that
terms of trade uncertainty may have been an important factor during this period.
The present study was concerned with the positive analysis of terms of trade
uncertainty effects. The normative analysis whether terms of trade uncertainty
leads to significant welfare losses or is associated with welfare gains and how the
optimal policy response function of the central bank should look like is left to future
work. Dib (2008) is a first study in this direction, showing in an estimated model of
the Canadian economy that permanently higher terms of trade uncertainty under
flexible exchange rates may be welfare increasing due to positive Hartman-Abel effects.
Moreover, future work should explore the consequences of terms of trade uncertainty
in a production structure of the Melitz (2003) and Ghironi and Melitz (2005)-type.
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Here, increased uncertainty about export prices in combination with entry costs may
lead to compositional changes in production and thereby affect aggregate productivity.
This might lead to additional output effects not considered in the present chapter.
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3.A Data Appendix
This section details the construction of the Chilean terms of trade index and the
data sources for computing the business cycle moments.
3.A.1 Terms of Trade Index
Data series for the terms of trade construction were taken from Datastream,
except. The prices for oil, fish meal and wood pulp were downloaded from the
Chilean central bank at: http://www.bcentral.cl/eng/economic-statistics/series-
indicators/xls/Precio_Cobre__HPescado_Petrol_Celulosa%20.xls.
Datastream mnemonics are provided in brackets.
Import Price Index
For the Import Price Index, the following series were used:
1. World market price oil 1960-1986, US$, 2005=100 (Source: IMF IFS): UK
MARKET PRICE INDEX - UK BRENT (741120363)
World market price oil 1986-2011, US$/bb. (Source: Chilean Central Bank):
PETROLEO
2. World import unit values, US$, 2005=100: WD IMPORT UNIT VALUES (IN
US$ TERMS) (740010147)
3. Share of oil imports in total imports (Source: Worldbank): WD FUEL IM-
PORTS (% OF MERCHANDISE IMPORTS) (504009709)
The import price series is generated in several steps. First, an oil price series, P oilt is
constructed through splicing the two oil price series. For this purpose, the second
series measured in U.S. $ is rebased to 2005=100 and then concatenated. Second,
the World import unit values series, PWorldImt , is purged of the effect of oil prices by
subtracting the Share of oil imports in total imports, st, for the respective month
times the price of oil. As the Share of oil imports in total imports is only available at
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annual frequency, st is linearly interpolated. The final nominal import price index,
P f∗t , is constructed by assuming a log linear specification with the weights given by
the share of oil imports in total world imports:
log
(
P f∗t
)
= stlog(P oilt ) + (1− st) log
(
PWorldImt
)
Export Price Index
For the Export Price Index, the following series were used:
1. Copper price, US$/pound (Source: Chilean Central Bank): BML price of refined
copper (dollars/pound)
2. Metal price index, US$, 2005=100 (Source: IMF IFS):WD MARKET PRICE
INDEX - METALS INDEX (WDI76AYDF)
3. Agricultural raw materials price index, US$, 2005=100 (Source: IMF IFS):WD
COMPOSITE PRICE INDEX - AGRICULTURAL RAWMATERIALS (WDI76BXDF)
4. Food commodities price index, US$, 2005=100 (Source: IMF IFS): WD COM-
POSITE PRICE INDEX - FOOD COMMODITIES (WDI76EXDF)
5. Fish meal price index, 1960-1986, US$, 2005=100 (Source: IMF IFS): PE
MARKET PRICE INDEX - FISHMEAL (PEI76Z.DF)
Fish meal price index, 1987-2011, US$/T.M.B. (Source: Chilean Central Bank):
HARINA DE PESCADO
6. Beverage price index, US$, 2005=100 (Source: IMF IFS): WD COMPOSITE
PRICE INDEX - BEVERAGES (WDI76DWDF)
7. Hardwood/Sawnwood/Logs price index, 1965-1970, US$, 2005=100 (Source:
IMF IFS): PHMARKET PRICE INDEX - PLYWOOD. PHILIPPINES (TOKYO)
(PHI76WXDF)
Hardwood/Plywood/Logs price index, 1970-2011, US$, 2005=100 (Source: IMF
IFS): HARDWOOD SAWNWOOD:MALAYSIA (54876RMD)
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8. Wood pulp/cellulose price index, US$, 2005=100 (Source: IMF IFS): FN
EXPORT PRICE - NEWSPRINT UNIT VALUE (FNI74ULDF)36
Wood pulp/cellulose price index, 1987-2011, US$/T.M.B. (Source: Chilean
Central Bank): CELULOSA BLANQUEADA
9. Industrial goods price index, US$, 2005=100 (Source: IMF IFS): TC EXPORT
UNIT VALUES (IN US$ TERMS) (TCI74..DF)
All series that need to be concatenated are spliced in the way described for the import
price index. The export shares are based on the linear interpolation of annual export
shares, computed as the fraction of the export value of the respective category in
the value of all categories. Data is taken from the annual nominal national accounts.
Computation of the Laspeyeres-Index follows Bennett and Valdés (2001). Finally, the
nominal indices are deflated using the U.S. Producer Price Index (2005=100, Source:
IMF IFS, US PPI (USI63...F)).
3.A.2 Moment Comparison
The nominal National Accounts data series for Chile were taken from the Statistics
Database → Section National Accounts → GDP expenditure and income →GDP
expenditure, at current prices, spliced series, 2003 base (millions of pesos).
The real National Accounts data series were taken from the Statistics Database →
Section National Accounts → GDP expenditure and income → GDP expenditure, at
constant prices, spliced series, 2003 base (millions of pesos).
36Due to the non-availability of the Merrill Lynch price index used in Bennett and Valdés (2001)
for the period 1970-1986, I use the series provided by the IMF until 1986.
147
Figure 3.9: Export Price Index – Price Components and Basket Shares
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3.B Convergence Diagnostics
A description of the convergence diagnostics can be found in Appendix 2.C.
Table 3.5: Convergence Diagnostics
Parameter 4% taper 8% taper 15% taper
Government Spending
ρ1 0.377 0.449 0.494
ρ2 0.597 0.658 0.695
ρσtot 0.850 0.863 0.866
ξtot 0.737 0.759 0.767
σ¯tot 0.937 0.938 0.930
Notes: Numbers are p-values of the χ2-test for equal means of the first 20% of draws and the last
50% of the draws (after the first 5500 draws are discarded as burn-in).
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Figure 3.10: Evolution of MCMC Sampler over Time.
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3.C Misspecification Tests
A description of the misspecification test performed can be found in Appendix 2.C.
Table 3.6: Tests for Model Misspecification
JB KS SW
Stochastic Volatility Model 0.500 0.274 0.940
OLS, ξtot = 0 0.001 0.000 0.000
Note: Bold number indicate significance at the 5% level. JB refers to the Jarque and Bera
(1987)-test, KS refers to the Kolmogorov (1933)/Smirnov (1948)-test, and SW refers to the Shapiro
and Wilk (1965)-test.
Figure 3.11: QQ-plot for Model Misspecification
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